In the past few years Moscow’s increasingly assertive foreign policy posture has been underscored by signs of improvement in the military realm. Several pundits have argued that the Russian army is “back,” that it is once again an effective force, having endured humiliating conditions through much of the post-Soviet period. Some recent developments have undoubtedly supported this contention. After all, in 2007 alone Russia resumed regular long-range bomber missions after a 16-year hiatus, conducted a military exercise with the People’s Republic of China and other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (a.k.a. “The Dictators’ Club”) that included 6,500 troops and over 100 aircraft, increased defense spending by more than 30 percent, announced a new rearmament program, and began planning the reclamation of the old Soviet naval base at Tartus, Syria in order to reestablish a Mediterranean naval presence.

America’s tragedy of September 11, 2001 and in the aftermath of these attacks constituted a historic watershed in the development of Middle Eastern politics and brought about significant changes in the formation of a new structure of international relations – both regionally and globally. Since the threat of international terrorism became an imminent reality to all nations, many states, including Russia - which during the past decade has been a primary target of international terrorist organizations- have implemented substantial revisions in their conception of national security and foreign policy. In Russia’s case, a key element of this new conception is the realization that the most effective force in combating the phenomenon of international terrorism may be the creation of a wide international counter-terrorist coalition.

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) framework obliges the EU to coordinate closely with Georgia on its policies for conflict resolution in the breakaway entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Brussels and Tbilisi do not share the same time perspective, however. The Georgian government is striving for a quick resolution of both secessionist conflicts, despite the impasse reached in the negotiations on the question of status and the marked incompatibility between its positions and those of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Russia. From the standpoint of the Georgian government, good governance cannot be expected with unmonitored borders, and the refusal of the Abkhaz authorities to acknowledge the right of return of all displaced persons is intolerable. In these conditions, a swift succession of new initiatives increases the government’s domestic legitimacy, while its proactive policy helps focus Western attention on the instability of this region.

A growing conventional wisdom holds that Vladimir Putin's attack on democracy has brought Russia stability and prosperity -- providing a new model of successful market authoritarianism. But the correlation between autocracy and economic growth is spurious. Autocracy's effects in Russia have in fact been negative. Whatever the gains under Putin, they would have been greater under a democratic regime.

The Duma election and its results reinforce the prevailing undemocratic trends in Russia. The changes in electoral laws, the election campaign and its biased coverage in the Russian media, the Russian authorities’ hostile attitude towards international election observation and the so-called Putin’s Plan leave very little hope of democratic pluralism developing in Russia anytime soon.

Plans to push the front lines of the US missile defence system into Eastern Europe have led to the most significant crisis in US-Russian relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This crisis is neither accidental nor artificial, but the inevitable result of the foreign and defence policies currently pursued by the USA and Russia.

The two papers grouped together here were delivered at the Strategic Studies Institute’s annual strategy conference for 2007. As the theme of the conference was global security challenges to the United States and proceeded on a region by region basis, these papers were delivered during the session devoted to security challenges issuing from what is now called Eurasia, i.e., to a large degree the former Soviet Union. The authors illustrate the degree to which great power rivalry in Eurasia has become a major security issue and source of growing Russo-American tensions. Whereas Dr. R. Craig Nation lays out some of the fundamental macro-strategic issues of this rivalry and U.S. goals in Eurasia, as well as the consequences of Russian resistance to Western and American pressures, Dr. Dmitri Trenin emphasizes the growing intensity of Russian threat perceptions.

We are here at this annual meeting in the Defence Ministry to sum up the results of work over this last period and outline measures for the Armed Forces’ ongoing modernisation. I would like to say from the outset that we have achieved some good results and that genuinely new steps have been taken in a number of areas. Our strategic aviation has resumed regular patrols and military exercises have resulted in improvements to the way we use our army and naval groups in different areas. Operational and military preparedness training has been carried out more intensively.

The symbolic planting of the Russian flag on the seabed close to the geographic North Pole on August 2, 2007, has received a disproportionate amount of media coverage and triggered massive jubilation domestically as well as international criticism. Officially, Moscow has maintained that it acted in full compliance with the Law of the Sea Convention. The goal of the on-going series of expeditions is to collect scientific evidence for resubmitting to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) its request to confirm that some 460,000 mi2 of underwater terrain between the Lomonosov and Mendeleev ridges are the continuation of the Siberian shelf and thus could be added to Russia’s exclusive economic zone. In fact, however, this particular expedition had minimal scientific content but played a prominent role in adding an Arctic dimension to Russia’s assertive foreign policy.

With Vladimir Putin's announcement this week that he would head the pro-Kremlin United Russia party in December's parliamentary elections, Russia's new power configuration began to take shape. Ultimately, it will mean the extension of Putin's authority and a triumph of manipulative politics. But as they have demonstrated, the Russian people won't mind.

By introdicing the Wider Europe concept and the European Neighborbood Policy, the European Union has actually entered a region which Russia has long considered the sphere of its national interests.

The EUISS organised a workshop entitled ‘Russia – A difficult partner for the EU’ on 23 April 2007 in Paris. The group of participants included experts from different EU member states and representatives of EU institutions as well as of Foreign Ministries. The aim of the workshop was to set up a Russia Task Force, which will meet twice a year and discuss topical issues relating to Russia’s domestic and international affairs. The next meeting is scheduled for the autumn and is likely to be dedicated to the upcoming Duma and Presidential elections and their implications for Russia’s foreign policy and relations with the EU. The programme of the first meeting focused mainly on three issues: Russia’s domestic situation one year before the Presidential elections and the probable end of Vladimir Putin’s term in office; recent changes in Russia’s foreign policy; and policy options for the EU against the backdrop of domestic and foreign policy developments.

One of the main problems in relations between Russia and the European Union (EU) is the absence of strategic goals. Russia, having played a critical role in ending the Cold War, has neither found its place in the strategy of EU expansion nor in that of NATO. In 2007, the active Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between Russia and the EU which both sides agree has become outdated and is no longer able to meet today’s challenges is due to expire. The form that any new legal, contractual basis for relations between Russia and the EU may take will have implications not only for stability within Europe, but also for Russia’s democratic future.

Tbilisi is taking imaginative steps towards solving the Georgian-Ossetian conflict but its new strategy may backfire, and frequent security incidents could degenerate into greater violence, unless it proceeds cautiously and engages all actors. Georgia is determined to solve the conflict but on its own terms and perhaps too quickly. The establishment of Dmitri Sanakoev and his alternative power centre in the Georgian-administered areas in the zone of conflict is alienating the broader Ossetian constituency. It would be a mistake to dismiss Ossetian aspirations together with the Kokoity regime in Tskhinvali. Tbilisi should resume substantive dialogue with Tskhinvali, while Sanakoev tries to steadily build credibility with the Ossetians.

France’s Russia policy is at the end of an arc that began in 1998. At that time, France and Germany paired with Russia diplomatically in what is known as the Yekaterinburg Triangle, named after the Russian city where it was initially formed, to accommodate Russia’s unique position in Europe and sustain its domestic transformation. The French-German alliance ambitiously hoped to stabilize “Grand Europe” with Russia while preparing for the enlargement of NATO and the European Union toward Russia’s borders.

For historical reasons, Germany and Russia are destined to have a special relationship. The success of the policy of reconciliation between the former World War II foes in the past 15 years has helped, in turn, to reconcile post–Cold War Europe. During the crucial years of Germany’s reunification, German policymakers enthusiastically applauded the constructive role played by the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, and the first Russian president, Boris Yeltsin.

The furor surrounding the November 2006 death of ex-spy Aleksandr Litvinenko from radiation poisoning hearkened back uncomfortably to the days of the Cold War. Although it remains to be seen exactly who ordered Litvinenko’s death, the assassination of prominent Kremlin opponents has reinforced a growing Western perception that President Vladimir Putin’s Russia is abandoning the West and, as in the days of the Cold War, is setting itself up as a serious rival to the agenda of spreading freedom and democracy around the globe.

There is a new reality on the global scene: a Russian foreign policy that is proactive and strategic. In Central Asia, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an increasingly effective instrument of Russian-Chinese security and economic cooperation, one that includes Iran as an observer and not the United States. Russian energy negotiations with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and China have yielded exclusive contracts for Russian energy exports at higher prices, agreements for Russian control over strategic pipelines, and even joint investment arrangements for Russian companies abroad.

The answer to the question of today’s talk, “Russia: toward democracy or dictatorship?” is “neither.” Russia is not a democracy, and it is not a dictatorship. Russia, like most countries of the world, has a ramshackle authoritarian system with some democratic trappings (some of which are meaningful). Russia is not in transition to or from anything. Russia is what it is.

Russian foreign policy’s modern-day motives are completely dissimilar to those of the recent Soviet and the more distant czarist past. Whereas the empire was predominantly about Eurasian geopolitics and the Soviet Union promoted a global ideological as well as political project backed up by military power, Russia’s business is Russia itself. Seen from a different angle, Russia’s business is business. In stark contrast to its Soviet past, postimperial Russia stands among the least ideological countries around the world. Ideas hardly matter, whereas interests reign supreme. It is not surprising then that the worldview of Russian elites is focused on financial interests. Their practical deeds in fact declare “In capital we trust.” Values are secondary or tertiary issues, and even traditional military power is hardly appealing. Fluctuating energy prices, not nuclear warheads, are what really matter to Moscow.

In Munich in 1938, the West abandoned Central and Eastern Europe to the dictators. On February 10, 2007, Vladimir Putin demanded that it do so again. In his confrontational speech to the annual Wehrkunde conference in Munich, Putin blasted U.S. policy, blaming American unilateralism for provoking a new arms race, destabilizing the Middle East, undermining international institutions, distorting the purpose of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), expand-ing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and supporting democratic revolutions in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). He concluded by assert-ing Russia’s foreign policy independence, clearly demanding that Washington accept Russia’s demand for equality with it, in practical terms giving Russia a free hand throughout the former Soviet Union. Reflecting Moscow’s continuing Cold War mental-ity, Putin also unwittingly revealed the abiding sense of illegitimacy and fear of fragmentation underlying so much of Russia’s overall policies. Thus he confirmed that the sources of Russian discord with Washington are military, political, and ideological (struggles over democratization).

The attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, enhanced the importance of both the South Caucasus and Central Asia to American security. Overflight rights through the Caucasus to Central Asia and Afghanistan are vital components of the ongoing military effort there by both U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces. Therefore the security dynamics in each of these areas are of heightened importance to U.S. policy. But the Transcaucasus is a region of multiple conflicts and fault-lines. Three of the four so-called “frozen conflicts” in the former Soviet Union are to be found there and are not as frozen as they may look. Indeed, as multiple recent crises show, Russo-Georgian tensions connected with South Ossetia and Abkhazia—two of the frozen conflicts—could erupt into open violence at any time.

This paper examines the strategic convergence between Russia and China. Strategic convergence is understood as the overlap of key objectives and interests with regard to long-term developments in world politics, which provides the basis for extensive tactical co-operation between two or more states. The paper focuses on the compatibility of Russia and China in terms of complementary economies, location and political outlook. The match between Russian natural resources and Chinese markets is examined in particular. The paper concludes that a closer relationship between the two countries in many ways would be of mutual advantage, but that it is far from certain that an alliance will develop.

On January 20, 2007, a conference of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences took place in Moscow. At the conference, the academy's president, Army General Makhmut Gareyev, and the chief of the general staff of the Russian armed forces, Army General Yuri Baluyevsky, presented elements of a new military doctrine. The revised doctrine -- to be published at the end of the summer -- is to replace the current one, which was ratified by President Vladimir Putin in 2000. A striking point is the apparent effort of the military to strengthen its position on security issues within Russia's decision-making circles. Moreover, not surprisingly, the preliminary entries of the new doctrine resemble the present complicated relationship between the West and Russia.

In the post-Soviet period, the Caucasus region has been a source of chronic instability and conflict. Many factors have ensured that the region would become a source of significant international engagement and concern. Conflicting interests that have made Russian-American relations in the region highly competitive are addressed as well as areas of shared priorities and mutual advantage that may provide a foundation for containing conflict and heading off further regional disintegration. However they are resolved, regional issues emerging from the Caucasus will have a significant impact upon the larger climate of U.S.-Russian relations in the years to come.

Vladimir Putin's visit to Saudi Arabia on February 11 was the first ever for any Russian or Soviet leader. Putin also visited U.S. allies Jordan and Qatar. Coming from Munich, where Putin delivered his most bellicose anti-American speech, he further delineated a Russian Middle Eastern policy at odds with Washington's in an interview with Al-Jazeera. Putin reiterated Russia's opposition to the Iraq war and disputed the justice of Saddam's execution.

The year 2006 marked the fifteenth anniversary of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Those fifteen years constituted an era in itself. The geopolitical space that had been occupied by the Soviet Union underwent farreaching political, economic and social change. For a decade and a half, the group of fifteen Newly Independent States (NIS) that succeeded the former Soviet republics bore the sobriquet of the ‘post-Soviet space’. This umbrella concept stressed the common political and economic roots as well as the shared residual features and specificities of a group of countries that have increasingly diverged over time.

Georgia is a multinational state, building democratic institutions and forging a civic identity. However, it has made little progress towards integrating Armenian and Azeri minorities, who constitute over 12 per cent of the population. Tensions are evident in the regions of Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo-Kartli, where the two predominantly live and which have seen demonstrations, alleged police brutality and killings during the past two years. While there is no risk of these situations becoming Ossetian or Abkhaz-like threats to the state’s territorial integrity, Tbilisi needs to pay more attention to minority rights, including use of second languages, if it is to avoid further conflict.

The nearest equivalent the Russian language has for the word chutzpah is naglost. In you, Vladimir Putin, the Russian nation has found the embodiment of naglost. Naglost: During the question-and-answer session following your speech on Saturday to the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, you were asked about the Oct. 7 murder (your birthday, Mr. President) of muckraking journalist Anna Politkovskaya. You never quite got around to uttering her name. But you did helpfully point out that in the past 18 months "the largest number of journalists were killed in Iraq."

The July 2006 meeting of the Group of Eight (G-8) major industrialized nations in St. Petersburg focused the attention of the international media on Russia. On issues ranging from Middle East conflict to energy security, President Vladimir Putin sought to demonstrate that his increasingly self-confident government has earned its seat at the G-8 table. Coverage of the summit focused squarely on Putin—his international priorities, control over domestic politics, personal relationships with other heads of state, and leadership style. These stories created the impression that Putin is Russian politics, reinforcing the view that to understand Putin himself is to understand Kremlin policy.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. interests in the Black Sea area span energy, military security, terrorist challenges, and the traffic in drugs, weapons, and people. The U.S. needs a comprehensive regional pol¬icy to protect American interests and influence security.

A functioning multiparty system is a sine qua non for a modern democracy. It is an empirical observation that a democracy remains an empty shell if there is no political competition and interaction between the various political parties. Even in this age when the civil society seems to be more vibrant than political society, and when we can see a general discontent with politics among citizens all over the OSCE region, political parties remain indispensable for the functioning of representative democracies.

This conference's structure allows me to avoid excessive politeness and the need to speak in roundabout, pleasant but empty diplomatic terms. This conference's format will allow me to say what I really think about international security problems. And if my comments seem unduly polemical, pointed or inexact to our colleagues, then I would ask you not to get angry with me. After all, this is only a conference. And I hope that after the first two or three minutes of my speech Mr Teltschik will not turn on the red light over there.

Its burgeoning military-industrial complex is increasingly capable of turning out cutting-edge weaponry – and selling it. At a major security conference this past weekend, Russian President Vladimir Putin blasted the US for its militaristic approach to foreign policy, saying its actions were "nourishing an arms race." But little noticed amid the sharp US and European response to Mr. Putin's comments is Russia's burgeoning military-industrial complex, generally thought to have collapsed with the Soviet Union.

Fifteen years after the Soviet Union collapsed and split apart, Russia still fits Winston Churchill's characterisation of Stalin's USSR nearly seven decades ago: a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma. Throughout the presidencies of Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s and that of Vladimir Putin, Russia has opened its doors to international trade, investment, tourism, the media, and the internet. In sharp contrast to the Soviet Union, Russia now publishes voluminous (if not always reliable) economic, social and demographic information.

The United States recognized the independence of all the former Soviet republics by the end of 1991, including the South Caucasus states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The United States has fostered these states’ ties with the West in part to end the dependence of these states on Russia for trade, security, and other relations. The United States has pursued close ties with Armenia to encourage its democratization and because of concerns by Armenian-Americans and others over its fate. Close ties with Georgia have evolved from U.S. contacts with its pro-Western leadership. The Bush Administration supports U.S. private investment in Azerbaijan’s energy sector as a means of increasing the diversity of world energy suppliers and to encourage building multiple energy pipelines to world markets. The United States has been active in diplomatic efforts to end conflicts in the region, several of which remain unresolved.

In recent months, relations between Georgia and Russia have deteriorated. The clash between these two states is only a symptom of the broader strategic positioning of the West and Russia in and around the South Caucasus. In this scenario, at regional and global levels, countries and organizations are involved in a struggle for power and energy security. Considering these two issues, what is the current situation in the South Caucasus and what can be expected in the future?

Russia and China have joined together in a strategic partnership aimed at countering the U.S. and Western "monopoly in world affairs," as was made clear in a joint statement released by the Chinese and Russian presidents in July 2005. The long standing border disputes between the two countries were settled in agreements in 2005, and joint military exercises were carried out in the same year. Furthermore, Russia, in addition to its arms exports, has been increasing its oil and gas commitments to China. Clearly, the recent comprehensive improvement of bilateral relations between China and Russia is a remarkable development.

"You may succeed in silencing me but that silence comes at a price. You have shown yourself to be as barbaric and ruthless as your most hostile critics have claimed. You have shown yourself to have no respect for life, liberty or any civilised value.

The first front for Russia’s new soft power ambition is domestic. Putin’s administration, represented by its deputy chief Vladislav Surkov, has been working on the development of ‘sovereign democracy’5 as a concept that should be the backbone of Russia’s ‘national idea’. It is not easy to grasp what ‘sovereign democracy’ means exactly. The concept is deliberately vague, and the debate still ongoing. Nevertheless, this notion is centred around two core ideas. First is the idea of sovereignty.

Russia's ambassador to the European Union sent a strong signal that European leaders looking for more cooperation over oil and natural gas supplies would face resistance from President Vladimir Putin at a meeting in Finland on Friday.

Anna Politkovskaya imagined her own death long before it arrived. For years, she was Russia's most fearless journalist, reporting for the newspaper Novaya Gazeta from the killing fields of Chechnya and exposing the brutality of the Kremlin's war under President Vladimir Putin. She received one death threat after another, and was detained and beaten by Russian troops who threw her into a pit, threatened to rape her and performed a mock execution.

El ejército ruso sostuvo recientemente su maniobra de todos los años 'RUBEZH ("Frontera") en la región del Mar Caspio. El portal iraní Baztab, afiliado al Secretario del Concejo de Conveniencia y ex comandante de la Guardia Revolucionaria Mohsen Rezai, presentó la maniobra, basada en un informe en la prensa central asiática, como la preparación del ejército ruso a la respuesta a un posible ataque del ejército americano en Irán.

Russia launched another strike against democracy on June 15, when 14 Duma members, representatives of Russia's five Duma factions, submitted amendments to ban any public political criticism by individuals and/or organizations, including demonstrations against the government.

Should the world's major democracies speak out loudly to express concern over the consolidation of autocracy in Russia?

Russian President Vladimir Putin is currently pursuing a two track policy towards the Middle East, allowing Russia to develop friendly ties with Israel while simultaneously nurturing alternative, sometimes competing, interests with Arab countries. This non-ideological policy has allowed Russia to reclaim a part of the economic and strategic leverage it lost following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus far, Russia has successfully signed diplomatic, military, and energy deals and developed ties with both Israel and its Arab neighbors without significantly alienating one or the other. Whether Putin's embrace of Hamas in March 2006 or his continued armament of Iran will damage Russia's relations with Israel is still an open question.

The Muslim world represents both an opportunity and a challenge for Moscow. The existence of several anti-American governments there has given Moscow ample opportunity to ally or otherwise cooperate with them. On the other hand, elements within the Muslim world have in the past provided support to Chechen and other Muslim opposition groups within Russia -- some of whom seek to establish "caliphates" in Central Asia, the North Caucasus and perhaps other Muslim regions of the Russian Federation. Further, this support could increase enormously, thus complicating and perhaps even dooming Russia's already difficult and costly attempts to suppress Chechen and other Muslim opposition in Russia and Central Asia.

Russia and Algeria, the two largest suppliers of natural gas to Europe, have stepped up cooperation in the energy sector and other areas, raising fears in Europe that the two could form a gas cartel to control prices.

Russia recently invited the Palestinian organization Hamas to Moscow and, at the same time, is involved in negotiating with Iran regarding its nuclear program. These two recent developments, tied with Russia's recent use of its energy weapon Gazprom against Ukraine, makes clear that Russia is returning to the international arena. In light of these developments, does Russia's return as a major power in international security coincide with the standing and conceptual thinking of Russia's armed forces?

It is fitting that we should gather in the Baltic region -the very front lines of freedom in the modern world. For several generations, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia were counted as provinces of an empire. In fact you were ancient nations, with your sovereignty lost by theft. The United States never recognized the legitimacy of that occupation, and we kept faith with you until the day your independence was restored.

Take any week of the year, and you are sure to find a top executive from the Russian state-owned natural gas monopoly Gazprom spending more time in a European capital than at headquarters in Moscow.

The criteria for membership in the Group of 8 are well known: a democratic regime; a large economy; a high level of economic and institutional development; a convertible currency; membership in the World Trade Organization, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the International Energy Agency; and dedication to the goals and principles of international cooperation.

Probably not since World War II had there been such a high-water mark in Russian cooperation with America. Within weeks of Sept. 11, 2001, President Vladimir Putin offered sweeping support for U.S. operations in Afghanistan, including help in securing bases in Central Asian countries.

Is Russia seriously considering putting nuclear pressures on Europe to a degree not seen since the last dark days of the Cold War? Or are a group of Russian generals trying to derail the reformist military policies of President Vladimir Putin and his Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov?

Fifteen years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, “U.S.-Russia relations are clearly headed in the wrong direction,” finds an Independent Task Force on U.S. policy toward Russia sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations. “Contention is crowding out consensus. The very idea of a ‘strategic partnership’ no longer seems realistic,” it concludes.

Russia's choice of energy security to top the agenda of its Group of Eight presidency was both prescient and timely. In Europe, we have to address urgently the dual problems of our fragmented internal market and our increasing energy dependence, particularly on imported gas, which brings new risks to Europe's energy security.

A report about the record scale of Sino-Russian trade, which reached $29 billion in 2005 -- a 37.1 percent increase -- came out in December and was supplemented in the first two months of this year.

In two years of fruitless negotiations with the Europeans, Iran won precious time to work on the world's first Islamist atomic bomb. Yesterday, the diplomatic two-step moved to Moscow with the full blessing of an "international community" apparently willing to keep engaging the mullahs in open-ended negotiations. The West, it seems, is now putting its future security in the hands of Russia and China.

Although the agency is now likely to report Iran to the Security Council, America and the Europeans agreed that the United Nations will wait at least a month before deciding on any punishment. There is little doubt what this cooling-off period is intended for: further negotiations on a proposal that would have Iran shift its large-scale, energy-related uranium enrichment work to Russia.

Muslims have never enjoyed as much freedom in Russia as they do today. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, there has been an Islamic revival of sorts in Russia. Muslims number 10 to 16 percent of the Russian population, and Islam is recognized as one of Russia’s four official religions. Yet that tolerance is tinged with suspicion, and some Muslims feel they are being persecuted. A perception, fueled by events in Europe, of Islam as a destabilizing force, is influencing the Russian government to take preventive measures against the threat, real or imagined, of Islamic militancy.

In foreign policy it’s critical to “know thine enemy.” So American policymakers should be aware that Russia and China are inching closer to identifying a common enemy — the United States.

For 60 years the word "Yalta" has meant betrayal and abandonment. The diplomatic accord reached between Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States in that sleepy Black Sea resort relegated millions of people to a ruthless tyranny.

Georgia and South Ossetia could blunder into another war unless Tbilisi takes immediate and visible steps to build confidence, most critically on the refugee issue. Georgia's verbal commitment to a just and lasting settlement to a conflict where relations remain tense and exchanges of small-arms fire are frequent has not been matched by concrete, sustained action.

During the war, we weren’t so scared… We knew, of course, that we might be hit by a bullet – no one was safe from that. But now, how can one sleep through the night? They wake people, take them away, shoot them… I’m terrified to talk, the prosecutor’s office is terrified – we’re all scared! At any moment [the security forces] might come after anyone of us. Ask anyone here – we are all weeping from fear. --A father of a young man who was summarily executed in June, 2004, Chechnya, February 4, 2005.