This whole six-party process has done more to bring the U.S. and China together than any other process I’m aware of,” stated Christopher Hill, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs and the top U.S. negotiator at the six-party talks, after agreement was reached on the February 13, 2007, action plan on North Korean nuclear disarmament. This remark, one of numerous accolades by U.S. officials praising Beijing for its cooperation on the North Korean nuclear issue, was undoubtedly partly intended to encourage China to use its influence over North Korea to further the process of denuclearization. Yet, there is little question that successful cooperation on the North Korean nuclear crisis has provided a boost to the U.S.-Chinese relationship.

What I want to do is just frame the issue. I read the press reporting coming out here. So I'm almost at the point of saying are there any questions. But just let me say that what we're going to discuss is a nuclear reactor. It was constructed by the Syrians in the eastern desert of Syria along the Euphrates River on the east side. The Syrians constructed this reactor for the production of plutonium with the assistance of the North Koreans.

The world eagerly anticipates the North Korean nuclear declaratory report, which is due out around the New Year. The US-Japan relationship stands at a crossroads in approaching North Korea at this critical juncture. On the one hand, the dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear program would remove the gravest threat to the Japanese homeland and US forces stationed in the region. On the other hand, the promise by the United States to remove North Korea from the list of terrorism-sponsoring countries complicates Japanese efforts to have its grievances over its abduction cases dating to the 1970s addressed.

North Korea’s October 9, 2006, nuclear test has propelled the region into a more dangerous phase and has challenged the viability of the international nonproliferation regime, with North Korea effectively becoming the world’s ninth nuclear-capable state. The test reignited long-standing policy debates in the United States and among North Korea’s immediate neighbors over how to pursue nonproliferation objectives in Northeast Asia. Many observers thought that such a test would tip the balance in at least Washington, if not North Korea’s neighbors, toward a more confrontational stance and bring the international community closer to applying maximum pressure to force North Korea to give up its nuclear program, perhaps even by military means. With the resumption of six-party talks among the United States, North and South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia and the February 2007 agreement, critics argue the test has done exactly the opposite.

A joint document, named the Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement, was released here Wednesday after a two-day recess of the second session of the sixth round of the six-party talks. The full text is as follows: The Second Session of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing among the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States of America from 27 to 30 September 2007.

The Six-Party Talks agreement of February 2007 raised hopes that the long-standing North Korean nuclear weapons crisis would be resolved, but the Beijing Agreement has significant shortcomings that are cause for serious concern. Even though North Korea's covert nuclear weapons program using highly enriched uranium (HEU) triggered the current impasse, the agreement does not explicitly limit the program. Nor does it ensure that North Korea will divest itself of its existing nuclear weapons stockpile or delineate verification requirements to ensure that North Korea does not again cheat on its international obligations.

Since the early 1990s, the development of a military nuclear program in North Korea has aroused anxiety in the international community in general and in the Far East in particular. The news in early February 2007 that another agreement was reached on the possible termination of this program spurred much optimism, though mitigated by the reality that as in the past, the ultimate success of this agreement is far from certain.

The 2006 stalemate at the six-party talks, coming after North Korea’s missile tests and its first nuclear detonation, was a sign that U.S. policy was failing. Hamstrung by bureaucratic bickering, unable to build a cohesive multilateral coalition in support of its efforts, and unwilling to engage in serious negotiations with Pyongyang, Washington faced the real prospect of a North Korea armed with a small but growing nuclear deterrent. The Bush administration said that it would never accept a nuclear North Korea, but because of its policies, it seemed to have no choice.

The north korean nuclear crisis entered a new phase when Pyongyang detonated a nuclear device on October 9, 2006. The response of the international community to the North Korean test was swift and stern. The five other countries participating in the North Korean Six-Party talks condemned North Korea immediately after the test, and the un Security Council passed a resolution imposing new sanctions on the North five days later.

As I think all of you are aware, this agreement was announced in Beijing on February 13th by diplomats from China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, North Korea and the United States. It calls on North Korea to shut down its main reactor complex at Pyongyang and allow international inspectors to verify the process. It would be a first step toward disclosing and dismantling North Korea’s entire nuclear infrastructure. In exchange, North Korea will receive international economic and humanitarian and energy assistance.

The military balance on the Korean Peninsula itself has not been changed by the DPRK test, nor would it be fundamentally changed even if the North were believed to have a truly deliverable weapon. The latter would, of course, raise the ante not only in terms of the threat to South Korea, but most especially to Japan and U.S. forces there given the substantial Nodong missile force in the North’s inventory. A workable Taepodong II missile would expand the North’s reach substantially, but even in that case, to put it in its crudest terms, the balance of forces ensures that if North Korea started a war, we would finish it.