The Bush Administration characterizes Iran as a “profound threat to U.S. national security interests.” The Administration perception is generated primarily by Iran’s nuclear program but is increasingly focused on Iran’s military assistance to armed groups in Iraq, which is resulting in U.S. battlefield losses. Iranian aid to the Palestinian group Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah is also considered a key threat to U.S. interests. The threat assessment of some other governments was lessened by the December 3, 2007 key judgements of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that indicates that Iran is likely not on a drive to develop an actual nuclear weapon, although Administration officials say that this finding was not the main thrust of the NIE, which judged Iran to be continuing uranium enrichment.

For most of 2007, concerns about Iran grew louder. This situation changed dramatically in December, with the release of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s nuclear intentions and capabilities. The NIE, which assessed that Iran had ceased its covert weapons program in 2003, was widely interpreted to indicate that Iran was no longer a threat. As a result, questions were raised whether U.S.-led efforts to ratchet up financial pressure against Tehran, through both UN sanctions and unilateral measures, remained either necessary or viable.

My remarks will focus primarily on the issue of Iran's nuclear program. Accordingly, I will begin with a brief description of the status of Islamic Republic's nuclear activities and then examine current US policy.

On May 26, 2008 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) circulated a technical and factual report on Iran, devoid almost entirely of political overtones. The IAEA report gives prominence to the major issue of the day – Iran's unrelenting progress in its uranium enrichment program – but also highlights an additional serious issue of concern: Iran's secret weapons development activities. The unprecedented level of concern included in the report reflects and furthers tendencies that first emerged last February, when new material was handed over to the IAEA regarding Iran's involvement in weaponization studies. On the basis of briefings at the IAEA in this regard, suspicions have increased within the organization that Iran is proceeding with its nuclear development program, and the program could eventually yield nuclear weapons. True, the signs were there long ago; unfortunately, their recognition by the IAEA has come quite late in the day.

In December 2007, the American intelligence community published a new assessment of Iran’s nuclear intentions and capabilities. The report stressed two new findings: • Iran had frozen its nuclear military program, in the framework of which secret installations had been used to convert and enrich uranium and to try to transform radioactive materials into weapons; • There are doubts about Iran’s intention and determination to develop nuclear weapons, and Iran is more sensitive to pressure on nuclear matters than had been previously thought.

Assessing any state’s intentions is a difficult undertaking – especially at a specific moment in time. When a state is considered hostile, its behaviour erratic, and its system opaque, what is difficult under normal circumstances becomes nearly impossible. It may thus often seem prudent to attribute the worst of intentions to such states, but this can create a selffulfilling prophecy. Iran with its revolutionary pretensions, fiery rhetoric and nuclear ambitions, is a case in point, since it is particularly difficult to ‘read.’ Located in the centre of a geopolitically sensitive and conflict-riven area, Iran is in a position to influence – positively or otherwise – the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus, the Middle East and South Asia. This influence may furthermore be expanding as a result of the weakening of Iraq and Lebanon, divisions among the Palestinians, and the more general rise of the Shi’i across the broader region. Add to this the ambiguous aims of Iran’s nuclear programme and the shadow this has already thrown across the region, and the need to assess Iran’s intentions accurately appears crucial. Here, Iran’s past behavior may provide some help, especially when it comes to Iran’s proclivity for risk taking – provided the acquisition of a nuclear capability does not alter Iran’s intentions or behavior so as to make the past irrelevant.

La Eurocámara pidió hoy a Irán que restablezca la transparencia de su programa nuclear. En una resolución aprobada hoy, los eurodiputados reafirman su convicción de que es posible encontrar una solución diplomática a la escalada nuclear iraní y subrayan que no debería plantearse la posibilidad de una acción militar. Además, emplazan a Estados Unidos a que participe en las negociaciones para convencer a Irán de que cumpla las exigencias del OIEA.

U.S. efforts to contain Iran and prevent it from attaining nuclear weapons have been set back by the release of part of the most recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s nuclear program. “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,” the unclassified summary of the key judgments of the NIE, contained a stunning bombshell: the conclusion that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003.

On December 3, 2007, the U.S. intelligence community declassified the key judgments portion of the November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities.” Critics of the Bush administration have seized upon the document as proof positive that the president and his foreign policy team have intentionally overstated the status of Iran’s nuclear weapons program—just as was allegedly done with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq—to justify a shoot-then-ask foreign policy. In fact, the substance, omissions, timing, and authorship of the document speak more to what many have come to see as a relentless guerrilla campaign by the analytical portion of the intelligence community against the president’s foreign and antiterror policies than they do to any policy deception by the administration.

Si bien el nuevo informe de inteligencia (NIE) sobre Irán alega que Teherán detuvo su programa encubierto de armamento nuclear en 2003, concluye que el régimen ha hecho “avances significativos” en sus esfuerzos por enriquecer uranio —el obstáculo más complicado de salvar para adquirir la capacidad de producir armas nucleares. El informe también dice que Teherán “mantiene abierta la opción de desarrollar armas nucleares”. A continuación se incluyen algunas preguntas frecuentes sobre las conclusiones del informe de inteligencia y sobre la amenaza que supone la continuación del programa nuclear iraní.

Although the new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran says that Tehran halted its covert nuclear weapons program in 2003, it concludes that the regime has made “significant progress” in its efforts to enrich uranium—the single most difficult hurdle to overcome in acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. The report also says that Tehran is “keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons.” Below are some frequently asked questions about the NIE’s conclusions and the threat posed by Iran’s continuing nuclear program.

The new National Intelligence Estimate on Iran is an awkward document, one subject to widely divergent interpretations, but providing a more benign assessment of Iran’s nuclear capabilities than probably is warranted. It judges with moderate to high confidence that Iran does not now have a nuclear weapon or sufficient fissile material to make one, but won’t rule out that it could have acquired a weapon or the necessary explosive ingredients from abroad.

At the beginning of December 2007, the National Intelligence Council, the supreme body of the American intelligence community, released a reappraisal of Iran’s nuclear intentions and capabilities. The document, a non-classified summary of a detailed and classified analysis on the subject, states that Iran halted its secret nuclear weapons program in the fall of 2003 and has yet to restart it. The summary also comes to the conclusion that Iran is less intent on developing nuclear weapons than was previously thought. On the other hand, the new assessment also states that, in technical terms, the end of 2009 is the earliest possible date for Iran to produce enough weapons-grade enriched uranium, but that this scenario is not very likely. Technically speaking, Iran can probably enrich enough weapons-grade uranium for a weapon between 2010 and 2015.

Tehran is again on the agenda of the U.S-China security relationship since the release of the recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which concluded that Iran had “halted,” among other things, engaging in the development of nuclear weapons since 2003. President George W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, however, warned against removing the crosshair on Iran, insisting that Iran continues to be “very dangerous,” a major “threat” and its nuclear program can still potentially be used for hostile purposes. Iran, therefore, has not escaped the eye of U.S. security storm. The United States, European Union (EU) and the UN will continue to mull over a solution for Iran—with or without Russia or China. China’s ambassador to the United States, Wang Guangya, commented, “I think the [UN] council members will have to consider that [NIE], because I think we all start from the presumption that now things have changed” (Reuters, December 4). Iran, therefore, will continue to be one of the major issues or opportunities for conflict or engagement between the United States and China.

You have before you the Agency´s Technical Cooperation (TC) Programme for 2008, as conveyed by the TACC to the Board. While the spotlight is often focused on the Agency´s nuclear verification role, much of our activity is centred on helping Member States address their development needs. With our TC programme, we are highlighting how peaceful nuclear technology can be used to address poverty, hunger and disease - crises that, regrettably, are too often given less visibility on the global stage. Today, the Agency´s TC programme comprises over 1000 projects distributed in more than 50 fields of activity in 115 Member States.

Russia is ambivalent about the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran. Moscow opposes such a development but appears to have a naïve faith that this problem can be resolved by diplomacy even though she has often complained about Iran’s attitudes. A nuclear Iran could be a threat to Russia but Moscow may feel that this is something she could live with; it would have the benefit of undermining US domination of the international system.

On August 27, 2007, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published an Information Circular (INCIRC 711) that included the text of the “Understandings of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues.”Towards the end of that document, the following text can be found: "The Agency's delegation is of the view that the agreement on the above issues shall further promote the efficiency of the implementation of safeguards in Iran and its ability to conclude the exclusive peaceful nature [sic] of Iran's nuclear activities."

Over the past four years, one of the most frequently asked questions about Iran is when will it be able to go nuclear. Sometimes the focus is on the so-called "point of no return" or "technological threshold," and sometimes the question is when it might actually be in a position to attain nuclear weapons, or mount them on long range surface-to-surface missiles. Speculation over this question has engendered any number of estimates as to how far advanced Iran's nuclear program really is. The urgency of the question keeps analysts busy trying to assess the answer, but from the range of answers provided, one cannot escape the distinct sense that there is no one authoritative assessment.

Iran presents a clear and present danger to international peace and security. Its ambitions to become the dominant power in the region, its heavy handed interference in the domestic affairs of its neighbors, its lavish support for terrorist groups, and its massive arms build‐up all underscore the nature of the threat. Moreover, in its quest to pursue nuclear weapons, Iran has been found in violation of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and UN Security Council resolutions. Finally, Iranian leaders have called for a world without Israel.

The present report, which is the twenty-ninth submitted in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), covers the activities of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) during the period from 1 March to 31 May 2007. During the period under review, the Acting Executive Chairman continued the practice of briefing the respective Presidents of the Security Council, representatives of Member States and officials of the Secretariat on the activities of UNMOVIC. The sanitized version of the compendium, with sensitive material appropriately redacted, is on schedule for completion by early summer, to be placed on the Commission’s website thereafter.

This report, which is being submitted to the Board, and in parallel to the Security Council, covers developments since the Director General’s report of 22 February 2007 on the implementation in Iran of its NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant Security Council resolutions.

The facts concerning the status of Iran's nuclear project are quite clear. Their implications are unequivocal. Yet there are those in the corridors of power that would lead us to believe that business is still as usual and that much can yet be done to reverse the situation. The following will review the facts, discuss their implications and evaluate the chances of dealing with the precarious situation at the present stage of developments.

Lost in the debate about how to prevent Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold is the fact that we lack the ability to prevent it. The Iranians have the indigenous technical ability, and possibly the nuclear material, to build nuclear weapons right now. They can do it if they want to, and we know so little about their program they could likely achieve it without detection. The question is why they’re so intent on detection.

Consider this scenario: The Saudis have gone nuclear. So have the Egyptians. Both countries had been signatories to the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, but that agreement is now dissolved. Riyadh and Cairo acquired their weapons from Pakistan, a Sunni ally, in response to the nuclear threat from Shia Iran. Meanwhile, Iraq continues to fester, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is far from settled, and Iranian proxies remain firmly entrenched within Lebanon's combustible sectarian mix -- a mix that pits Sunni against Shia and just so happens to exist on Israel's northern border. In short, all the key players in the Middle East -- Sunni, Shia, Israeli -- now have nuclear weapons at a moment when the simmering and, in some cases, quite open conflicts between the region's states, sects, and ethnicities are almost too numerous to count.

Iran has ignored another United Nations Security Council deadline to halt its suspect nuclear activities, which are widely believed to mask clandestine efforts to develop nuclear weapons.The United States must push hard for stronger sanctions against Iran, not only at the Security Council but also directly with European and Japanese allies, who have considerable untapped leverage over Tehran. Relying solely on U.N. sanctions, which are likely to be diluted and delayed by Russia and China, will be to too little, too late. Unless the European Union and Japan agree to withhold foreign investment, strategic trade, and technology from Iran, there is little chance that Iran's nuclear ambitions will be stopped, short of war.