European energy security is facing a set of serious challenges connected to Europe’s dependence on Russian energy and the need for diversifying energy supply sources. Already high and rising European energy demand will, especially with the eventual decline of North Sea resources, further increase the importance of the already significant energy imports from Russia and the Middle East. Europe currently imports over half of its natural gas from Russia, while several East European states are almost completely dependent on Russia for their gas supply. The problematic aspects of European dependence on Russian energy became especially obvious during the Ukrainian gas crisis in January 2006, and have been subsequently reconfirmed by Russian energy diplomacy against Belarus, Georgia, and Lithuania. These developments have highlighted both a Russian willingness to use its energy leverage as an active component of its foreign policy and the vulnerabilities the EU is subjected to through reliance on Russia as a dominant gas supplier.

In the past year, discussion of energy security has become a la mode. This is almost inevitable if one considers the problems between Ukraine and Belarus on the one hand and Russia on the other, an ongoing perception of high prices and continuing instability in almost all of the major fossil fuel producing regions of the world. When we add into this mix the essential pessimism surrounding long-term availability of fossil fuels and the potentially catastrophic effects of man made climate change we could say discussion of energy security has reached fever pitch. This should not of course distract us from the very real challenges we face, but neither should we succumb to despair. There is a growing recognition of the importance of energy, and in particular the impact our historical energy usage has had, as a factor in global security. That the UN Security Council has discussed the matter and that a record number of States participated in the debate demonstrates how important the subject is, even if not all are yet convinced that it is a security issue.

Since the industrial revolution the geopolitics of energy – who supplies it, and securing reliable access to those supplies – have been a driving factor in global prosperity and security. Over the coming decades, energy politics will determine the survival of the planet. The political nature of energy, linked to the sources of supply and demand, comes to public attention at moments of crisis, particularly when unstable oil markets drive up prices and politicians hear constituent protests. But energy politics have become yet more complex. Transport systems, particularly in the United States, have become largely reliant on oil, so disruption of oil markets can bring a great power to a standstill. Access to energy is critical to sustaining growth in China and India – not only to lift these countries out of poverty, but to keep pace with burgeoning populations. Failure to deliver on the hope of greater prosperity could unravel even authoritarian regimes, and even more so democratic ones, as populations become more educated and demanding. And it is these very factors that have turned the market power of energy suppliers into political power. Importers have come to compete for supplies, driving up prices, supplier wealth and the capacity to play roles in regional and international politics that go well beyond the GDP of countries such as Russia, Venezuela and Iran.

The sudden November 8 announcement of the size of the Tupi oil field has pushed Brazil into a delicate and potentially powerful economic and political position in the Americas. Petrobras, the Brazilian state-run oil company, has known about the field for more than a year. Up until now, however, they have been tight lipped as to the size of Tupi, which is located off the southeastern coast of Brazil. Petrobras recently cast aside their silent treatment in regard to the field, which was revealed to have between five and eight billion barrels of crude oil and natural gas. The possibilities of this new development have ramifications for three main actors: Brazil, Venezuela and the United States.

En enero de este año, la Comisión Europea publicó su Hoja de Ruta de Energías Renovables en la que proponía un objetivo obligatorio por el cual los biocombustibles debían alcanzar el diez por ciento de los carburantes para transporte consumidos por los Estados miembros antes de 20201. El objetivo para biocombustibles de la UE está generando en el Sur una carrera alocada para satisfacer la demanda, lo que supone una grave amenaza para una población vulnerable y en riesgo de explotación, de ver arrebatadas sus tierras y deteriorada su seguridad alimentaria. Es inaceptable que las personas pobres de los países en desarrollo tengan que soportar los costes de la reducción de las emisiones de la UE. Para evitar esto, la Comisión debe incluir estándares sociales en su marco de sostenibilidad, y desarrollar mecanismos por los que el objetivo del diez por ciento pueda revisarse si se detecta que está contribuyendo a la destrucción de los medios de vida de población vulnerable.

The dissolution of the USSR opened up the possibility of new energy routes spreading in all directions. Henceforth, the post-Soviet successor states would, in theory, no longer be forced to send their natural gas to Moscow only, but potentially sell to customers in Europe, South Asia, and East Asia alike. With a decreased dependence on the Russian market, these states would potentially have the chance to pursue an independent energy policy and independent path of development. In the majority of cases, however, this did not happen. The primary factors accounting for this are both structural and political. When the Soviet successor states became independent they inherited a continental pipeline system directed to Moscow only. This very tangible dependence has given the now sovereign states within the CIS little room for exploring other energy export-markets and options but the Russian one, and by extension, little room to maneuver their own policies.

Although China and the United States do not rely on one another for energy supplies, energy security has ironically become a necessary agenda item in Chinese-U.S. relations. As the world’s second-largest and largest consumers of oil, respectively, China and the United States are becoming more sensitive to each other’s pursuit of energy sources from other countries. Likely because the Chinese and U.S. economies have absorbed the impact of the most recent global oil price spikes and still enjoyed steady growth, energy remains mostly an issue for dialogue rather than a cause for confrontation. Yet, the prospects for energy to become a cause for more serious clashes are high, with demand in both countries set to rise continuously, even rapidly.

Much has been made of President Vladimir Putin’s recent aggressive posturing against Europe and the United States. In the past few months, the Russian leader imposed a “moratorium” on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, compared U.S. government policies to those of the Third Reich, and threatened to aim nuclear-tipped missiles at European targets again. These developments are certainly troubling, but the days when NATO troops looked warily across the Folda Gap in Germany for signs of invading Soviet tanks are long gone. Russian power and influence is no longer measured in ballistic missile accuracy or bomber production but in miles of pipeline constructed and barrels of oil per day exported, and for Europe, this energy invasion has already begun.

As the demand for biofuels surges with over one billion people living without access to electricity, a new United Nations report released cautions that the world's energy needs must be met in a sustainable and environmentally sound manner.

El Consejo de Cooperación Económica (CCE), del que forman parte empresas de primer nivel de Francia, España, Portugal e Italia, ha solicitado el respaldo de los Gobiernos español e italiano a la promoción de "un mercado energético del arco latino". La petición, destinada especialmente a los Ejecutivos de España e Italia ante la celebración, hoy, de la cumbre bilateral hispano-italiana en Ibiza, forma parte del grupo de asuntos que el Consejo considera prioritario para abordar en el encuentro.

Brasil y Estados Unidos esperan tener lista a finales de 2007 una propuesta común sobre los parámetros de producción de etanol, indicaron este martes portavoces oficiales.

El Gobierno de EEUU busca aliados para aumentar un 800% el consumo de etanol en 2007

To achieve vigorous competition, the market should not be too concentrated and the participants should be similarly equipped and have similar generation technologies, so that it is easier to detect collusion.

The report begins with a review of world trends in energy demand and the major macroeconomic assumptions used in deriving the IEO2007 projections, along with the major sources of uncertainty in the forecast. The time frame for historical data begins with 1980 and extends to 2004, and the projections extend to 2030. High economic growth and low economic growth cases were developed to depict a set of alternative growth paths for the energy forecast. The two cases consider higher and lower growth paths for regional gross domestic product (GDP) than are assumed in the reference case. New to this report, IEO2007 also includes a high world oil price case and, alternatively, a low world oil price case. The resulting projections—and the uncertainty associated with international energy projections in general—are discussed in Chapter 1, “World Energy and Economic Outlook.”

Steadily and stealthily, a natural gas cartel is emerging. The Gas Exporting Countries’ Forum is the brainchild of some of the world’s least democratic countries—Iran, Qatar, Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela— and it took a step toward emergence at a meeting in Doha, Qatar, on April 9.1 The cartel is led by those who stand to benefit most from its future geopolitical muscle: Russia and Iran, and specifically President Vladimir Putin and Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The United States should create a global coalition of energy consumers to oppose oil and gas cartels and to bring market principles to the natural gas industry. The U.S. should also liberalize its own regulations to allow energy exploration in the Arctic, in the Rocky Mountains, and along the Pacific and Atlantic Continental shelves.

Nuclear technology is reemerging as a power generation option in the face of concerns about climate change, energy demand growth, and the relative cost of competing technologies. After more than a decade in which no new nuclear power plants were completed in the U.S., nuclear power is now the focus of considerable attention and debate. Nuclear power has long been controversial; consequently, the debate about its reemergence requires a fresh assessment of the facts about the technology, its economics and regulatory oversight, and the risks and benefits of its expansion. In the past year, the Keystone Center assembled a group of 27 individuals (see the Endorsement page for a list of Participants) with extensive experience and unique perspectives to develop a joint understanding of the “facts” and for an objective interpretation of the most credible information in areas where uncertainty persists. Participants represent diverse backgrounds and points of view—environmental and consumer advocates, the utility and nuclear power industry, non-governmental organizations, state regulators and former federal regulators, public policy analysts, and academics.

Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev announced on May 12 that his state will continue to export all of its gas through Russia, quashing European aspirations to diversify energy sources by building an alternate Kazakh pipeline. The statement, delivered in conjunction with Russian President Vladimir Putin's tour through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, indicates that the Central Asian republic is continuing to nurture its relationship with Moscow and is positioning itself to become a major player in the region. On a geopolitical scale, the proclamation is the most recent display of Russia's increased leverage vis-à-vis Europe through its former Soviet satellites and a sign of renewed vigor and confidence in Putin's international relations.

On November 30 and December 1, 2007 the Center for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School hosted a conference addressing the topic “The Militarization of Energy Security.” The National Intelligence Council’s Long-Range Assessment Unit sponsored the event, which brought together about 30 government officials, military officers, civilian analysts, academics, and non-governmental experts.

The United States is the largest oil importer in the world, bringing in 13.5 million barrels per day (mbd), which accounts for 63.5 percent of total U.S. daily consumption (20.6 mbd).1 Oil from the Middle East—specifically, the Persian Gulf—accounts for 20 percent of U.S. oil imports, and this dependence is growing. By 2017, the U.S. will be importing approximately 68 percent of its oil needs. Oil consumption represents 40 percent of America’s energy needs, primarily used in ground and air transportation. The dependence of the U.S. and the global economy on oil is growing, which can have dire consequences for the economic well-being of the United States, our national security, and the American way of life.

Nuclear Energy: Balancing Benefits and Risks is a sobering and authoritative look at nuclear power. Dr. Ferguson argues that nuclear energy, despite its attributes, is unlikely to play a major role in the coming decades in strengthening energy security or in countering the harmful effects of climate change. In particular, the rapid rate of nuclear reactor expansion required to make even a modest reduction in global warming would drive up construction costs and create shortages in building materials, trained personnel, and safety controls. There are also lingering questions over nuclear waste, as well as continued political opposition to siting new plants. Nonetheless, the report points out steps the United States could take—such as imposing a fee on greenhouse gas emissions—to level the economic playing field for all energy sectors, which over the long run would encourage the construction of new nuclear reactors (if only to replace existing ones that will need to be retired) and help reduce global warming.

The performance of China’s national system of innovation has improved since reforms began in 1978, but reform impact by sector is not well characterized. This case study identifies factors affecting patterns of technological innovation and adoption in eight industries in China’s energy sector (coal, oil and non-conventional hydrocarbons, natural gas, nuclear power, electric power, renewable sources, automobiles, and motor systems). Innovation performance is strongest in industries that have experienced institutional transformation and growing market competition, whereas in industries where the prereform legacy of central control, weak intellectual property protection, and low levels of corporate R&D persists, innovation is lagging. Government initiatives to mitigate urban air pollution by strengthening environmental regulations and reduce dependence on imported oil by funding alternatives are also influencing innovation patterns. Based on current performance of the innovation system and examples of collaboration in the energy sector, China’s ability to be a productive partner in international collaborative R&D efforts depends on the participation of local developers, domestic policy support for collaboration, and the strength of China’s own R&D enterprise.

This inquiry was prompted by the question of whether Australia should be concerned about peak oil. This term refers to the theory that, for fundamental geological reasons, global conventional oil production will reach a peak and then start an irreversible decline soon enough to be of concern.

The European Commission is putting the finishing touches to both the strategic energy review and a green paper on climate-change policy post-2012, following the expiration of the Kyoto Protocol. Both papers will be presented on 10 January. They will outline the EU’s long-awaited ‘energy and climate-change vision’ and propose a roadmap on how to ensure the competitiveness of European industry while at the same time combating climate change and ensuring security of supply. The European Council will on 8-9 March make this vision official EU policy. Many hope that this will be the beginning of a more secure and sustainable energy future.

China’s blistering economic growth has made access to adequate energy supplies an increasingly important priority. It is the world’s second largest consumer and third largest producer of primary energy. From 2000 to 2005, China’s energy consumption rose by 60 percent, accounting for almost half of the growth in world energy consumption. The country is able to meet more than 90 percent of its energy needs with domestic supplies—largely because of abundant coal reserves and a coal-based economy. However, it imports almost half of the oil it consumes.

In the past seven years, Russia has experienced a remarkable change of fortune. Following economic and political crises in the 1990s—culminating in a state of virtual bankruptcy in August 1998—Russia has racked up successive years of economic growth and low inflation. Since 1999 its economy has been growing strongly and consistently. In the 1990s the Russian government regularly ran massive budget deficits. Today, it is accumulating even larger surpluses. Similarly, its balance with the outside world has reversed. A decade ago Russia was deep in debt to foreign lenders, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and nearly devoid of foreign currency of its own. Today, the country has no IMF debt and its trade balance and foreign exchange reserves are among the largest in the world.