El representante saharaui, muy crítico con el Gobierno de José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, tiene la convicción de que no hay nada que esperar de España para la aceleración de la independencia del Sáhara. No hemos llegado a nada porque el planteamiento marroquí impide que avancemos, sólo quieren que el pueblo saharaui renuncie a la independencia y acepte la migaja de un pan llamado autonomía dentro de Marruecos. El proceso está hoy paralizado. Hemos pedido al Secretario General de la ONU que cambie a su enviado oficial debido a su postura contra los intereses saharauis.

De acuerdo con lo establecido en el art. 23.4 de la LOPJ, el principio de justicia penal universal, la Sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional de 26 de septiembre de 2005, el artículo 65 de la LOPJ, el art. 14 y concordantes de la LECrim, artículos 163,166, 173 y 607 del Código Penal y Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, procede admitir la competencia de este Juzgado, incoar el correspondiente procedimiento penal para iniciar la investigación y concreción de hechos, responsabilidades, y si existe o no procedimiento o causas abiertas en Marruecos contra las personas mencionadas, por los hechos objeto de querella.

El plan propuesto por Marruecos para concederle una autonomía al Sahara Occidental es una solución desacertada para el olvidado conflicto de África. El fracaso del Reino de Marruecos y el Frente Polisario para alcanzar un acuerdo sobre las modalidades del referéndum patrocinado por las Naciones Unidas y que está previsto desde hace mucho tiempo sobre el destino del Sahara Occidental, unido a una campaña de resistencia pacífica creciente en los territorios ocupados contra los 31 años de ocupación marroquí, ha llevado a Marruecos a proponer la concesión de un estatus de autonomía especial para la antigua colonia española dentro del Reino. Stephen Zunes es profesor de Política en la Universidad de San Francisco y redactor-jefe de Oriente Medio/Norte de África de la revista Foreign Policy in Focus.

Morocco's proposed plan to grant Western Sahara autonomy is a poor solution to Africa's forgotten conflict. The failure of the Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario Front to agree on the modalities of the long-planned United Nations-sponsored referendum on the fate of Western Sahara, combined with a growing nonviolent resistance campaign in the occupied territory against Morocco's 31-year occupation, has led Morocco to propose granting the former Spanish colony special autonomous status within the kingdom.Stephen Zunes is a professor of Politics at the University of San Francisco and the Middle East / North Africa editor for Foreign Policy in Focus.

On June 18 and 19, 2007, direct talks between the two protagonists in the Western Sahara conflict, the Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario Front, were held under United Nations auspices at Greentree Estate in Manhasset, New York. As expected, the negotiations were concluded without any major breakthrough or mishap, and both sides agreed to the UN suggestion that another round take place on August 10 and 11.

The Western Sahara conflict is both one of the world’s oldest and one of its most neglected. More than 30 years after the war began, the displacement of large numbers of people and a ceasefire in 1991 that froze military positions, its end remains remote. This is substantially due to the fact that for most of the actors – Morocco, Algeria and the Polisario Front, as well as Western countries – the status quo offers advantages a settlement might put at risk. But the conflict has human, political and economic costs and real victims: for the countries directly concerned, the region and the wider international community. This is important to acknowledge if a new conflict-resolution dynamic is to be created.

The combination of Morocco’s recent proposal of a “Sahara autonomous region”, the Polisario Front’s counter-proposal of independence with guarantees for Moroccan interests and the UN Security Council’s 30 April resolution calling for direct negotiations between the parties – due to begin on 18 June – has been hailed as a promising breakthrough in the protracted Western Sahara dispute. This optimism may eventually be vindicated but is likely to prove premature, since the underlying dynamics of the conflict have not changed. The formal positions of Morocco and the Polisario Front are still far apart; Algeria’s position remains ambiguous and difficult to deal with; and the UN, which has responsibility for resolving the conflict, still denies itself the means to do so.

The conflict over Western Sahara between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario Front, a rebel movement striving for the independence of Western Sahara from Morocco, has been on the agenda of the UN Security Council since 1991. The settlement plan that came into effect that year envisaged a referendum on self-determination for the people of Western Sahara with the choice of either integration with Morocco or independence. This "win or lose" approach is responsible for the "take no prisoners," zero-sum attitude adopted by both sides ever since. It has caused both parties to miss opportunities for a solution that would have allowed each to get some of what it wanted while allowing the other to save face. It has also paralyzed the UN from taking decisive action that could have resolved the conflict.

El contencioso del Sahara Occidental ocupa un lugar central en nuestra política hacia el Magreb y en la sensibilidad de muchos españoles. Es indudable que un interés primordial de España es fomentar en la región la paz y la estabilidad y apertura políticas, un desarrollo económico vigoroso y unas relaciones sólidas de buena vecindad. La política de Zapatero aleja la consecución de estos objetivos.

Few topics on the United Nations agenda have been as divisive within and even outside the organization as that of Western Sahara. The Western Sahara question has hung unresolved over the world body since the 1970s, when a rebellion broke out against Morocco’s attempt to annex the territory in the wake of Spain’s withdrawal. Morocco eventually secured control by force of arms, but the Polisario Front, sheltering in Algeria, remains a force to be reckoned with. The 1991 UN Settlement Plan for Western Sahara had laid out two possible but polar opposite outcomes that would follow a UN-supervised referendum on self-determination: either the territory would be integrated into Morocco, or it would become independent.

It's not double standards, it's no standards at all. The world has let scoff-law Morocco ride roughshod over international law and the UN Charter. It helps to have friends! Their territory split by a huge wall built at enormous expense, an occupied Arab population suffers under police raids and arbitrary imprisonment while the occupiers try to swamp the territories with settlers from their own population. In response, the locals are beginning an intifada, but face a much larger, better-equipped military force, the beneficiary of substantial overseas aid. Refugees living in camps are refused the right to return to their homes.

In late February 2007, Western Saharan nationalists celebrated the thirty-first anniversary of their government, the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic. The official ceremonies did not take place in Laayoune, the declared capital of Western Sahara, but in the small outpost of Tifariti near the Algerian border. This is because most of Western Sahara is under the administration and military occupation of Morocco, which claims the desert land as its own. The Western Saharan independence movement, led by the POLISARIO Front and the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, exists largely in exile, as does nearly half the native population. Roughly 100,000 Sahrawis have lived in refugee camps in the southwest corner of Algeria, near Tindouf, since POLISARIO proclaimed an independent republic in 1976. A generation has come of age in the camps, knowing nothing but refugee life and cut off from contact with their homeland.

In a routine decision, the UN Security Council two weeks ago extended the mandate of the UN mission for the referendum in Western Sahara until April 30, 2007. When it was established in 1991, the mission was supposed to organize a referendum within nine months for the self-determination of the Saharawi people.

The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade notes that given the status of Western Sahara as a Non-Self-Governing Territory, there are international law considerations with importing natural resources sourced from the Western Sahara. We recommend that companies seek legal advice before importing such material.

Ce courant est très atomisé et il est donc difficile d'en évaluer le poids politique. Il y a toutefois un chiffre qui parle de lui-même : au début des années 90, on comptait moins d'une dizaine d'associations culturelles amazighes et, aujourd'hui, elles sont plus de 200. Le courant est particulièrement actif dans les universités au travers du MCA, le mouvement culturel amazigh, qui agit au sein de l'UNEM.

Je pense que le référendum est l’unique solution possible. Ce que l’intifadha (dans les territoires sahraouis occupés, ndlr) met en évidence, c’est que sans autodétermination, il n’y aura jamais de stabilité dans les territoires occupés. Pour moi, c’est une solution réaliste et c’est même l’unique solution.

"The Court’s conclusion is that the materials and information presented to it do not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco....” Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice 1975

The goal of Sahara-Watch is to provide objective (i.e., true, not 'balanced') information and analysis on the Moroccan-Polisario conflict over Western Sahara.

Letter from Congress of the EEUU regarding the upcoming Fisheries Agreement signed by Morocco and the European Community. Feb 28, 2006

Last November marked the 30th anniversary of the Sahara crisis, triggered when Morocco successfully pressured Madrid out of its desert colony in autumn 1975. Despite the United States’ denials, declassified records reveal that King Hassan’s success was made possible through US intervention.

Qu’est-ce qui se trame au Sahara? La lettre dénonciatrice adressée le premier février 2006 par Mohamed Benaissa, le ministre marocain des Affaires étrangères, au secrétaire général des Nations Unies, Kofi Annan, ne présage rien de bon.

Ce texte militant est écrit en solidarité avec les deux journalistes, du « Journal Hebdomadaire » marocain, Boubker Jamaï - directeur de la publication - et Fahd Iraqi - secrétaire de rédaction, accusés par le « Centre européen de recherche, d'analyse et de conseil en matière stratégique »

La cuestión del Sahara occidental es actualmente uno de los temas inscritos en las agendas del Consejo de Seguridad y de la Asamblea General de la ONU, en espera del encauzamiento definitivo del proceso de paz por ahora estancado. Los observadores coinciden en considerar que la persistencia del conflicto prolonga una situación de injusticia para el pueblo de dicho territorio, afecta seriamente a la paz y a la seguridad de la región del Maghreb y, en consecuencia, repercute profundamente en las relaciones de ésta con su vecindad europea.

Apoya una solución justa y definitiva del conflicto del Sáhara Occidental, basada en el Derecho y la legalidad internacional, partiendo de las resoluciones pertinentes del Consejo de Seguridad, y en especial de la resolución 1495.

81 Estados en todo el mundo han reconocido a la RASD.

The purpose of the report, it seems, was to damage the reputation of the Polisario Front and the Saharawi people at this crucial time as far as the decolonisation conflict in Western Sahara is concerned.

Treinta años después de que los colonizadores españoles abandonaran el territorio, el conflicto del Sáhara Occidental sigue, hoy día, sin resolverse.

Votre 6éme année de règne a connu une série d'événements particulièrement importants. Ils méritent qu'on s'y attarde car ils concernent le devenir de notre pays et interpellent directement votre gouvernance, voire la nature même de la monarchie marocaine.

Despite sporadic attempts at western Mediterranean co-operation through the ‘Five plus Five’ grouping, the 1990s saw few signs of the emergence of a coherent security community in this purported ‘sub-region’ of the Mediterranean.