North Korea’s relations with Russia have been marked by unrealistic expectations and frequent disappointments but common interests have prevented a rupture. The neighbours’ history as dissatisfied allies goes back to the founding of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) with Soviet support and the Red Army’s installation of Kim Il-sung as leader. However, the Soviets were soon written out of the North’s official ideology. The Sino-Soviet split established a pattern of Kim playing Russian and Chinese leaders off against each other to extract concessions, including the nuclear equipment and technology at the heart of the current crisis. Since Vladimir Putin visited Pyongyang in 2000, diplomatic initiatives have come undone and grandiose economic projects have faltered. Russia is arguably the least effective participant in the six-party nuclear talks.

U.S. and South Korean negotiators have struck a landmark trade deal in the Korea–U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). If ratified, the agreement will provide American workers and businesses with new opportunities and serve as a powerful statement of the U.S. commitment to East Asia. But although the deal would eliminate more than 90 percent of all tariffs within three years, it will face considerable opposition in the U.S. Congress and South Korean National Assembly—particularly over trade in the sectors that were contentious during negotiations, such as agriculture, automobiles, and pharmaceuticals. Presidents George Bush and Roh Moo-hyun must exercise strong leadership and explain the FTA’s benefits to gain public and legislative support. Passage would mean a new era for U.S. economic engagement with East Asia and expanded opportunities for the American economy. Failure, however, would strike a blow to a key alliance that would reverberate for decades to come.

This compendium contains the text of major regulations, laws, and other documents governing U.S. interactions with North Korea. Also provided are the text of U.N. Resolutions, agreements, and other documents that represent major policy decisions in U.S. relations with North Korea. Accompanying each major document, law, or regulation is a brief analysis discussing the policy reflected by that document and major significance of the provisions of the law or regulation promulgated. As discussed in this compendium, changes in U.S. sanctions over time appear to reflect variations in U.S. approaches to North Korea and its nuclear program – at times reflecting a policy of engagement but at other times displaying a U.S. strategy of trying to isolate North Korea. The documents presented in this compendium demonstrate the wide latitude any U.S. Administration has in implementing sanctions on any country and the corresponding discretion to remove these sanctions.

The United States has been coping with a new phenomenon since 2002: a South Korea that can say “no” to America. Along with Japan and the Philippines, South Korea used to be one of the staunchest U.S. allies in Asia. From 1950 to 1953, 54,000 Americans lost their lives to defend South Korea from North Korean and Chinese Communist forces. The United States has since poured more than $13 billion in economic aid and military assistance into the country, and it still maintains approximately 29,500 troops there. Yet, despite these past and present contributions to its security and modernization, more and more Americans feel that South Korea no longer appreciates their efforts and is growing ungrateful, uncooperative, and in some cases downright hostile. Troubled by the spread of anti-U.S. sentiment in South Korea, Senator Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.) lamented that South Korea is suffering from “historical amnesia.”

Strong indications exist that the North Korean (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK) regime is involved in illicit drug production and trafficking, as well as production and trafficking in counterfeit currency, cigarettes, and pharmaceuticals, with drug trafficking likely decreasing and counterfeiting of cigarettes expanding. Overall, the reported scale of this activity is significant and arguably provides important foreign currency resources to the military-oriented North Korean state. Media reports also indicate that North Korea may engage in insurance fraud as a matter of state policy. DPRK crime-for-profit activities are reportedly orchestrated by a special office charged with bringing in foreign currency under the direction of the ruling Korean Worker’s Party.

There is general optimism about the future of the U.S.-ROK relationship, but its success depends on South Korea’s ability to develop and articulate a vision of its place in the region and the role the alliance will play in achieving that objective. The U.S. must be prepared to accept a mature and confident Seoul as a more equal partner.

North Korea’s economic collapse and famine in the 1990s and subsequent food shortages have prompted scores of thousands to seek refuge in China and beyond. The international community has failed to find an effective means of dealing with this situation.

Civil-military relations is one of the most challenging dimensions to deal with regarding North Korea. It is a topic that is difficult—if not impossible—to quantify with any real precision. Yet few subjects are more crucial to understanding that country. After all, since 1998, Pyongyang’s foremost policy has been declared as “military-first.” While experts debate the precise meaning and significance of this policy, considerable consensus exists that it gives the leading role to the Korean People’s Army (KPA)—as all services of the armed forces of North Korea collectively are known. Hence, military leaders in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are very powerful and influential figures. Who are they? What kind of power and influence do these leaders wield, and how do they exert it? How do KPA leaders interact with dictator Kim Jong Il and their civilian counterparts? Mr. Ken Gause sets out to answer these questions in this monograph.

The question I was asked to address is whether the U.S.–ROK alliance is at risk. The short answer is “yes,” but the reasons why and the ensuing prescriptions are far from simple. Thus, for the sake of efficiency and clarity, I will begin with my conclusion and then pro¬vide an explanation: The maintenance of a strong U.S.– ROK alliance is absolutely in the short-,mid-, and long-term strategic interests of the United States.

The United States’ policies toward North Korea attracted increased attention in the wake of North Korea’s missile testing on the 4th of July, 2006[1]—an occasion of obvious symbolic significance for Americans celebrating their Independence Day. That issue shall be addressed below as part of the broader evolution of U.S. relations with North Korea. The foreign and defense policies of the United States toward Korea today are increasingly complex in terms of U.S. national interests versus Korean national interests in that long divided nation.[2] To better understand the contextual legacy of those U.S. policies, it is worthwhile providing a brief overview of the historical setting which has shaped those policies.

Australia is a stakeholder in the peace and prosperity of Northeast Asia. In 2005, the Northeast Asian region accounted for over 38 per cent of total Australian merchandise trade and over 45 per cent of Australian merchandise exports.3 Further, the economies of Australian trade partners—and consequently, demand for Australian goods—outside the immediate Northeast Asian region are, to a certain extent, dependent on stability within the region. Any conflict in the region would present a considerable challenge to the Australian economy.

North Korea's missile launches have posed a huge dilemma to South Korea as it pursues reconciliation and cooperation with its communist neighbor.

Adding an international relations angle to America’s Independence Day celebration, North Korea fired six missiles yesterday, and at least one more today, into the Sea of Japan. Among these missiles was the Taepodong 2 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which failed approximately 40 seconds into its flight.

North Korea's missile launches are considered as part of its long-standing brinkmanship aimed at boosting its negotiation leverage with the United States by ratcheting up its security threats, officials and analysts in Seoul say.

It is no accident that North Korea has allowed U.S. intelligence to take note of its apparent preparations for firing a newer, longer range missile that might be capable of carrying nuclear warheads to U.S. soil.

As we went to press in the U.S. last night, morning was breaking at the Musudan-ri launch facility in the remote northeast of North Korea. It's possible we'll wake up to the news that Pyongyang has tested the long-range ballistic missile that is fully fueled and which U.S. satellites have monitored for more than a month.

North Korean technicians are reportedly in the final stages of fueling a long-range ballistic missile that some experts estimate can deliver a deadly payload to the United States. The last time North Korea tested such a missile, in 1998, it sent a shock wave around the world, but especially to the United States and Japan, both of which North Korea regards as archenemies. They recognized immediately that a missile of this type makes no sense as a weapon unless it is intended for delivery of a nuclear warhead.

It has been nine months since the fourth round of Six-Party Talks concluded with a joint statement of principles. Unfortunately that statement now appears to be the high-water mark of the six-party process rather than a baseline for future negotiations. Even if the prospects for near-term movement on the negotiating front appear slim, the process may still prove useful as a crisis management tool until negotiations are once again possible.

Reports from defectors and returned abductees have indicated that North Korea may be holding abductees from as many as twelve countries. The abduction of foreign citizens – and particularly of children – contravenes the most basic tenets of a civilized society.

North Korea’s decisions to restart nuclear installations at Yongbyon that were shut down under the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework of 1994 and to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty create an acute foreign policy problem for the United States.

China’s influence on North Korea is more than it is willing to admit but far less than outsiders tend to believe. Although it shares the international community’s denuclearisation goal, it has its own concept of how to achieve it.

Following is a text of the joint statement at the conclusion of the fourth round of Six-Party Talks, as released in Beijing on September 19, 2005 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China.

Can the economic system of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea be successfully reformed? That is to say: Is it possible for contemporary North Korea, with its autarkic, hypermilitarized, and ostensibly centrally planned economic structure to move toward and eventually embody an economic regimen akin to theones that have permitted so much material progress in East Asia’s two exemplars of “reform socialism”—China and Vietnam—over the past generation?