On june 24, 2003, at a Camp David meeting with President General Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan, President George W Bush declared that key al Qaeda terrorists had been successfully neutralized thanks to "the efecctive border security measures and law enforcement cooperation throghout (Pakistan), and ... to the leadership of President Musharraf.

Following a fascinating debate that ranged from bullet-proof hosting to onion-routing, the conclusion had to be that the cyber security threat was evolving rapidly and was touching all aspects of society. Its political importance is also increasing and in a cyber society that “has no rules or borders”, according to Estonia’s Minister of Defence Jaak Aaviksoo, there is a need for improved coordination at the highest level.

U.S. law requires the Secretary of State to provide Congress, by April 30 of each year, a full and complete report on terrorism with regard to those countries and groups meeting criteria set forth in the legislation. This annual report is entitled Country Reports on Terrorism. Beginning with the report for 2004, it replaced the previously published Patterns of Global Terrorism.

U.S. attention to terrorism in Latin America intensified in the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, with an increase in bilateral and regional cooperation. In its April 2007 Country Reports on Terrorism, the State Department highlighted threats in Colombia, Peru, and the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. There were no known operational cells of Islamic terrorists in the hemisphere, but pockets of ideological supporters in the region lent financial, logistical, and moral support to terrorist groups in the Middle East. Cuba has remained on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1982, which triggers a number of economic sanctions. In May 2007, for the second year in a row, the Department of State, pursuant to Arms Export Control Act, included Venezuela on the annual list of countries not cooperating on antiterrorism efforts. Congress fully funded the Administration’s FY2008 request for $8.1 million in Anti-Terrorism Assistance for Western Hemisphere countries in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2008 (P.L. 110-161). In the first session of the 110th Congress, the House approved H.Con.Res. 188, which condemned the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association in Buenos Aires, and H.Res. 435, which expressed concern over the emerging national security implications of Iran’s efforts to expand its influence in Latin America, and emphasized the importance of eliminating Hezbollah’s financial network in the triborder area. The Senate also approved S.Con.Res. 53, which condemned the hostagetaking of three U.S. citizens for over four years by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, while a similar resolution, H.Con.Res. 260, was introduced in the House.

Osama bin Laden had ambitious plans to follow up the attacks of September 11, 2001. He and his top aides expected that an invasion of Afghanistan would follow their “Manhattan Raid” and welcomed it as a chance to ensnare the US in what they hoped would become a bloody quagmire.

The Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip in August 2005 created a new situation which accelerated the establishment of an area fully controlled by Hamas. It was quick to use its increased military power to make political capital in internal Palestinian affairs. It won the Palestinian Legislative Council elections in January 2006 and formed the government the following March. In June 2007 Hamas carried out a putsch in the Gaza Strip, neutralized Fatah and the Palestinian Authority’s military and political power and set up a radical Muslim entity in the Gaza Strip, nicknamed Hamastan. The new entity, supported and aided by Iran and Syria, directs its own internal and foreign affairs, conducts a terrorist campaign against Israel and has divorced itself from the PA in Judea and Samaria, led by Abu Mazen and Fatah.

El 20 de marzo de 2008, la policía de la Federación de Bosnia y Herzegovina (BiH) arrestó a cinco personas en Sarajevo y Bugojno (Bosnia Central) bajo cargos de tenencia ilegal de una gran cantidad de armas y explosivos y la sospecha de planear actos terroristas. La prensa ha identificado a los cinco detenidos como seguidores del "movimiento wahhabi radical" de BiH. Estas últimas detenciones han hecho saltar numerosas alarmas y han vuelto a centrar la atención internacional en BiH y en la presencia en dicho de país de células terroristas que puedan poner en peligro la estabilidad y seguridad, no sólo de BiH, si no la de toda Europa. El objetivo de este análisis es el de ofrecer una imagen tan real como sea posible acerca de la situación actual de los movimientos yihadistas en BiH.

Durante la Cumbre de Río, Uribe mostró evidencia a Felipe Calderón de que al menos cinco ciudadanos de su país estaban en el campamento donde fue abatido el guerrillero 'Raúl Reyes'.

On March 9, 2008, the London Sunday Times published an interview held in Gaza City by correspondent Marie Colvin, who met with a senior operative belonging to the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’s terrorist operative wing. He was accompanied by an operative from Hamas’s weapons manufacturing wing, whose job is putting together explosive mixtures for use in Qassam rockets. The senior operative was speaking on the record but preferred to remain anonymous (although his physical description appears in the article).

Confer further powers to gather and share information for counter-terrorism and other purposes; to make further provision about the detention and questioning of terrorist suspects and the prosecution and punishment of terrorist offences; to impose notification requirements on persons convicted of such offences; to amend the law relating to asset freezing proceedings under United Nations terrorism orders; to amend the law relating to inquests and inquiries; to amend the definition of “terrorism”; to amend the enactments relating to terrorist offences, control orders and the forfeiture of terrorist cash; to provide for recovering the costs of policing at certain gas facilities; to amend provisions about the appointment of special advocates in Northern Ireland; and for connected purposes.

Los yihadistas extranjeros vinculados a al-Qaida están experimentado un progresivo declive en Irak que puede terminar en su derrota definitiva en aquel país. Este breve análisis describe las diversas transformaciones que ha experimentado al-Qaida en Irak. La organización no ha sabido obtener el apoyo de la población local y actualmente libra una lucha a muerte con otros grupos islamistas sunníes, en particular contra el Ejército Islámico de Irak, y contra las tribus sunníes del Despertar de al-Anbar. El análisis finaliza valorando la posible evolución de la situación en Irak y los riesgos que ello puede conllevar para España.

The al-Qaida leadership around Usama Bin Laden and his deputy Aiman al-Zawahiri used the year 2007 for an unprecedented public relations campaign.

La Yama’a At-Tabligh Al-Da’wa (Congregación para la Propagación del Islam), o sencillamente Yama’a Tabligh, fuen fundada por Maulana Ilyas en la INdia en 1927, y deriva del movimiento revivalista deobandi. Se trata de un movimiento de reforma de la sociedad islámica, a la que se considera contaminada por los valores no-islámicos del securalismo, materialismo, etc.

This document summarizes the data and major trends that characterized Palestinian terror in 2007, broken down by areas, Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip, and general trends that were prominent this year, such as the activities of the Palestinian security apparatus, the growing strength of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and exploitation of humanitarian allowances. This past year brought significant changes that affect the entire region. The most conspicuous was Hamas's takeover of the Gaza Strip, which altered the reality in the Palestinian arena by creating de facto two separate Palestinian entities in Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip.

The controversy over interrogation tapes destroyed by the CIA is a farce rich in high-dudgeon hypocrisy. It is the latest act in our square-peg, round-hole experiment in judicializing warfare — in intruding the non-political branch into the quintessentially political realm of national defense.

Reproducimos literalmente el documento intervenido en el domicilio de los miembros liberados del comando de ETA "Araba", detenido en 1998. Es oportuno publicar este manual por tratarse de uno similar al incautado por la Guardia Civil al comando "Elurra".

Existen numerosas experiencias de radicalización yihadista en prisiones, algunas de ellas también en España. Este artículo describe en primer lugar la situación de los internos de origen musulmán en las prisiones españolas, y analiza los retos y disfunciones que afronta el sistema penitenciario español. Se trata de puntos débiles que afectan a la relación entre internos yihadistas y presos comunes de origen musulmán, a la vigilancia y control de la vida cotidiana de los internos, de la posible difusión de documentos radicales dentro de las prisiones y de las comunicaciones entre el interior y exterior de los centros. En conjunto, se advierte la falta de un plan estratégico por parte de la Administración penitenciaria para la prevención de la radicalización yihadista.

Counterterrorism, like espionage and covert action, is not a spectator sport. The more a country practices, the better it gets. France has become the most accomplished counterterrorism practitioner in Europe. None of the western European counterterrorism officials we have met with over the last eighteen months would dissent from this view. And while there may be a debate about which European state has had the most experience dealing with terrorism—be it Germany with its Baader-Meinhof Group, Italy with its Red Brigades, Spain with the Basque separatist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, or even Great Britain with the Irish Republican Army—there is no question that France has had as much experience with the most virulent, police-resistant forms of modern terrorism as any of them. Whereas September 11, 2001, was a heart-stopping shock to the American counterterrorism establishment—and only slightly less revolutionary for many in Europe—it was not a révolution des mentalités in Paris.

The United States has been actively engaged in prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) since September 2001. However, after 5 years of national effort that has included the loss of over 3,000 service members in combat operations, many question whether the U.S. strategy is working, and whether the United States understands how to combat an enemy motivated by a radical revolutionary religious ideology. The author reviews the pertinent cultural history and background of Islam and then posits three root causes of this conflict: the lack of wealth-sharing in Islamic countries, resentment of Western exploitation of Islamic countries, and a U.S. credibility gap within the Islamic community. Following this discussion of root causes, this analysis compares the Ends, Ways and Means of the U.S. Strategy for Combating Terrorism with that of terrorist organizations such as al-Qai’da. The author concludes that the United States is not achieving its long-term strategic objectives in the GWOT. He then recommends that U.S. strategy focus on the root causes of Islamic hostility. Accordingly, the United States should combat radical Islam from within the Islamic community by consistently supporting the efforts of moderate Islamic nations to build democratic institutions that are acceptable in Islamic terms.

Frente a Euskal Herria sigue alzándose el muro y la violencia permanente del Estado español. Al igual que en el proceso de negociación pasado, el muro con el que nos encontramos en el camino es el de la Constitución española y la negación a nuestro pueblo. El Estado español no ha llevado a cabo una verdadera transición democrática, y Zapatero ha tomado la misma senda de González y Aznar. Ha perdido una oportunidad inmejorable para reformar el Estado fascista que gobierna. Para dejar a Euskal Herria que siga el camino que desee.

Since September 2001, the Security Council and its various counterterrorism-related subsidiary bodies have made significant contributions to the global counterterrorism campaign, primarily through normsetting and institution building and by keeping terrorism on the political agenda while engaging in dialogue with—and stimulating the activities of—states and multilateral bodies.Yet, rather than together constituting a comprehensive strategy to address the global terrorist threat, each Council initiative has had an improvisational, ad hoc quality. Following each major terrorist attack—often against one of its own members—the Council’s response has extended well beyond the specific incident at hand with little regard to its relation to the already existing Council program.

By its nature, war is a formative event. Often when war begins, various processes come to an end and are replaced by new ones. The Second Lebanon War is no exception. The campaign that took place in Lebanon and on the Israeli home front had a profound impact on the Israeli and Lebanese sides. The national, political, military, and social consequences of the campaign are evident in both Israel and on the other side of the border. This essay analyzes the effect of the war on Hizbollah’s military doctrine and reviews its rehabilitation process over the last year. In addition, it attempts to identify the characteristics of the next campaign in the Lebanese theater and their significance for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Israel.

La sociedad española cuenta con un amplio marco institucional referido a la promoción pública de la participación de los ciudadanos en la vida social. De esta manera, tanto la Administración del estado como las Comunidades Autónomas y los Ayuntamientos cuentan con recursos que se destinan a facilitar las actividades de todo tipo de entidades asociativas, deportivas y culturales. Paradójicamente, sin embargo, ello no es así en lo referente a la participación política. En este caso, el sistema se comporta como un oligopolio de pocos participantes y trata de impedir la entrada de otros nuevos imponiendo barreras en cuanto al acceso a los medios de comunicación públicos y a los programas presupuestarios de financiación de partidos políticos —lo que, a su vez, induce la desconfianza de las entidades bancarias con respecto a las fuerzas políticas emergentes—. Se asegura así el status quo en el reparto del poder político.

Entre análisis sobre violencia, terrorismo e investigaciones a cerca de criminología e inmigración, Luis de la Corte Ibáñez atendió a ‘El Faro’ con motivo del aniversario de la ‘Operación Duna’. En sus libros ‘La lógica del terrorismo’ y ‘La yihad terrorista’, este último co-escrito con Javier Jordán, trata éstos y más temas relacionados con el movimiento yihadista. En la conversación con este medio, se centró en el terrorismo en el contexto de Ceuta.

Este artículo describe las fuentes de financiación y los modos de transferencia de fondos más utilizados por los grupos terroristas relacionados con al-Qaida o inspirados en ella. Los cambios en la lucha contra el terrorismo y los consiguientes cambios en la organización de al-Qaida han alterado aspectos fundamentales de la financiación de terrorismo que se ajustan a la regulación y el control tanto internacional como nacional. Estos cambios pueden variar el objetivo del control mucho más que antes del nivel internacional al nivel nacional donde los grupos inspirados por al-Qaida encuentran apoyo social, recursos, fondos económicos y apoyo ideológico para desarrollar sus actividades. Finalmente, este artículo analiza las implicaciones de estos cambios así como los aciertos y desaciertos en la lucha contra la financiación del terrorismo hasta ahora.

Este análisis trata de llenar el hueco existente en el conocimiento de la definición legal de grupo terrorista aceptada por organismos internacionales, con especial detenimiento en los que son vinculantes para España.

Hay dos opciones. Un país donde prevalezcan los valores y principios constitucionales, como son la Libertad, al Justicia, la Igualdad, la Seguridad Jurídica (…) En el otro lado, un país muy distinto, donde la debilidad de las instituciones haga que nuestros derechos y libertades queden en papel mojado y seamos por tanto condenados a la indefensión ya a la arbitrariedad.

It is fairly unusual for the head of MI5 to speak at a media-focused event. But the issue of trust is highly relevant to the world of intelligence. All the more so as we tackle the most immediate and acute peacetime threat in the 98-year history of my Service. Public trust is becoming an increasingly important issue for many organisations, both private and public. My Service is no exception, and we need to ensure that our work is sufficiently understood. Although our operations must remain secret for them to be successful, we have a responsibility to keep the public informed about the threats they face and what we are doing to counter them.

The conflicts in Iraq, Lebanon, and Afghanistan and the global Islamist insurgency have revealed that Western democracies and their political and military leaders do not fully comprehend the multifaceted threats represented by radical Muslim nonstate actors. In this, they violate the most famous dictum of Sun Tzu, the Chinese strategic genius of 2,500 years ago: “If you know yourself and understand your opponent you will never put your victory in jeopardy in any conflict.”

The truest test of the value to our nation of the U.S. diplomatic presence abroad is whether the people we ask to represent us effectively promote American values and interests. Diplomacy is a vital tool of national security. The aim of this report is to make the diplomatic pursuit of U.S. interests abroad even more effective than it is today. Our diplomats and those who support them must have the right tools and capacity to do their work. This is an urgent national priority. Transnational threats, including terrorism, put U.S. citizens and national interests at risk. Potential competitor nations are emerging on the global stage. Anti-Americanism can have lethal consequences for our nation and its citizens. Operating in a higherthreat environment is part of today’s diplomatic job. Traditional diplomacy—where government and social elites interact in highly formal channels—is being transformed. U.S. diplomats will still need to influence foreign governments, but increasingly they will work directly with diverse parts of other nations’ societies. The Embassy of the Future Commission envisions an embassy presence in which U.S. officials reach out broadly, engage societies comprehensively, and build relationships with key audiences effectively. This project is called the “Embassy of the Future,” but “embassy” is meant in a broad sense, of which embassy buildings are only one dimension. The commission underscores that the U.S. presence and our diplomacy are about our people—Foreign Service, Civil Service, Foreign Service nationals and other locally employed staff—and their capacity to carry out their mission.

The Lebanese crisis has receded from the headlines but has not gone away. Today, all eyes are on the presidential election, the latest arena in the ongoing struggle between pro- and anti-government forces. Yet even if a compromise candidate is found, none of the country’s underlying problems will have been addressed, chief among them the status of Hizbollah’s weapons. If the election is to be more than a mere prelude to the next showdown, all parties and their external allies need to move away from maximalist demands and agree on a package deal that accepts for now Hizbollah’s armed status while constraining the ways in which its weapons can be used.

Uno de los aspectos más destacados de la sentencia del 11-M ha sido la incapacidad para determinar la autoría intelectual de los atentados, y la consiguiente exculpación en ese sentido de los presuntos cerebros de la matanza: Yousef Belhadj, Hassan El Haski y Rabei Osman El Sayed. A primera vista, da la impresión de que este hecho ha deslucido el resultado final del proceso y ha ofrecido un mínimo asidero a los partidos de las -cada vez más patéticas- teorías conspiratorias.

In late September 2007, the European Union appointed Gilles de Kerchove d'Ousselghem, a Belgian academic and a high-ranking officer at the E.U. Council Secretariat, to the post of E.U. counter-terrorism coordinator, a post created in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004. With the selection of de Kerchove, the European Union has finally found a successor to Gijs de Vries, the first E.U. counter-terrorism coordinator.

Sentencia número 65/2007. Presidente: Ilmo. Sr. Don Javier Gómez Bermúdez (Ponente) Magistrados: Ilmo. Sr. Don Félix Alfonso Guevara Marcos. Ilmo. Sr. Don Fernando García Nicolás. En nombre del Rey La Sección Segunda de la Sala de lo Penal de la Audiencia Nacional, constituida en audiencia pública por los magistrados mencionados al margen, en el ejercicio de la potestad jurisdiccional que la Constitución y el pueblo español le otorgan, dictan la siguiente: SENTENCIA En Madrid a 31 de octubre de 2007. Vista, en juicio oral y público, la causa procedente del Sumario núm 20/04 del Juzgado Central de Instrucción número 6, por los atentados ocurridos en Madrid el 11 de marzo de 2004. Manifiesta:

Since the end of the Cold War, failed or failing states and ungoverned territories within otherwise viable states have become a more common international phenomenon. Many of the crises that have required intervention by U.S. or international forces were produced by the collapse or absence of state authority. These ungoverned territories generate all manner of security problems, such as civil conflict and humanitarian crises, arms and drug smuggling, piracy, and refugee flows. They threaten regional stability and security and generate demands on U.S. military resources. The problem of dealing with ungoverned areas has taken on increased urgency since 9/11, which demonstrated how terrorists can use sanctuaries in the most remote and hitherto ignored regions of the world to mount devastating attacks against the United States and its friends and allies.

the most serious threats that our society faces today. The debate about these emerging alliances has been ongoing for some time now. Experts agree that there are clear overlaps between international terrorist and organized crime networks. In her Congressional Testimony delivered in September 2005, Glenn E. Schweitzer stated that organized crime had ‘entered a new phase of complicity’ with terrorist networks: Terrorist and criminal organizations rely on the same global transportation, communication, and financial infrastructures for illegal ploys. They take advantage of the same breakdowns in authority and enforcement in states under siege. They both seek increasing shares of the fortunes generated from narco-trafficking and other crimes.

Recent political debate surrounding the war on terrorism has centered on evaluating the Bush administration’s performance. That worthy debate, however, tends to obscure the more fundamental question: what can the United States hope to accomplish in the global war on terrorism? To answer that broader query, policymakers and analysts need to think more deeply about the prospects for successfully confronting transnational terrorist organizations, because these groups, such as al Qaeda, are different from national groups such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) or Hamas, on which so much discussion and research is based.

The next U.S. president will face three key foreign policy challenges: setting a course for victory in the terrorists' war on global order, strengthening the international system the terrorists seek to destroy, and extending the system's benefits. With a stronger defense, a determined diplomacy, and greater U.S. economic and cultural influence, the next president can start to build a lasting, realistic peace.

According to the U.S. State Department 2007 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, “Saudi donors and unregulated charities have been a major source of financing to extremist and terrorist groups over the past 25 years.” The September 11, 2001 attacks fueled criticisms within the United States of alleged Saudi involvement in terrorism or of Saudi laxity in acting against terrorist groups. The final report released by the bipartisan National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) indicates that the Commission “found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded [Al Qaeda].” The report also states, however, that Saudi Arabia “was a place where Al Qaeda raised money directly from individuals and through charities” and indicates that “charities with significant Saudi government sponsorship” may have diverted funding to Al Qaeda. U.S. officials remain concerned that Saudis continue to fund Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations.

A three-year peace process between the government of Alvaro Uribe and the left-wing National Liberation Army (ELN) is at a standstill, with concern rising that it is doomed by mutual recalcitrance. The insurgent group, while much smaller than the more prominent (and notorious) Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), is probably both militarily stronger than the government believes and politically weaker than its leaders think. To counteract the spread of frustration and prevent failure, the government and the rebels should immediately explore creative options, as much to begin to establish some badly needed mutual confidence as to tackle the persistent procedural and substantive bottlenecks.

Since September 2001, the United States has increased focus on radical Islamist and terrorist groups in Southeast Asia, particularly those in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore. Southeast Asia is a base for past, current, and possibly future terrorist operations. Al Qaeda penetrated the region by establishing local cells, training Southeast Asians in its camps in Afghanistan, and by financing and cooperating with indigenous radical Islamist groups. Indonesia and the southern Philippines have been particularly vulnerable to penetration by anti-American Islamic terrorist groups.

Historically, large parts of the Iberian Peninsula were under Islamic rule from 711 until 1492, with the final eviction of the Moors from what they called al-Andalus. Despite the passage of over five hundred years, the memory of Islamic rule in Spain has become increasingly part of the discourse in radical Islamic circles. Ayman al-Zawahiri, deputy of Osama bin Laden in the al-Qaeda leadership, in a new tape publicized on 20 September 2007, referred to the global aspirations of the Islamic Revolution: O, our Muslim nation in the Maghreb [North Africa], zone of deployment for battle and jihad! The return of Andalus [today's Spain] to Muslim hands is a duty for the [Islamic] nation in general and for you in particular. You will not be able to achieve this except by purifying the Islamic Maghreb of the French and the Spanish who have once again returned, after your fathers and grandfathers had expelled them unsparingly in the way of Allah.

In the six years that have passed since the shock of the attacks on 11 September 2001, a great deal of change has occurred within the US Intelligence Community (IC). Legislation created a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with authorities to develop overall strategies and promote integration of intelligence activities; specific intelligence units have been established within the FBI and as part of the newly created Department of Homeland Security, as well as new IC-wide centers like the National Counter-terrorism Center and the National Counterproliferation Centers.

Más de tres años después de los atentados del 11 de marzo de 2004, las Fuerzas y Cuerpos de Seguridad del Estado continúan desarticulando redes yihadistas en nuestro país. Durante este tiempo los medios de comunicación han venido prestando atención a las operaciones policiales de cierto calado y, en los últimos meses, también han logrado espacio informativo las proclamas yihadistas a favor de la recuperación de Al-Andalus. Parece claro que España sigue amenazada por el terrorismo yihadista pero la capacidad de real de estos grupos para volver atentar resulta un tanto confusa.

El 20 de septiembre de 2007, As-Sahab, el brazo mediático de Al Qaida difundía a través de internet la cuarta entrega de una serie de producciones audiovisuales destinadas a acaparar la máxima atención mediática durante el mes en el cual se cumple el sexto aniversario de los atentados contra Washington y Nueva York. Este nuevo video de ochenta minutos titulado “El poder de la verdad”, ha alcanzado una notable repercusión en nuestro país debido a la inclusión de amenazas específicas contra España.

Dos preguntas a propósito de las amenazas de Al Qaida por Luis de la Corte Ibáñez. Athena Intelligence, 21 de septiembre de 2007La reciente llamada de Ayman al-Zawahiri a “limpiar el Magreb Islámico de los hijos de Francia y España”, así como a recuperar Al Ándalus han vuelto a suscitar el mismo interrogante de otras ocasiones: ¿realmente hay que tomar en serio las amenazas de Al Qaida? Esta era la pregunta que un medio de comunicación dirigía a un miembro de Athena Intelligence –yo mismo- pocas horas después de que el lugarteniente de Bin Laden hiciera públicas sus últimas amenazas).

The documentary style video begins with the voice of Mohamed Atta shortly after hijacking the plane that would fly into the World Trede Center, and inludes clips from various Al Qaeda leaders, as well as clips from TV news and features. The videro also includes it's spin of US politics.

While terrorism has been with us for centuries, the destructive power and global reach of modern terrorism is unprecedented. The entire world witnessed the attacks of September 11, 2001, but most of the attacks and attempted attacks since then have shown 9/11 to be an anomaly rather than the standard pattern for terrorism in the homeland. If the post-September 11th world has taught us anything, it is that the tools for conducting serious terrorist attacks are becoming easier to acquire. Therefore intention becomes an increasingly important factor in the formation of terrorist cells. This study is an attempt to look at how that intention forms, hardens and leads to an attack or attempted attack using real world case studies. While the threat from overseas remains, many of the terrorist attacks or thwarted plots against cities in Europe, Canada, Australia and the United States have been conceptualized and planned by local residents/citizens who sought to attack their country of residence. The majority of these individuals began as “unremarkable” - they had “unremarkable” jobs, had lived “unremarkable” lives and had little, if any criminal history. The recently thwarted plot by homegrown jihadists, in May 2007, against Fort Dix in New Jersey, only underscores the seriousness of this emerging threat.

An praise is due to Allah, who built the heavens and earth in justice, and created man as a favor and grace ffrom Him.

La actual amenaza yihadista está relacionada con la expansión, a lo largo del pasado siglo XX, de una corriente de pensamiento islámico sunní puritana, retrógada y sectaria generalmente designada como islamismo salafista.

National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are the Intelligence Community’s (IC) most authoritative written judgments on national security issues and designed to help US civilian and military leaders develop policies to protect US national security interests. NIEs usually provide information on the current state of play but are primarily “estimative”—that is, they make judgments about the likely course of future events and identify the implications for US policy.

The dramatic developments which led to the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip and the creation of “Hamastan” surprised Iran, in our assessment, and created a new situation in the internal Palestinian arena, which holds both opportunities and risks for Iran. The main ones are the following: A. On the one hand, the establishment of a Hamas-controlled entity reinforces Iran’s deterrent image and creates new opportunities for Iran to maneuver against Israel, the moderate Arab camp and the Western countries. That is because the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip can be perceived as the victory of the ideology the radical Islamic movement which is supported by the Iranian-Syrian axis. That ideology includes resolving the Israeli-Arab conflict through terrorism and violence. The takeover weakened the nationalist-secular and pro-Western trend in Palestinian society and also harmed American and Israeli interests.

While the troops go after the terrorists, officials back in Washington must keep after the terrorists' assets. Even as Congress and the Bush administration scrutinize the effects of a troop surge in Iraq, they should agree immediately to implement a surge on the financial front in the “war on terror.” Although the freezing and tracking of terrorists’ assets has been among the war’s greatest success stories, this progress is now being threatened by an unfunded mandate, which leaves our global financial warriors without the resources to do the vital tasks they have been asked to perform.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, powerfully advanced the notion that terrorist groups might acquire and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or, more plausibly, radiological dispersal devices (RDD). Terrorist interest in weapons of mass destruction is ample. Al Qaeda has been on record as determined to acquire and use these weapons.

On May 20, Israel Security Agency arrested at the Erez crossing two female residents of the Gaza Strip who intended to perpetrate a double suicide bombing attack at a crowded place in Tel-Aviv and in Netanya. Planned and guided by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the suicide bombing attack was to take place at the height of the Hamas rocket attack on Israeli population centers in the western Negev desert. The women were supposed to use false medical documents to enter Israel.

Citizen preparedness is a key variable in our response, but while the United States has made substantial investments in professional preparation, only rhetorical attention has been paid to preparing the broader public. Using aerosol anthrax and smallpox attacks as primary examples, this paper demonstrates that our present preparations are likely to fail when measured against the six most fundamental citizen expectations. It advocates five research and development investments that would enhance citizen preparation.

New York is the heart of the world's financial system and Treasury Secretaries often come here to talk about the role that system plays in our economic health. Today, I want to talk about something a little different - the financial system's importance to our national security. Throughout history, Treasury Secretaries have focused their efforts on promoting policies and actions to help ensure the safety and soundness of our financial system. Today, the Secretary must focus on the security of the financial system, as well as its safety and soundness.

In an article titled "How the Arabs Explain the Terror Phenomenon" in the Qatari daily Al-Raya, Al-Ansari criticized the ways in which the Arab world denies and ignores the phenomenon of terrorism, and refuted the political and socio-economic arguments justifying it: "...I don't understand the personality split in some people; they depict the terrorist in Iraq as a martyr and a resistance fighter…How can we term someone a martyr when he blows up schools and hospitals, does not respect the sanctity of religious sites, and, worse, blows himself up in restaurants and bus stations full of workers?!...

El fenomeno terrorista es un mal cuya solución pasa, inevitablemente por la concienciación social y la contestación cívica, basada en los valores que cimientan el Estado democrático.

Dr. Moussa Abu Marzouq, Deputy Chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau, has recently granted an interview to Felesteen, a recentlylaunched Hamas daily. The interview, titled “A Great Opportunity to Establish a State in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank”, deals primarily with the latest developments on the internal Palestinian scene and with the rocket attacks on Israel.

El entramado terrorista de ETA-Batasuna, ante la pasividad de la Fiscalía y del Gobierno, volverá mañana a las instituciones municipales y financiará sus asesinatos con nuestros impuestos. El Presidente del Gobierno no parece haber renunciado a abrir en el futuro nuevas vías de contacto y diálogo con ETA y, por este motivo, evita adoptar medidas que constituyan una dificultad añadida para, en su momento, iniciar una nueva fase del ahora encallado proceso de negociación.

As the lebanese Army continues to battle Fatah al-Islam, a jihadist group operating in the Nahr Bared Palestinian refugee camp in northern Lebanon, questions are being raised about the group's relationship to Al Qaeda and whether it is an official part of Osama bin Laden's network. Indeed, since 9/11, Al Qaeda's name has been applied liberally to numerous individuals and groups believed to be engaged in jihadist terrorism. However, while Al Qaeda does provide logistical and financial support to jihadist cells and continues to serve as the inspiration for countless jihadist groups across the globe, bin Laden does not allow any group to carry the brand name "Al Qaeda" without his approval. Groups wishing to join Al Qaeda officially must meet certain requirements before they are granted the right to adopt the name.

The frail ceasefire between Hamas and Fatah which went into effect at the end of the last round of confrontations (May 13-19) collapsed completely after the talks in Cairo failed. Behind the new round of confrontations, the seventh since Hamas came to power, are Hamas’ refusal to accept Abu Mazen’s initiative (the ten-point plan), the abiding mutual hatred and loss of faith between the sides inflamed by virulent propaganda.

Following major terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda against housing compounds inhabited by foreign and Arab oil experts in 2003, the Saudi regime launched a major onslaught against the al-Qaeda-led Saudi fundamentalists. Gradually the regime succeeded in eroding the ranks of the Afghanistan war veterans who comprised the operational leadership of the organization.

Hezbollah, “the party of Allah,” is a Lebanese Muslim terrorist organization, established with Syrian support in 1982 during the first Lebanon war (Operation Peace for the Galilee). Hezbollah’s ideology is radical Shi’ite Islam, and the organization serves as a tool to promote the goals of Iran and Syria, while at the same time it is an integral part of the Lebanon’s political and social fabric.

While on a visit to Egypt, Moussa Abu Marzouq, Deputy Chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau, met with a group of Egyptian intellectuals and politicians. The meeting, held on June 1, 2007 and hosted by the Arab Doctors’ Union, lasted for two hours and was meant to “shed light on the happenings on the Palestinian scene”. At the meeting, Moussa Abu Marzouq answered questions from the audience. A report on the meeting was published on the website of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, of which Hamas is the Palestinian offshoot (article by Abd al-Muizz Muhammad, Ikhwan Online, June 2, 2007).

Daré lectura a un comunicado conjunto de Francia, España y Suiza. Principio de cita: "Francia, España y Suiza saludan la importante iniciativa que representa la liberación de Rodrigo Granda, por una decisión del Presidente colombiano. Mediante este acto, las autoridades colombianas manifiestan su voluntad de hacer avanzar el intercambio humanitario. Los tres países instan a las FARC a responder esta iniciativa de manera constructiva. Francia, España y Suiza continuarán realizando esfuerzos con la finalidad de lograr una solución humanitaria lo antes posible, y abrir así un camino para la paz."

American decisionmakers irrespective of political affiliation seem far more comfortable with bombing people in other countries than with trying to persuade them to change their attitudes or behavior. They wonder why people in Middle East hate us when Arabiclanguage satellite TV channels saturate viewers with ceaseless, bloody images of maimed and slain Iraqi children and grandparents, cut down and blasted apart either by the day’s bombings or Coalition operations. The sight of a child reclining placidly in a worn-out hospital bed breaks the heart when the camera lens pulls back and shows the bandaged stumps of a freshly amputated arm or leg. Few such images, to say nothing of the R-rated gore of a bombing aftermath, make it on heavily sanitized American TV.

"ETA, organización socialista revolucionaria de liberación nacional vasca, desea comunicar a los vascos lo siguiente: Son tiempos de clarificación. Euskal Herria quiere dar pasos para superar la actual división institucional y construir un Estado independiente. Han sido miles de votos en favor del cambio político y social, miles de voces en pro del futuro de este pueblo. ETA se posiciona a favor del proceso de liberación de este pueblo, un proceso cuyo fin, sin duda, será un Estado independiente: Euskal Herria. Pero, para llegar a eso, será necesario un marco único que incluya Navarra, Álava, Vizcaya y Guipúzcoa, y otro que aúne Lapurdi, Benafarroa y Zuberoa. De este modo, con los siete territorios unidos, construiremos el futuro de nuestro pueblo. Está claro que las falsas soluciones que se han presentado hasta el momento no nos llevan a ninguna parte. El futuro está en nuestras manos, y lo conseguiremos.

This report provides a summary review of issues related to Pakistan and terrorism, especially in the context of U.S. interests, policy goals, and relevant assistance.1 The outcomes of U.S. policies toward Pakistan since 9/11, while not devoid of meaningful successes, have neither neutralized anti-Western militants and reduced religious extremism in that country, nor have they contributed sufficiently to the stabilization of neighboring Afghanistan. Many observers thus urge a broad re-evaluation of such policies. For a substantive review, see a forthcoming CRS Report entitled Pakistan and Terrorism.

"Toda las alabanzas son para Alá, Creador de los cielos y la tierra, y que las plegarias y la paz estén con el mensajero de Alá y sus compañeros, su familia, y sus seguidores hasta el Día del Juicio Final. Bush, pensaste que serías recordado por la historia como el presidente que emprendió una serie de exitosas cruzadas contra los musulmanes. En cambio, pasaras a la historia no sólo como el presidente que enredo a su nación en una serie de conflictos sangrientos no conquistables en el mundo islámico, sino como el presidente que envió los Estados Unidos a su marcha mortal y hacia su desplome y desintegración.

As the fight between Islamic militants Fatah al-Islam and Lebanese forces entered its fourth day Wednesday – with a cease-fire holding just long enough to allow many civilians to flee – little is known about the group that says it refuses to surrender.

On May 8, 2007, some two months after the abduction (March 12) of BBC journalist Alan Johnston, an organization calling itself Jaish al-Islam (“The Army of Islam”) claimed responsibility for the abduction and laid out its demands. A videotape sent to the Al-Jazeera office in Gaza City contained a recording of the abductors’ demands with an image of Alan Johnston’s journalist’s security pass in the background. The announcement was broadcasted on Arabic-language TV channels Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiyya (May 9) and on Al-Firdous, an online message board associated with Al-Qaeda.

Increasingly, there are signs that al-Qaeda is gaining strength in the Gaza Strip. In the midst of the decaying internal situation in Gaza, with its regular gun battles between the well-established Hamas and Fatah militias, there are more incidents reported of attacks against symbols of any Western presence from a UNRWA school to a Christian bookstore.

Hamas’ rocket attack against Sderot and the western Negev settlements which began on May 15 continues. So far 74 hits have been identified, causing scores of injuries (most of them slight or shockrelated). The attack has been accompanied by Hamas boasts of having “successfully pulverized” the Israeli settlements and seriously upset the daily lives of the local population.

Terms such as “proxy” and “client” are often used to characterize the power dynamic between Hizballah and its allies Iran and Syria. These states’ vital resources and indispensable political sponsorship elevated Hizballah to the position it enjoys today. They each played a central role in past decisions of momentous importance for Hizballah. Today, however, this image of Hizballah as a client of Iran and Syria has become obsolete due to the power base the Shi‘ite group has nurtured and expanded in Lebanon and the growing political capital it has acquired in the Middle East thanks to at least the perception of its military victories, be they real or not, particularly in the summer 2006 war against Israel.

Can the United States deter a nuclear terrorist attack? Two conventional wisdoms prevail on this question. One contends that Cold War ideas about deterrence are utterly irrelevant to coping with an enemy such as al Qaeda, whose members are unafraid of earthly punishments and whose leaders lack a return address at which to direct retaliation. The other suggests, more optimistically, that nuclear forensics make it possible for the United States to determine the origin of nuclear bombs and thus credibly threaten retaliation against any state that transfers nuclear material, weapons, or knowledge to terrorists. Following this logic, the United States need only combine modern nuclear physics with concepts of deterrence honed in the Cold War to solve its most worrisome present-day threat.

This chapter highlights terrorism trends and ongoing issues, focusing on calendar year 2006 that will provide a framework for detailed discussion in later chapters. Since this issue of the Country Reports on Terrorism falls five years after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the chapter commences with a review of progress against the terrorist threat to date.

On April 17, Al-Alam, an Iranian TV channel in Arabic, broadcasted a talk show called Al-Mihwar (“the axis”). The show featured an interview with Ayman Muhammad Saleh Taha, a former Hamas operative who was held prisoner in Israel and is now one of the Hamas spokesmen and a member of the inter-organizational committee for preventing conflicts between Hamas and Fatah. In the interview, Ayman Taha was asked about Hamas’s position on the contacts held by Abu Mazen with Israel.

I cannot begin to describe how great a privilege it is, indeed an honour, to be invited to deliver this, the first Colin Cramphorn Memorial Lecture. I was delighted when Dean asked me, but only later realised the enormity of the task. The challenge of putting together some thoughts that could in any way do justice to Colin’s memory was daunting. Colin, as everyone who knew him can testify, was a man of enormous knowledge of his chosen profession. But it was not simply a bookish knowledge. He had an instinctive feel for policing. He understood police officers, their thoughts, their hopes and fears. But he also understood communities. He knew what people wanted and expected from their police service. He was always able to see policing in a broader context, to understand the links and dependencies between the act of policing, if I can put it like that, and the communities and institutions that we as police officers serve. He knew that the relationship between the police and citizens is delicate, indeed often fragile. He also knew that maintaining that relationship depends not only on what happens on the street. He realised that if the public are to have confidence, it is vital that policing is properly understood by those who represent the interests of citizens at both local and national level, by local and central government, by the judicial system, and of course by the media. This often feels like a complex web of sometimes competing interests, and it is that very complexity that Colin understood so well.

Signe d’une remarquable influence, la doctrine wahhabite, à l’exception des mouvements chiites, inspire et guide encore la plupart des mouvements islamistes, modérés ou radicaux, de par le monde. Des spécialistes la présentent comme l’idéologie fondatrice de l’islam politique. Un mouvement politico-religieux qui allie rigorisme, puritanisme, et vise à (ré)instaurer le califat. Le wahhabisme désigne (encyclopédie Wikipédia, ndlr) la doctrine du salafisme, une « forme rigoriste de l’islam sunnite, telle qu’enseignée par le théologien Mohamed ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792) ».

En las últimas semanas se ha hablado mucho de las intenciones de ETA. El comunicado del 10 de enero era el objeto de valoración y debate más reciente hasta el día de hoy. En esta entrevista realizada por GARA, ETA detalla sus reflexiones, objetivos y compromisos. Está realizada en euskara, pero por su valor periodístico se ofrece también la traducción íntegra al castellano en este cuadernillo especial.

At the end of July 2006, Moroccan authorities dismantled Ansar al-Mahdi, a previously unknown terrorist group, and made initial arrests of 44 people. The number of arrestees later grew to 56 and spanned multiple cities in northern Morocco. The group itself was unique and included an eclectic mix of drug traffickers, wives of Air Maroc pilots and members of the armed forces reportedly led by Hassan al-Khattab—a known Salafi-Jihadi aspirant who was imprisoned for two years in 2003 following the Casablanca bombings (La Gazette du Maroc, August 21, 2006; L'Expression, August 13, 2006).

Iraq’s descent into civil war and Iran’s growing influence in the Middle East have dominated discussions throughout Washington’s foreign policy community. Many have viewed and interpreted these developments from the prism of a growing divide between Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims. In fact, this notion of a factional rift within the Middle East – bolstered by the sectarian bloodletting in Iraq; the lack of support by Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia for Hizb’allah in its fight with Israel last summer; and the perception among Sunni Arab leaders that an Iran-led “Shi’ite Crescent” has descended across the region – has been so prevalent in Washington that many have looked at events in Lebanon through that same prism.

Somaliland was previously known as British Somaliland and from 1960 until it unilaterally declared its independence in 1991 the northwestern region of the Somali Republic. That part of Somalia now controlled by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has since 1991 had three neighbors—Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somaliland—and a long Indian Ocean coastline. The TFG claims Somaliland, which has not been recognized by any state, but has wisely avoided a confrontation with the authorities in Hargeisa as it tries to consolidate its power in the former Italian Somalia. Once there is a national government in Mogadishu that is widely accepted and clearly in control of the country there inevitably will be discussions between Mogadishu and Hargeisa on the future of their relationship. In the meantime, it is advisable for the TFG to focus on more immediate challenges and leave the question of Somaliland, which is doing just fine on its own, for another day.

When we last gathered here, on July 11, 2006, it was to discuss what the U.S. strategy should be towards Somalia, after the Islamist Courts had routed the U.S.-backed warlord coalition in May of 2006. Six months later, we are gathered to consider what strategy makes sense now that the Courts have been vanquished by the Ethiopians, with U.S. support. The wheel has certainly turned, and U.S. engagement has been enlarged conspicuously on several fronts, following a fallow period of virtual non-engagement dating back to the spring of 1994.

The most controversial decision that Jose Luis Rodríguez Zapatero has made in his three years in office was not to pull Spanish troops out of Iraq or legalize gay marriage. Instead, it was the prime minister's move this month to convert the prison sentence of a high-profile member of ETA, the Basque separatist group, to house arrest.

Shrouded in white canvas, the memorial commemorating the March 11 terrorists attacks will be unveiled outside Atocha rail station here tomorrow, the third anniversary. Though the exact design is secret, the high glass structure is said to reflect light at different angles in tasteful tribute to the 191 lives extinguished that day.

Nos ha traído aquí la falta de gallardía de un Gobierno que pretende disfrazar la humillación con razones de política inteligente y la indignidad con excusas humanitarias. Hemos venido para proclamar que la mayoría de los españoles no estamos conformes; para que nadie pueda beneficiarse de nuestro silencio; para que nadie cuente con nuestra resignación.

Este escrito es una contribución nuestra para guiar la acción islámica yihadí en Irak. En él hemos intentado mencionar las cuestiones más importantes que incumben al querido Irak y que influyen en su futuro. Hemos puesto buen cuidado en que sea corto y práctico, lo que ha llevado a resumir y simplificar mucho, algo que deseamos no repercuta en el beneficio deseable, como deseamos que este pequeño libro sea un incentivo para nosotros y para otros que quieren a la Nación Islámica, para escribir y dar consejos, lejos del idealismo y la teórica.

Un des grands mystères narcissiques de la planète algérienne est la fameuse « expérience » de lutte contre le terrorisme que nous nous apprêtons à vendre à l’Amérique, en plus du pétrole. Pas un seul déplacement d’un haut responsable US au pays ne passe sans le recours à cette explication journalistique de l’intérêt des USA pour l’Algérie, en dehors des hydrocarbures.

I appreciate the chance to come and share some thoughts with the men and women of AEI. I admire AEI a lot--I'm sure you know that. After all, I have been consistently borrowing some of your best people. More than 20 AEI scholars have worked in my administration. A few have returned to the fold--you'll have to wait two more years to get another one to return to the fold. Dick Cheney is occupied. He sends his best.

Por orden de la Sección Segunda de la Sala de lo Penal de la Audiencia Nacional se está procediendo; en el Laboratorio Químico de la Comisaría General de Policía Científica; al análisis químico de diversas muestras de explosivo; de restos y/o vestigios de los focos de explosión y otras muestras relacionadas con el Sumario 20/2004.

Call it prophetic or defeatist or just plain cynical. But when the Basque separatist group known as ETA shattered its so-called "permanent cease-fire" in December with a massive bombing at Madrid's airport that killed two people, former ETA leader and convicted killer Eduardo Uriarte was not surprised.

La militancia yihadista es un desafío nuevo e inquietante para la sociedad español, que todavía sigue siendo escasamente conocido. Este trabajo tiene como fin analizar las características internas de dos de los principales grupos yihadistas que se han formado y han actuado en nuestro país: la red de Abu Dahdah y la red de los atentados del 11-M. En nuestro estudio se examinan los perfiles personales de sus componentes, la relevancia de interacción social antes y durante la militancia yihadista, la aparición de contraculturas radicales en el seno de estos grupos, y las características e implicaciones de su estructura en red.

The phrase “A Nation at War” evokes images of mobilization of the nation’s resources: military surely, but also the government, industry, and the population. Thus far in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), though, the mobilization has not been on the scale seen in past “global” wars. As the Nation approached the 5-year mark of the start of the GWOT, the USAWC focused the attention of its Seventeenth Annual Strategy Conference on whether or not the evidence supports the continuing assumption that the Nation is really at war. Some would insist that the answer is obviously yes. The conference studied this question in depth with panels on the homeland security aspects, the international context, the legal foundation for the war, and the associated economic and domestic policy issues. The conclusion was that the answer to the question is not as clear as first thought. Much of the evidence suggests that the Nation—or at least some parts of it—is not at war.

Según parece, la proyectada y ya menguante asignatura de Educación para la Ciudadanía incluirá lecciones dedicadas al diálogo y a la negociación. Nada puede resultar más oportuno, en vista de la fenomenal catarata de equívocos y malentendidos creo que no todos inocentes- que rodean el frecuente uso de esos términos tan ensalzados como aborrecidos. En una democracia parlamentaria, elogiar el diálogo es un empeño tan aparatosamente ocioso como pasearse por un hospital cantando loores a la medicina.

Alors que le Pakistan est au cœur d’une polémique des services de renseignement américains sur leur laxisme à l’égard du développement des camps d’entraînement dans la province incontrôlée du Waziristân, Islamabad cherche à rassurer ses partenaires dans la lutte antiterroriste dont l’Algérie.

While Algeria appears to have succeeded in defeating the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, in reality the threat can still not be discounted. Emily Hunt explains why the militants'silence does not necessarily mean they are defeated, but may instead show that the group is evolving into a structure that will be much harder to defeat.

When the predominantly Sunni Muslim country of Bangladesh was established as a secessionist state from Pakistan in 1971, its constitution declared that it would be both democratic and secular. Periods of democratic rule, however, were interrupted by coups, martial law, and states of emergency. In 1988, the Bangladeshi parliament approved a constitutional amendment making Islam the state religion of Bangladesh.

¿Por qué ahora? ¿Qué diferencia esta decisión de otras anteriores? No es suficiente con analizar detenidamente la actual situación política, es preciso decir que nos encontramos ante los resultados y la cosecha de la lucha y la evolución de estos últimos años.

«ETA, organización socialista revolucionaria vasca de liberación nacional, desea mediante esta Declaración dar a conocer la siguiente decisión: Euskadi Ta Askatasuna ha decidido declarar un alto el fuego permanente a partir de las 00.00 horas del 24 de marzo de 2006.

Este documento político quiere trasladar a la opinión pública los análisis y conclusiones a las que ha llegado BATASUNA, en un momento especialmente importante para el presente y el futuro de nuestro pueblo. No se puede entender este momento sin entender lo ocurrido en los últimos 25 años. Es por ello que este documento hace un recorrido de todo este periodo, a la vez que aporta unas conclusiones sobre la situación actual.

"Euskadi Ta Askatasuna" ha decidido declarar un alto el fuego permanente a partir del 24 de marzo de 2006. El objetivo de esta decisión es impulsar un proceso democrático en Euskal Herria para construir un nuevo marco en el que sean reconocidos los derechos que como Pueblo nos corresponden y asegurando de cara al futuro la posibilidad de desarrollo de todas las opciones políticas.

The CT Calendar is designed for anyone concerned with terrorism or threat: lawenforcement, intelligence, military, security personnel, contingency planners, or simply citizens concerned by terrorist threats. The Calendar is oriented primarily to readers in the United States, but we hope that we have also made it useful for citizens of other countries. We welcome suggestions on ways to improve the Counterterrorism Calendar.

A casual reading of major newspapers would leave one with the impression that terrorists are running rampant across Africa. Terrorists are said to hide out in the multiple lawless and stateless areas that litter the continent; they supposedly gain recruits from among the starving and displaced masses who have been victimized by powerful warlords and governments that are fighting over the continent’s spoils. Militant Islamic recruiters are thought to prey on vulnerable communities, building militant organizations and recruiting the next generation of suicide bombers from the ranks of the poor Africans.

This report provides a review of the 9/11 Commission recommendations and the status of their implementation at the end of the 109th Congress. The discussions herein are organized on the basis of policy themes that are at the core of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations, rather than through a review of each numbered item set out in the Commission’s final report. The analysis was produced by a large team of CRS Specialists, analysts, and attorneys who are responsible for the wide variety of policy areas covered by the 9/11 Commission in its work. The authors of the varied segments of this report are identified in footnotes. Each section of the report summarizes the pertinent elements of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation relevant to the section’s policy theme.

Los medios de comunicación de alcance nacional han difundido en las últimas semanas varias noticias sobre la presencia de actividades de índole yihadista en las ciudades de Ceuta y Melilla.

The American people need to prepare for a long-duration war against radical Muslims who are set to fight for 50 to 100 years to create an Islamist state in the region, a top Pentagon strategist in the war on terror says.

The “al-Qaeda universe” does not incorporate the entirety of the terrorist or extremist threat facing the United States. Clearly, Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders hope that their efforts will persuade other Islamic militant groups to join the global jihad. But what about the terrorist or extremist groups that are not part of the al-Qaeda network and do not adhere to its agenda? The temptation for policymakers is to set aside groups that have not chosen to join al-Qaeda as less dangerous. Yet these Islamist groups, non-Islamist terrorists, and criminal organizations still pose a threat to the United States, its interests, and its allies. This volume, therefore, addresses the threats outside the al-Qaeda universe.

The objective of this RAND Corporation study, undertaken as part of a project entitled “Beyond al-Qaeda: Countering Future Terrorist and Other Nontraditional Threats to U.S. Security,” is to understand the shape of future threats to the United States and U.S. security interests from terrorist and other extremist organizations. We do this through analyses that draw together the various threat strands that are informing current U.S. thinking in the war on terror. The study looks specifically at four sources of threats.

Since the invasion of Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,the “field commander” of al-Qaeda in Iraq, has arguably become the face of Islamist terrorism and what is often referred to as the “salafi-jihadi” movement. Bloody beheadings, grisly bombings and Zarqawi’s skillful use of the media including the Internet have brought him increasing notoriety. But despite this notoriety, little is known about how this once petty thug and small-time criminal became al-Qaeda’s “emir” in Mesopotamia and one of the leading lights of the global salafi-jihadi movement.