A power struggle is underway between Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) co-chairman (and widower of Benazir Bhutto) Asif Ali Zardari, Pakistan Muslim League/Nawaz (PML/N) leader Nawaz Sharif, and President Pervez Musharraf. This struggle threatens to unravel the newly elected coalition government and plunge Pakistan back into political chaos.

Pakistan stands at a critical crossroads. The legislative elections held on 18 February have radically transformed the country’s political landscape, ushering in a new era of democratic government after almost nine years of military rule under President Perwez Musharraf.

This article examines Pakistan following the assassination of Benazir Bhutto and the recent parliamentary elections within the confines of the challenges that arise from the need to embrace democracy. The article accepts that Pakistan must contend with a powerful military, rising Islamism, tribalism, an unstable political system, quarrelling leaders, and difficult foreign policy issues while it strives to continue to play its role in the global war on terror. The author concludes that only by uniting the different actors and seeking a stable Pakistan can the Islamist threat be defeated.

General Pervez Musharraf imposed martial law in Pakistan on 3 November 2007. He suspended the constitution, sacked the chief justice of the Supreme Court and removed other judges of that court who declared his act illegal. Police immediately began arresting lawyers, politicians and human rights activists. Independent television channels were taken off the air and reporting restrictions imposed. Thousands have since been jailed, journalists threatened and protests by lawyers and others suppressed. Replacing dissenting judges with hand-picked appointees, and ruling by decree, Musharraf’s objective is to retain personal power by gaining judicial approval for martial law, followed by the creation of a democratic façade through rigged elections. The international community should demand the immediate restoration of constitutional order, the rule of law and the legitimate judiciary, the release of political prisoners and the appointment of an impartial caretaker government to oversee free and fair elections.

On November 19, Pakistan's Supreme Court -- now stacked with government appointed judges -- dismissed most of the legal challenges to President Pervez Musharraf's continued hold on power. The actions are close to providing Musharraf with the opportunity to step down as head of the army and instead serve as the country's president for another five-year term. This latest move by Musharraf is another attempt to maintain the reins of power despite rising domestic discontent with his regime.

Since the start of Pakistan's current political crisis on November 3, there are still few signs that opposition forces in the country will be able to form an effective political platform to unseat President Pervez Musharraf. Although faint signs of cooperation appeared on November 15 when two of Pakistan's most popular politicians -- former prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif -- spoke of a "joint struggle" to unseat Musharraf, since then the two leaders and the parties which they represent continue to pursue independent strategies. The situation is unfolding quickly, as the country is steering toward national elections on January 8, of which the winning party will select a prime minister who will take power alongside President Musharraf.

With President Musharraf's 3 November declaration of emergency rule, Pakistan, and organizations operating there, face multiple security challenges due to civil unrest, government repression and terrorist threats.

This paper explores several key elements undermining the viability of the Pakistani state: Islamism, tribalism, ethno-nationalism, and quasi-secularism. The demands of each of these movements are difficult to reconcile with the needs of the others. At the same time, these movements exert pressure on a very weak government and state system. Hence, the author argues that unless the current regime undertakes substantial structural reforms, Pakistan may come apart at the seams, with dire consequences for regional and international stability.

2007 marks the 60th anniversary of Pakistan’s independence. By contrast with the attention that the identical anniversary of its powerful neighbour, India, has received, the international response has been decidedly muted. This reflects the relative uncertainty and pessimism which many observers feel about Pakistan’s future prospects.

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf is widely viewed as a military strongman who should be pressed to hold free and fair elections this year. Both the characterization of Musharraf and the policy recommendation are misguided. Musharraf's problem is that he has failed to act swiftly and ruthlessly to set Pakistan's politics on a proper course, and he knows—better than his critics—that given the complexity of Pakistan's internal problems, the holding of free and fair elections might not check Pakistan's drift toward extremism.

In the five and a half years since the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington forced the military government of General Pervez Musharraf to undertake a sudden, drastic reordering of its foreign policy orientation, the U.S.–Pakistan defense relationship has grown to a level—not just in monetary terms, but in daily military-to-military interaction—never before attained in its 52 year history. But the U.S.–Pakistan political relationship, despite positive rhetoric on both sides, has not followed suit. Given a stark choice of being "with us or against us," and thus with the very survival of the state in the balance, Pakistan was forced to repudiate its strong support of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, curtail support to militant's operating in Indian-held Kashmir, and become a de facto military ally of the United States in its Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Not unnaturally given the amount of duress under which it was obtained, doubts have grown over time in Washington about the sincerity of Islamabad's commitment to GWOT goals, and, more specifically, concern about the role of its intelligence services in providing covert support and sanctuary to Al Qaida and Taliban remnants on both sides of the Durand Line.

The rationale for the current U.S.–Pakistan engagement is the war on terror. Because this is also the rationale for many other events world wide there is a need to flag some aspects of past U.S.–Pakistan engagements. Pakistan’s geo-strategic and geo-political goals were determined by the environment created by the unresolved issues with India and the consequent hostility, the close alliance between India, the former USSR and Afghanistan and the global war against Communism waged by the United States throughout the Cold War period. The USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan gave the United States the opportunity to build the Resistance in Afghanistan into a jihad by forging an alliance with the Islamic countries. Pakistan became the logistic base and the front line state in this decade long struggle. This is when the seeds of terror were sown in Afghanistan. These seeds flourished because no one foresaw the consequences—they only saw the immediate opportunities and Pakistan was no exception.

Without Pakistan’s active and full cooperation, the United States and the broader international community cannot reconstruct Afghanistan, defeat the Taliban, and turn the tide of international terrorism. Yet most observers agree that Pakistan has not provided the fullest possible cooperation. Debate is growing about whether the Pakistani state is merely unable to do better or is actively undermining international efforts in Afghanistan and against terrorism.

President Pervez Musharraf, facing his most serious challenge in nearly eight years of authoritarian rule, is likely to try to retain power despite growing opposition. Rumours abound in Pakistan that he will declare a state of emergency, which would suspend fundamental rights and in effect mean martial law. Given an increasingly assertive opposition following his 9 March 2007 decision to remove the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, it will be impossible for the president and his military backers to maintain the status quo. Western friends of Pakistan, most influentially the U.S., can tip the balance by delivering a clear message that emergency rule is unacceptable and Pakistan should return to democratic government by holding free, fair and democratic elections by the end of the year.

The signs of creeping "Talibanization" in northwest Pakistan and calls for Shariah (Islamic) rule in the heart of the country's capital have heightened the urgency for free, fair, and transparent elections later this year. President Pervez Musharraf's best chance for dealing successfully with threats from radical Islamists lies in enforcing the rule of law against the anti-democratic vigilantes in Islamabad and militants in the tribal border areas and taking a conciliatory approach toward Pakistani civilian leaders who support a democratic, progressive vision for Pakistan. If a free and fair election is held with the full participation of the mainstream secular parties, they are likely to win, thereby striking a blow against religious extremists.

More than five years after President Pervez Musharraf declared his intention to crack down on violent sectarian and jihadi groups and to regulate the network of madrasas (religious schools) on which they depend, his government’s reform program is in shambles. Banned sectarian and jihadi groups, supported by networks of mosques and madrasas, continue to operate openly in Pakistan’s largest city, Karachi, and elsewhere. The international community needs to press President Musharraf to fulfil his commitments, in particular to enforce genuine controls on the madrasas and allow free and fair national elections in 2007. It should also shift the focus of its donor aid from helping the government’s ineffectual efforts to reform the religious schools to improving the very weak public school sector.

In the five years since Pakistani president General Pervez Musharraf announced his intention to cut ties with the Taliban and join the war on terrorism, U.S. policy toward Pakistan has been one of unstinting support. That approach has brought some genuine gains: more al Qaeda members have been captured and killed in Pakistan than anywhere else in the world since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Yet today, it is worth asking whether U.S. policy has reached its limits and if it is now being guided more by inertia than strategy. Washington’s close alliance with Musharraf may now have run its course.

Almost six decades after Pakistan’s independence, the constitutional status of the Federally Administered Northern Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan), once a part of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir and now under Pakistani control, remains undetermined, with political autonomy a distant dream. The region’s inhabitants are embittered by Islamabad’s unwillingness to devolve power to its elected representatives, and a nationalist movement, which seeks independence, is gaining ground. The rise of sectarian extremism is an alarming consequence of this denial of basic political rights. Taking advantage of the weaknesses in the imposed dispensation, religious organisations espousing a narrow sectarian agenda are fanning the fires of sectarian hatred in a region where Sunnis, Shias and Ismailis have peacefully coexisted for several centuries.

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's decision on March 9 to dismiss the country's chief justice, Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, sparked country-wide protests, with some demonstrators calling for Musharraf to leave office. Chaudhry was charged with abuse of power and nepotism, but it appears he was removed from power due to the threat that Pakistan's independent judiciary poses to Musharraf's rule. The political conflict sparked by this decision put international attention again on Musharraf's dictatorial leanings, and caused pro-democracy activists in the United States to criticize Washington's close relations with the country.

Taliban and other foreign militants, including al-Qaeda sympathisers, have sheltered since 2001 in Pakistan’s Pashtun-majority Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), seven administrative districts bordering on south eastern Afghanistan. Using the region to regroup, reorganise and rearm, they are launching increasingly severe cross-border attacks on Afghan and international military personnel, with the support and active involvement of Pakistani militants.

Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz recently stated that his country will not allow U.S. strikes on militants within its borders. Speaking to CNN on November 12, Aziz said, "We do not allow any country to violate our sovereignty. We are committed to fighting terrorism but it has to be fought together. … We are totally capable of taking care of activities within our borders and we do not encourage or allow any country to violate this understanding."

The Taliban and al Qaeda insurgencies today are equally active in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The nationalist insurgency in Pakistani Baluchistan, which Pakistani leaders assert receives support from Indian agents in Afghanistan, also aggravates relations between the two countries. The challenges of violent insurgency require both countries to address their relationship, particularly as it affects the border areas. Formation of such a policy is essential to the vital interests of the United States, NATO, and the international community, which has committed itself to the effort in Afghanistan through UN Security Council resolutions and other measures.

A stable, democratic, economically thriving Pakistan is considered vital to U.S. interests. U.S. concerns regarding Pakistan include regional terrorism; Pakistan-Afghanistan relations; weapons proliferation; the ongoing Kashmir problem and Pakistan-India tensions; human rights protection; and economic development. A U.S.-Pakistan relationship marked by periods of both cooperation and discord was transformed by the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the ensuing enlistment of Pakistan as a key ally in U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts. Top U.S. officials regularly praise Islamabad for its ongoing cooperation, although doubts exist about Islamabad’s commitment to some core U.S. interests. Pakistan is identified as a base for terrorist groups and their supporters operating in Kashmir,India, and Afghanistan. Since late 2003, Pakistan’s army has been conducting unprecedented counterterrorism operations in the country’s western tribal areas.

For years, Nawab Mohammed Akbar Khan Bugti battled the Pakistan Army. The 80-year-old renegade hidden in the mountains of Balochistan became a legend in his fight for greater autonomy against what he saw as colonial brutality.

When the U.S.-led coalition invaded Afghanistan five years ago, pessimists warned that we Americans would soon find ourselves in a similar situation to what Soviet forces faced in the 1980s. They were wrong - but only about the timing.

Imran Gul would like to see a better future for the tribal youth of his corner of Pakistan, but most days he only sees military helicopters returning from Waziristan, ferrying wounded and dead. Casualties in the conflicts along the Afghan border serve as a reminder that the tribal system, once strong and proud, is now falling apart.

The visit by U.S. President George W. Bush to India and Pakistan during the first week of March this year is rightly viewed as a turning point in U.S. relations toward South Asia for two reasons: first, for formally “de-hyphenating” India and Pakistan in Washington’s worldview; and second, for producing a landmark agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation between India and the United States that will “legitimize” India’s status as a nuclear weapon state, open the door for foreign reactor sales and technological assistance, and bring India more fully into the international nuclear export control regime.

According to some people, including former president Bill Clinton, South Asia is the most dangerous place on earth. Certainly there is the possibility of conflict, but actually, the region is by no means the most dangerous place on earth. Indeed, during Clinton’s tenure in office, Rwanda was much more dangerous, if one looks at the sheer number of people who were killed (by machetes, not nuclear weapons).

The Pakistan government’s ill-planned and poorly executed emergency response to the October 2005 earthquake highlighted the inadequacies of authoritarian rule. As the government now embarks on three to four years of reconstruction and rehabilitation, the absence of civilian oversight and inadequate accountability and transparency could seriously undermine the process.

A stable, democratic, economically thriving Pakistan is considered vital to U.S. interests in Asia. Key U.S. concerns regarding Pakistan include regional terrorism; Pakistan- Afghanistan relations; weapons proliferation; the ongoing Kashmir problem and Pakistan- India tensions; human rights protection; and economic development.

Strengthening Pakistan's democratic parties is also crucial for the international community. The marginalisation of moderate voices has allowed religious parties to fill a political vacuum. Their increasing strength has encouraged intolerance and extremism that could erode regional stability if left unchecked.

Sectarian conflict in Pakistan is the direct consequence of state policies of Islamisation and marginalisation of secular democratic forces.