We are facing a threat that is catastrophic in its scale. The damage that even a single attack with weapons of mass destruction would wreak could run into the millions of lives, and do egregious damage to American economic, political, and social structures. There is no graver threat to the United States.

There is growing evidence that asymmetrical warfare has become a strategy of choice among dissident, extremist political groups and will be the most likely national and international security threat in the 21st century. Operating in small, covert groups, and having no recognized sovereign territory or population to defend, asymmetrical combatants can engage in violent, lethal activities with far less risk of being totally overwhelmed by reprisals that a nation-state might face. In addition, those killed in action can be portrayed as martyrs and used to recruit more converts to the cause.

The next American president will inherit an overseas military base realignment process begun in the first term of the George W. Bush administration. This realignment, guided by an effort known as the Global Posture Review (GPR), was perhaps former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s chief intellectual and policy accomplishment during his six-year tenure at the Pentagon. Unlike his likely warfighting legacy, particularly in regard to Iraq, the GPR is on generally sound conceptual foundations. But a successful outcome for the Global Posture Review, roughly halfway implemented as of mid-2008, will depend on the next U.S. administration refining numerous rough edges of the current plan — and redefining the broader national security policy context in which any base realignment will inevitably be viewed.

In wartime Washington, the one point of bipartisan agreement is that our land forces are too small. Indeed, the small size of America’s land forces has for years been the tightest constraint on U.S. military strategy, and it is likely to remain so for years to come. The failure to foresee the need for larger ground forces, and the reluctance to respond rapidly once the requirement became undeniable, may constitute the most profound mistake made by the Bush administration after the attacks of September 11, 2001. It will fall to the next administration to begin the effort to remedy this most dire divergence between American military ends and American military means, and the undertaking is likely to go on for at least a decade. We went to war with the army we had, and now must accept the truth about the size, shape, and costs of the land forces we need.

This is the fifteenth edition of the Army’s capstone operations manual. Its lineage goes back to the first doctrine written for the new American Army, Baron von Steuben’s 1779 Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States. Today, as with each previous version of Operations, FM 3-0 shapes all of Army doctrine, while influencing the Army’s organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, and Soldier concerns. But its contents are not truly capstone doctrine until Army forces internalize it. This requires education and individual study by all Army leaders. And it requires more: Army leaders must examine and debate the doctrine, measuring it against their experience and strategic, operational, and tactical realities. They must also recognize that while FM 3-0 can inform them of how to think about operations, it cannot provide a recipe for what to do on the battlefield.

Difficult national security decisions involve hard trade-offs between benefit and risk. On the merits, the Bush administration’s decision about what to do with a failing satellite isn’t difficult. In this case, great harm can come from using this satellite for target practice, and there is relatively little risk in allowing the satellite to burn up in the atmosphere, with some charred remnants falling to Earth.

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

The Army is at war. Since Operation Desert Storm in 1991 it has been committed to a series of operations that have intensified since the homeland was attacked on 11 September 2001. Since that attack, Army and joint forces have deployed repeatedly for conventional and irregular warfare, and on missions as different as noncombatant evacuation, peacekeeping, and homeland security. Wartime missions and circumstances have forced the Army to adapt to enemies and conditions pragmatically, changing old arrangements decisively and quickly. Even if worldwide contingencies were not forcing the pace of action, the Army and the joint force would still face change. Strategic adjustments after the Cold War—new opponents, new liabilities, new opportunities—and the need to accommodate constant technological developments would have required the armed forces to change to remain effective. In less than a decade, the U.S. military has evolved dramatically under the pressure of these changes. This evolution has transformed operations from loosely linked, Service-dominated operations into fully integrated, interdependent campaigns.

Before I talk about specific threats, I want to raise an issue of immediate importance for the functioning of the Intelligence Community and protection of the nation. The authorities granted by the Protect America Act (PAA)—which temporarily closed gaps in our intelligence collection and allowed the Intelligence Community to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance—are critical to our intelligence efforts to protect the Nation from current threats.

One of President George W. Bush’s stated reasons for starting the war in Iraq was to bring democracy to that country. He stated in December 2006 that “[We] are committed to a strategic goal of a free Iraq that is democratic, that can govern itself, defend itself and sustain itself.” More broadly, the Bush Administration has viewed democracy promotion as an instrument for combatting terrorism.

Considered at “initial operating capacity” on Oct. 1st of this year, the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) lays the groundwork for ambitious goals: to improve security mechanisms, military professionalism, set up accountable governance where lacking, and to work in conjunction with African states and regional organizations in deterring aggression and responding to crises. For fiscal year 2007-2008, AFRICOM has a budget of $50 million, and it is predicted the command will eventually have a budget of $250 million, which would comprise 3 percent of U.S. government spending on Africa. The doctrine for the command proposes an unprecedented level of U.S. interagency cooperation, with the aim of supporting other agencies in implementing security policies and strategies. AFRICOM also aims to establish regional headquarters on the African continent, which would make the command one of only two U.S. Combatant Commands with headquarters outside of the continental United States. For the present, AFRICOM operates out of Stuttgart, Germany, which also hosts the U.S. European Command headquarters.

The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, most often referred to as the Ottawa Convention, is built on a few simple ideas: civilians should not be killed or maimed by weapons that strike blindly and senselessly, either during or after conflicts; wars should end when the fighting stops; and postconflict communities should be free to rebuild without risking lives and livelihoods to do so.

Simple solutions to complex problems are inherently attractive and almost always wrong. So it is with the Pentagon’s recent decision to enter into “crash” production of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected armored vehicles, or MRAPs. Political and military leaders are currently grappling with this problem, which can be summed up as: How much to invest in a new system that appears to provide enhanced protection for troops against the most common, lethal threat in Iraq, without undermining either the ability of the force to conduct the current mission set before it, or the ability to remain effective across the range of missions and operating environments it will also have to be ready for in the years ahead?

This report is prepared annually to provide Congress with official, unclassified, quantitative data on conventional arms transfers to developing nations by the United States and foreign countries for the preceding eight calendar years for use in its policy oversight functions. All agreement and delivery data in this report for the United States are government-to-government Foreign Military Sales transactions. Some general data are provided on worldwide conventional arms transfers by all suppliers, but the principal focus is the level of arms transfers by major weapons suppliers to nations in the developing world. Developing nations continue to be the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity by weapons suppliers. During the years 1999-2006, the value of arms transfer agreements with developing nations comprised 66.4% of all such agreements worldwide. More recently, arms transfer agreements with developing nations constituted 65.7% of all such agreements globally from 2003-2006, and 71.5% of these agreements in 2006.

On October 1, the United States launches the U.S. Africa Command, an historic step in meeting steeply rising U.S. stakes in Africa. We recently traveled to Stuttgart, Germany to meet with General “Kip” Ward, nominated to be the first AFRICOM Combatant Commander, and his staff. The trip reinforced the high risks this command faces in its first year. In Africa, inept outreach has both hardened opposition to the command and raised unrealistic expectations among supporters. At home, State-Defense cooperation has been largely absent, and Congress is concerned that the command’s high start-up costs will produce little return. Within Defense, Africa expertise is thin, and the command will be vulnerable early on to unforeseen, quick breaking crises. Despite these cautions, our trip underscored the fundamental soundness of the command’s strategic rationale. We remain convinced that AFRICOM will improve America’s strategic approach to Africa and advance the necessary evolution of its national security apparatus.

The Army Science and Technology Investments seek to enable capabilities described in the Quadrennial Defense Review and the needs established in the TRADOC Capability Gap/Technology Shortfalls process. The S&T investments are characterized in Future Force technology areas. The highest priority S&T investments in Future Force technology areas are designated as ATOs. The ATOs are developed and approved for execution through a rigorous process that engages the S&T, acquisition, and combat development communities. Each ATO has defined products, milestones, designated resources, and projected warfighter payoff. The ATO products are shaped to provide technologies that are relevant to satisfying capabilities needs. The acquisition program managers partner with the S&T materiel developers to enhance opportunities for rapid transition of technology described in Technology Transition Agreements.

America is at war with terrorist enemies who are intent on attacking our Homeland and destroying our way of life. The lives and livelihoods of the American people also remain at risk from natural catastrophes, including naturally occurring infectious diseases and hazards such as hurricanes and earthquakes, and man-made accidents. Our National Strategy for Homeland Security recognizes that while we must continue to focus on the persistent and evolving terrorist threat, we also must address the full range of potential catastrophic events, including man-made and natural disasters, due to their implications for homeland security.

The President: Thank you all. Please be seated. It's good to be with you again. I understand you haven't had much of a problem attracting speakers. I thank you for inviting me. I can understand why people want to come here. See, it's an honor to stand with the men and women of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. The VFW is one of this nation's finest organizations. You belong to an elite group of Americans. You belong to a group of people who have defended America overseas. You have fought in places from Normandy to Iwo Jima, to Pusan, to Khe Sahn, to Kuwait, to Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. You brought security to the American people; you brought hope to millions across the world.

The costs and unmet expectations of the democracy promotion project in Iraq and the wider Middle East have sparked a broad debate about the future of U.S. grand strategy. In the chorus for change, some suggest that the United States should return to such principles of liberal internationalism as multilateralism and financial beneficence, which marked the golden era of U.S. diplomacy in the years immediately following the end of World War II. Others insist that U.S. foreign policy needs to be reestablished in a more pragmatic realism that responds to the global balance of power and resists the overuse of military muscle to promote democracy around the world.

The end of the Cold War shifted the tectonic plates, but the repercussions from these momentous events are still unfolding. Emerging powers in Asia, retrenchment in Eurasia, a roiling Middle East, and transatlantic divisions are among the issues that have only come to a head in recent years. The very magnitude and speed of change resulting from a globalizing world—apart from its precise character—will be a defining feature of the world out to 2020. Other significant characteristics include: the rise of new powers, new challenges to governance, and a more pervasive sense of insecurity, including terrorism. As we map the future, the prospects for increasing global prosperity and the limited likelihood of great power conflict provide an overall favorable environment for coping with what are otherwise daunting challenges. The role of the United States will be an important variable in how the world is shaped, influencing the path that states and nonstate actors choose to follow.

The most important military component of the Long War will not be the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our allies to fight with us. After describing the many complicated, interrelated, and simultaneous tasks that must be conducted to defeat an insurgency, the new Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual notes “Key to all these tasks is developing an effective host-nation (HN) security force.” Indeed, it has been argued that foreign forces cannot defeat an insurgency; the best they can hope for is to create the conditions that will enable local forces to win for them.

Madam President, I rise today to offer observations on the continuing involvement of the United States in Iraq. In my judgment, our course in Iraq has lost contact with our vital national security interests in the Middle East and beyond. Our continuing absorption with military activities in Iraq is limiting our diplomatic assertiveness there and elsewhere in the world. The prospects that the current “surge” strategy will succeed in the way originally envisioned by the President are very limited within the short period framed by our own domestic political debate.

For the second time in a generation, the United States faces the prospect of defeat at the hands of an insurgency. In April 1975, the U.S. fled the Republic of Vietnam, abandoning our allies to their fate at the hands of North Vietnamese communists. In 2007, Iraq's grave and deteriorating condition offers diminishing hope for an American victory and portends risk of an even wider and more destructive regional war.

The U.S. military and national security community lost interest in insurgency after the end of the Cold War. Other defense issues such as multinational peacekeeping and transformation seemed more pressing and thus attracted the most attention. But with the onset of the Global War on Terror in 2001 and the ensuing involvement of the U.S. military in counterinsurgency support in Iraq and Afghanistan, insurgency experienced renewed concern in both the defense and intelligence communities.

En este debate del 15 de Mayo der 1967 entre el gobernador de California y el senador Robert Kennedy, Reagan aplastó a RK. No fué un debate directo entre ellos. Respondían a preguntas, o más bien afirmaciones vitriólicas, que les hacían estudiantes extremistas de todo el mundo, sobre Estados Unidos y Vietnam. Tiene el interés de que son el mismo tipo de acusaciones que la izquierda hace ahora contra los estados Unidos de Bush y la guerra de Irak, de ahí su actualidad.

Redefining Sovereignty is a very useful tool for those who are interested in or concerned about the subject of national sovereignty. It presents views from perspectives as varied as those of Kofi Annan and Jesse Helms. Before I turn the microphone over to our moderator and our guests, I’d like to share with you a portion of Senator Helms’s speech to the United Nations in January of 2000. I’m taking this from his memoir, Here’s Where I Stand.

“Immense Expense Is Mainly in Defense” is a parody tune performed by the Capitol Steps, a Washington-based troupe; but while the tune has a nice rhyme scheme, it does not reflect the facts concerning recent federal budgets. By historical standards, the federal government’s investment in defense is relatively modest. Given that the United States has been at war since September 11, 2001, and has been conducting significant military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, this may come as a surprise to many Americans.

I’m going to suggest that if I was an American from the 1942 era and was studying the current national discourse on “the War” (regardless of how you define the current “War”) using major legacy network television, cable news, legacy newspapers, and the Internet as my sources, I’d immediately draw some conclusions for this Long War. I’d expect our daily casualties to be in the tens of thousands, our base camps in the war zones to be falling one after another, Al-Jazeera footage showing disheveled Coalition General Officers walking out of Camp Victory with their hands in the air followed by their weary staffs, ships being torpedoed off the Virginia Coast, forces of Al-Qaeda and the Axis of Evil relentlessly advancing on I-95 towards Washington DC and so on.

Veteran Middle Eastern analyst and former Clinton Administration official Martin Indyk recently characterized the Middle East as being turned “upside down” in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. It’s hard to argue with his assessment. The Iraq invasion has unleashed wide-ranging forces that are re-ordering the internal and external dynamics of regional security that could see the region plunged into a prolonged period of strategic insecurity.

Modern-day U.S. defense strategy, of necessity, is global in scope, and it will likely retain this character for decades. Fundamental to maintaining this global awareness and presence are satellite operations. National economic and commercial interrelationships thrive on the flow of invisible ones and zeros through space channels, so that timely, agile intercontinental trade is now taken for granted. U.S. and coalition forces routinely leverage earth-circling platforms to enhance military capabilities: the Global Positioning System for improved navigation and precision timing, reconnaissance and early warning sensors, and high-bandwidth communications. Space, moreover, is an open arena, a global commons increasingly used by many countries for military purposes.

Brent Scowcroft is someone I have known and worked with since I was first detailed for the National Security Council from CIA 33 years ago this summer. Brent was then the deputy national security adviser. And as I recall, President Nixon's final appeal for the Watergate case was being heard by the Supreme Court. I later wrote that working for Brent in the White House at that time was like being a deckhand on the Titanic.

During the cold war, the U.S. embassy in Moscow occasionally released an end-of-the-year cable to break up the usual routine of political assessments and military analyses. Instead, it quoted the latest jokes making the rounds of Moscow. A sample: Leonid Brezhnev takes a day off to show his mother his city mansion and his country dacha. That evening at dinner his mother says she is impressed but whispers with concern, “But Lenya, what happens if the Bolsheviks come back?” Or: “tass reports that the latest Five Year Plan will have the Soviet Ministry of Electronics design the world’s largest microchip.”

This report examines U.S. government assistance to the police and internal security agencies of repressive and transitioning states. Throughout its history, the United States has provided assistance to a number of countries that have not shared its political ideals. Their security forces were not accountable to the public, and their practices and approaches were not transparent. The decision to provide assistance to repressive and autocratic states (and states that are, to varying extents, seeking to transition away from repression) raises a number of questions, the answers to which have significant policy implications. Can U.S. assistance improve the effectiveness of internal security agencies in countering security threats? Has U.S. assistance improved the accountability and human rights records of these agencies? What is the relationship between improving security and improving accountability and human rights?

A clash over defense spending looms as the new year gets underway. The costly wars raging in Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with political change in Washington, as well as earlier decisions to approve a number of high-cost weapons systems, will make the debate over FY2008 defense spending particularly contentious. As always, the three services—the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy (which also contains the Marine Corps)—each view their particular needs as under-funded priorities. In Congress, leaders in both parties say the practice of paying for combat operations through “Emergency Supplemental Spending Bills” has gotten out of hand and want more of this money folded into the regular budget process.

In August, 1941, in the midst of a world convulsed by war, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill convened to “make known certain common principles ... on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.“ In issuing the Atlantic Charter, these two statesmen did not simply plant the seeds of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. They prompted new thinking about transatlantic security, a conception that did not rest solely on the shifting tectonic plates of geopolitics or the narrowly construed interests of the nation-state, but rather in an alliance of liberal democracies, one sharing the will and means to safeguard their interests and their values against external threats.

Robert M. Gates: Distinguished ministers, Parliamentarians, representatives of the United States Congress - ladies and gentlemen. I would like to thank Horst for inviting me to speak at this venerable forum to offer some thoughts on our transatlantic partnership. It's gratifying to see so many people who I've worked with on these security issues going back many years. Speaking of issues going back many years, as an old Cold Warrior, one of yesterday?s speeches almost filled me with nostalgia for a less complex time. Almost.

With the new Democrat-dominated Congress, changes in the Administration and in anticipation of the Baker-Hamilton Commission’s report, it seems that America’s foreign policy, and especially its policy on Iraq, is heading towards a ‘change of course’. However, a number of questions remain. For example, will the new Congress be in a position to effectively influence U.S. foreign policy? What will be the relationship between the Democratic legislature and Republican President? Do the Democrats have a clear idea of what to do about Iraq, Iran and other foreign policy issues? It is also not clear what policy changes may be brought about by the new appointment at the Defence Department or what Robert Gates’s relationship with other governmental agencies will be, especially with the State Department. In what follows some tentative thoughts are offered on these matters.

Next week, the new congressional majority will introduce legislation to fulfill an election year pledge to further implement the reforms proposed by the 9/11 Commission. Prudent action by Congress that better prepares the nation to deal with the threat of transnational terrorism is certainly warranted, but determining whether this initiative achieves that end will not be easy. Moving quickly to mark up this legislation without hearings or floor debate will leave little time to consider the bill. There are, however, three tell-tale signs that will indicate whether the measure is thoughtfully constructed to help keep America secure, free, and prosperous.

Reviewing the past, present, and future contribution of maritime forces to the conduct of expeditionary operations, the author concludes that the importance of this contribution is growing. He considers the diplomatic and ""good order"" roles of maritime forces which enable such operations in the first place. He reviews contemporary naval thinking about the nature and the relevance of sea control, and examines changes in the way maritime power may be projected ashore. Finally, the author analyses the extent to which future sea-basing can enable expeditionary forces can meet the challenges of the 21st century. Using past and recent experience, he demonstrates how important maritime outcomes are to the achievement and, equally important, the consolidation of victories ashore. Accordingly, navies around the world are having to adjust their plans and their priorities in order to meet these challenges.

On behalf of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, we are pleased to transmit the Commission’s fourth Annual Report to the Congress, pursuant to Public Law 106–398 (October 30, 2000), as amended by Public Law No. 109–108 (November 22, 2005). This report responds to the mandate for the Commission ‘‘to monitor, investigate, and report to Congress on the national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China.’’ In this report, the Commission reached a broad and bipartisan consensus; it approved the Report unanimously, with all 12 members voting to approve and submit it.

This manual is designed to fill a doctrinal gap. It has been 20 years since the Army published a field manual devoted exclusively to counterinsurgency operations. For the Marine Corps it has been 25 years. With our Soldiers and Marines fighting insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is essential that we give them a manual that provides principles and guidelines for counterinsurgency operations. Such guidance must be grounded in historical studies. However, it also must be informed by contemporary experiences.

With U.S. President George W. Bush's new Iraq strategy unveiled, it is clear that the administration is running out of options. The "surge" policy that will now be implemented is an attempt to somewhat stabilize the situation in Baghdad. This is the most that the new policy can hope for -- temporary stabilization -- because a surge in troops does little to address the issues that are fomenting the insurgency. Once the surplus soldiers are called back, or once the insurgents adapt to the increased numbers, attacks will escalate again and Washington will be in the same position that it is in now.

We know that the nation requires more from our Intelligence Community than ever before because America confronts a greater diversity of threats and challenges than ever before. Globalization, the defining characteristic of our age, mandates global intelligence coverage. Globalization is not a “threat” in and of itself; it has more positive than negative characteristics.

Less than a month after Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates took office, his imprint on American military strategy is beginning to show. Mr. Gates, it turns out, is a hawk. In just the last two weeks, he has supported deepening the American military commitment in Iraq, spoken approvingly of sending more troops to Afghanistan and, after dispatching a second American aircraft carrier to the Persian Gulf, declared that negotiations with Iran right now would be futile.

I'll start with a very editorial-minded kind of question. The Iraq Study Group doesn't mention democracy. They urge you to talk to Iran and Syria, which has not been helpful to the democracy cause, particularly in Lebanon.

The basic objective of U.S. strategy must be to protect the American people and the American way of life. This overarching goal should comprise three more specific aims: 1) a secure homeland, including protection against attacks on our people and infrastructure and against fatal epidemics; 2) a healthy global economy, which is essential for our own prosperity and security; and 3) a benign international environment, grounded in security cooperation among nations and the spread of liberal democracy.

America is at war with a transnational terrorist movement fueled by a radical ideology of hatred,oppression, and murder. Our National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, first published in February 2003, recognizes that we are at war and that protecting and defending the Homeland, the American people, and their livelihoods remains our first and most solemn obligation.

Select U.S. and British military personnel will be use the same computer network in the future for joint intelligence and planning purposes.

The recent publication of the second Bush administration statement on national strategy passed without the controversy that marked its predecessor in 2002 even though the new statement reiterates the commitment to a strategy of pre-emption in exactly the same words as the last.

Our Nation’s security challenges are substantially more diverse and uncertain than they were just two decades ago. The ongoing Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), continued unrest and instability in the Middle East, and the effects of globalization accelerated by remarkable technological advancements illustrate the increasing complexity of our world.

The goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. This is the best way to provide enduring security for the American people.

Success in Iraq requires progress on all three tracks — political, security, and economic — of the President’s National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. The three tracks are fundamental to our counter-insurgency, counterterrorism campaign and our effort to help Iraqis build a democratic, stable and prosperous country that is a partner in the war against terrorism.

The NMSP-WOT constitutes the comprehensive military plan to prosecute the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) for the Armed Forces of the United States. This document reflects the lessons of the first four years of the Global War on Terrorism, including the findings and recommendations of the 9-11 Commission and a rigorous examination within the Department of Defense (DoD), personally led by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Testimony presented to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission on February 3, 2006

The QDR is not a programmatic or budget document. Instead, it refl ects the thinking of the senior civilian and military leaders of the Department of Defense.

The current U.S. National Defense Strategy identifies irregular challengers as an increasingly salient problem. The ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was expected to shape America's capacity to deal with nonlinear and irregular warfare, as well as balance the Pentagon's overdrawn checkbook.

We live on the cusp of a new era. It is an era plagued by uncertainty and change and unrestricted warfare, an era of shifting global threats and challenging new opportunities.

Victory in Iraq is Defined in Stages • Short term, Iraq is making steady progress in fighting terrorists, meeting political milestones, building democratic institutions, and standing up security forces. • Medium term, Iraq is in the lead defeating terrorists and providing its own security, with a fully constitutional government in place, and on its way to achieving its economic potential. • Longer term, Iraq is peaceful, united, stable, and secure, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism.

The United States places a very high priority upon verifying compliance with, and detecting violations of, such agreements and commitments – as well as upon ensuring that violators promptly return to compliance and that other would-be violators are deterred from breaking their own promises.

This publication provides guidelines for the joint employment of forces in nuclear operations. It provides guidance for the employment of US nuclear forces; command and control relationships; and weapons effect considerations.

These scenarios are designed to be the foundational structure for the development of national preparedness standards from which homeland security capabilities can be measured. While these scenarios reflect a rigorous analytical effort by federal, state, and local homeland security experts, it is recognized that refinement and revision over time may be necessary to ensure the scenarios remain accurate, represent the evolving all-hazards threat picture, and embody the capabilities necessary to respond to domestic incidents.

The National Security Strategy of USA seeks to defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants, to preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers and to extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.

The United States and its allies and partners have a strong interest in protecting the sovereignty of nation states.

It describes the Armed Forces’ plan to achieve military objectives in the near term and provides the vision for ensuring they remain decisive in the future.

Training Iraq’s security forces is the centerpiece of President George W. Bush’s strategy in Iraq. To the extent that training records can be uncovered in the muddle of conflicting reports, the chronicle of the past eighteen months raises grave doubts about the strategy’s hope of success.