The most surprising aspect of Europe’s newest treaty is not so much its content, but more the way it came into being. For the first time in the history of European integration, a treaty is not the result of a “night of the long knives” at an EU Summit, but rather a several-year process. This process, characterized by a series of advances and setbacks, began with the “Laeken Declaration”, in which the Heads of State and Government of the EU Member States recognized that the usual modes of diplomacy no longer represented an appropriate means for setting the course of future European politics. Consequently in February 2002, a Convention presided by former French president Valery Giscard d’Estaing was convened for the purpose of working on proposals on institutional and constitutional reforms of the European Union.

As EU leaders meet today (13 December) to sign the Lisbon Treaty, attention is turning to the prospects of getting it ratified in all 27 EU Member States by the December 2008 deadline. As part of its ongoing work on the new Treaty, the EPC has updated the table it first published in July 2007 setting out the timetable and ratification requirements in each Member State, and evaluating whether the Treaty is likely to secure the required majority in each case.

European leaders will meet in Lisbon on October 18th-19th, to reach final agreement on the EU’s new treaty. The Portuguese, who currently hold the EU’s rotating presidency, hope that the document will be called the ‘Treaty of Lisbon’, in line with the tradition of naming treaties after the cities in which they were agreed. Other European governments will prefer to stick with the ‘Reform Treaty’, to signal that it is less ambitious than the constitutional treaty, rejected in the French and Dutch referendums of 2005. Like the treaties of Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2000), the new treaty will amend the EU’s founding charters. Since its changes are presented as amendments to existing texts, the new treaty is very hard to read. The constitutional treaty would have consolidated all existing treaties into one document, which would have made the Union’s legal basis much more accessible.

Conclusiones de la Presidencia del Consejo de la Unión Europea. 1.La sesión del Consejo Europeo ha sido precedida de una intervención del Presidente del Parlamento Europeo, D. Hans-Gert Pöttering, seguida de un cambio de impresiones. 2.El Consejo Europeo también ha mantenido un cambio de impresiones con D. Ernest-Antoine Seillière, Presidente de BusinessEurope y D.ª Maria Helena André, Secretaria General Adjunta de la CES, en presencia del Presidente del Parlamento Europeo. 3.El Consejo Europeo celebra el acuerdo logrado el 18 de octubre de 2007 en la Conferencia Intergubernamental y la firma subsiguiente del Tratado de Lisboa el 13 de diciembre, así como la proclamación, el 12 de diciembre de 2007, de la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales. Asimismo llama a la rápida conclusión de los procesos de ratificación nacionales, con objeto de que el Tratado pueda entrar en vigor a 1 de enero de 2009.

La CONFERENCIA DE LOS REPRESENTANTES DE LOS GOBIERNOS DE LOS ESTADOS MIEMBROS, convocada en Bruselas, el 23 de julio de 2007, para elaborar de común acuerdo las modificaciones del Tratado de la Unión Europea, del Tratado constitutivo de la Comunidad Europea y del Tratado constitutivo de la Comunidad Europea de la Energía Atómica, ha establecido los textos siguientes.

It has gone down in history as “the other world series”: a championship match even more shocking than the Milwaukee Braves’ upset victory over the New York Yankees in baseball’s 1957 Fall Classic. That shot literally “heard ’round the world” was the Soviet launch of Sputnik 1, the first artificial earth satellite. It gave birth to the Space Age, and its fiftieth anniversary this October 4 is sure to inspire worldwide attention. By contrast, another anniversary of equivalent importance was all but ignored this past March. The birth certificate of that other age born fifty years ago was the Treaty of Rome, which founded the European Economic Community, or Common Market. Its charter members included only the “original six”—France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg—and they pledged only to coordinate some tariff and industrial policies and cooperate on peaceful atomic energy. Fifty years later Europe is not just a Community, but a Union. It numbers not six, but twenty-seven members. And the purview of its institutions so transcends economics that Europe today has become a veritable state of mind.

Treaty on the European Union: How Does It Compare to the Constitution?

The Presidency herewith forwards to the Intergovernmental Conference the full text of the Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, including the Protocols, and the Declarations for the Final Act, as these texts emerged from the proceedings of the Working Party of Legal Experts. The Presidency will submit this text to the Intergovernmental Conference (Foreign Ministers) meeting in Luxembourg on 15 October 2007, with a view to its final adoption at the Intergovernmental Conference (Heads of State or of Government) meeting in Lisbon on 18 October 2007. All the language versions of this text are being forwarded to the delegations today, 5 October 2007. In accordance with normal practice, each language version will be finalised by the Council's legal/linguistic experts before the Treaty is signed.

Over the last two years much intellectual energy has been devoted to the analysis of, and the potential solutions to, the constitutional impasse resulting from the failure to ratify the treaty signed in Rome on 18 June 2004. The European Council held in Brussels in June 2007 gave a conclusion to that eff ort by drafting a mandate which was to be “the exclusive basis and framework” for the work of a forthcoming Intergovernmental Conference drafting a “Reform treaty”. Th at conclusion was rightly considered to be a great success for the German presidency. The fact is that, over that two year period, much less attention has been given to the practical implementation of new institutional proposals included in the proposed treaty. Even a cursory examination indicates that the implementation of some of these proposals is likely to be uneasy, and in some cases could be a source of future problems or difficulties. This is why three Brussels based think-tanks have thought it useful to join eff orts in analysing potential implications of the most significant proposals in the fi eld of institutions. Seven issues have been identifi ed, shared out and debated in working groups, and this publication contains the results of that collective effort.

The Treaty on European Union shall be amended in accordance with the provisions of this Article. Preamble 1) In the preamble the words "of this Treaty" shall be replaced by "of these Treaties" and the following text shall be inserted as the second recital: "DRAWING INSPIRATION from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law,".

“Yesterday the draft text of the new EU Treaty was published. This Treaty would fundamentally change the European Union and Britain’s place in it. Although to call it a Treaty is contentious in some circles: the new trade minister Digby, Lord Jones has said ‘this is a con to call this a treaty – it’s not. It’s exactly the same – it’s a Constitution’. I think he is right.

On July 23rd European leaders will open fast-track negotiations in Brussels on a ‘re f o rm treaty’ to make the EU work better. The proposed treaty should end years of pointless agonising over what to do with the EU constitution, agreed in 2004 but killed off by referendums in 2005. Much of proposed treaty will be taken from the wreck of the constitution. But controversial aspects are being amended or dropped and the new text will be stripped of any pretensions to be a US constitution-style founding charter. The treaty ’s remit will now be simple. It should enable smoother EU decision-making and a more effective foreign policy, without seriously altering the balance of power between the 27 member-states and the Union’s main institutions: the Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice.

The Polish government has made public its desire to renegotiate the voting system in the Council. The main reason is that the voting system envisaged in the Constitution implies a huge loss of voting power with respect to Germany and a break-up of the accession package which brought Poland to the EU. Whereas the previous government accepted the new voting system as a part of a global package, the new government considers that once the Constitutional Treaty is open for renegotiation, each and every member state has the right to place onto the agenda the elements it dislikes. Whereas this is not often clearly perceived from abroad, the Polish government has adopted a constructive position: rather than a 'Nice or die' position, it is demanding that new options be examined, discussed and eventually negotiated. One of them is the 'square root' formula, which offers some sort of middle point between the Nice system and the Constitutional Treaty, but there are other possibilities. But, first and foremost, the European Council should allow the issue to be included in the IGC's agenda. Not to do so would not only amount to repeating the mistakes made during the previous IGC negotiations but would open a question mark about the legitimacy of the EU's treaty-making processes and threaten the satisfactory conclusion and ratification of the new Treaty.

In June 2007 the European Council summit will decide on the key issues concerning the future of EU treaty reform. The question of reform has been on hold for the last two years, and the process of ratifying the treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe has halted. The summit will end the “period of reflection and debate” and give a fresh impetus to treaty reform, albeit in a different form, to the Constitutional Treaty.

The machinery of the European Union has recovered from the shock of the failed French and Dutch referenda, but not the heart that pumps it, says Aurore Wanlin.

The double “no” in France and the Netherlands is also a demand for better European democracy from the European Union and national governments alike, says Aurore Wanlin of the Centre for European Reform.

European think-tank leaders from Western and Eastern Europe addressed the following message to the June 2005 Brussels European Council.

Contrary to popular fears, the 2004 enlargement of the EU had a positive, albeit limit impact on western European economies, according to a study published today (27/04/2006).

EU co-operation in justice and home affairs (JHA) is helping the member-states to fight crossborder crime. However, having agreed ambitious innovations like the European arrest warrant in 2001, the governments have become less enthusiastic about working together at EU level. The way the EU takes decisions on criminal justice issues holds back progress. Governments agreed to fix this decision-making machinery in the EU constitutional treaty, but its rejection in 2005 has prevented the planned reforms from entering into force. Another major problem is that governments cannot agree on how best to protect their citizens’ rights if they are arrested or imprisoned in another EU country. Finland will review the Union’s JHA policies when it takes up the EU presidency in the second half of 2006. The Finns should devote a European Council solely to JHA, to come up with some practical solutions to the current problems, such as inadequate rules for decision-making.

The EU has begun debating what to do in response to the rejection of the draft European constitution by French and Dutch voters in referendums last year.

Austria’s priorities for its EU presidency are: the future of the EU constitution; jobs and growth; and EU enlargement to the Balkans. But much of the presidency’s time will be taken up by more pressing issues, such as getting the European Parliament to pass the EU budget or dealing with Iran and bird flu. Austrians are the most eurosceptic people in the EU. With elections coming up in the autumn, the government of Wolfgang Schüssel will not have much room for manoeuvre during its presidency. Schüssel’s idea – backed by Germany and the European Parliament – of reviving the EU constitution is unrealistic. EU countries will waste time and energy on a renewed institutional debate at a time when they should be focusing on economic reform, the EU neighbourhood and global issues.

Western European politicians should stop exploiting populist fears of low wage competition.

EU leaders must champion an interpretation of the French and Dutch referendum results that recognises them for what they are: the expression of popular sentiment on a range of domestic and European issues, of which the Draft Constitution was only one. The two referendums were not a definitive vote by a majority of the electorate on the idea of the Constitution. The results were more likely a repudiation of existing elite-driven processes of EU reform, though even that interpretation is open to question. Further serious analysis of the two results to establish actual voter sentiment in both countries on the draft Constitution is essential. EU leaders must change course on the timetable for ratification of the draft Constitutional Treaty. This does not have to mean abandoning its contents or visions. As polling on voter sentiment at the time of the referendums has shown, the draft itself is simply not politically contentious for the majority of voters. Suspending the ratification process for a couple of years may be the minimum amount of time required for future success. A review of the referendum process itself is also needed. It may be desirable for any future referendums on EU constitutional issues to be held simultaneously with national elections. Not only does this make economic common sense, but will allow voters to express a range of views, both on their government’s performance and the referendum question. As such, in the medium term, the European Council must adopt a policy of reform based on a more sensible approach to use of referendums to ratify major changes.

La participación registrada en el referéndum sobre la Constitución Europea ha sido del 42,3%. El análisis de los datos disponibles permite realizar las siguientes afirmaciones. En primer lugar, las pautas de distribución territorial son muy similares a las de las pasadas elecciones europeas; una vez más, la abstención ha sido mayor en la periferia que en el centro del país. En segundo lugar, la participación tiene un claro perfil sociológico: la abstención ha sido mayor entre las mujeres, los jóvenes menores de 25 años, las personas con niveles de estudios inferiores, los parados y las amas de casa. Esto permite interpretar la abstención más como un signo de indiferencia que de rechazo. Tercero, la participación ha sido más elevada entre los votantes afines a posiciones ideológicas de izquierda, aquellos que valoran positivamente la gestión del Gobierno y aquellos que confían en el presidente Rodríguez Zapatero. Cuarto, el voto en blanco ha sido inusualmente elevado. A falta de estudios postelectorales más precisos, la abstención puede explicarse como resultado de: el elevado desconocimiento y la complejidad del tema objeto de la votación; la previsibilidad del resultado; las actitudes políticas; y las presiones cruzadas y mensajes contradictorios recibidas por los electores.

Es necesario, para comprender la crisis en que actualmente está sumida la UE y avanzar en su resolución, analizar las motivaciones y causas que están detrás de los votos negativos de Francia y Holanda y de las posturas contrarias en otros Estados miembros. A efectos de clasificación, las motivaciones pueden dividirse en políticas (soberanista, antisistema, europeísta y oportunista) y socioeconómicas (miedo popular, castigo a la clase política y descontento en general). Las causas pueden en ocasiones solaparse con las motivaciones pero en general cuentan con entidad propia: la consideración de Europa como cabeza de turco, la irresponsabilidad de parte de la clase política, la ambigüedad del proyecto europeo y lejanía del mismo, el olvido del pasado reciente y la desaparición de la amenaza soviética, el impacto de la globalización y de la nueva situación geopolítica y geoeconómica mundial, el fenómeno de la inmigración, la inseguridad ciudadana asociada a menudo a la desaparición de fronteras dentro de Europa y la ampliación de la Unión y la cuestión turca.

Los días 16-17 de junio, los líderes europeos, reunidos en torno al Consejo, tenían la obligación de dar una respuesta a la difícil situación creada por el doble “no” francés y holandés a la Constitución Europea. Sin embargo, tanto la falta de unanimidad en la respuesta a la crisis constitucional como la incapacidad de desbloquear la negociación del presupuesto 2007-2013 han abocado al proyecto de integración europeo a una muy profunda crisis. Este análisis se centra en tres aspectos centrales de la actual crisis: uno, la decisión sobre si suspender o continuar con el proceso de ratificación; dos, la falta de liderazgo; y tres, los escenarios posibles de integración que se derivan de la actual crisis. Como se deduce de las decisiones tomadas en estos días, hay algo sobre lo que los políticos europeos han sido absolutamente sinceros: realmente no había Plan B alguno más que mirar hacia otro lado durante algún tiempo.

Gaëtane Ricard-Nihoul propone, en este texto, un proceso e itinerario que, en su opinión, permita al tren europeo “salir del atolladero” tras el “no” francés del 29 de mayo al Tratado por el que se establecía una Constitución para Europa. Pero antes de proponer soluciones, hay que ofrecer un diagnóstico veraz y útil, lo que requiere explorar minuciosamente las causas del “no”. Se trata, por tanto, de un enfoque dividido en dos etapas: comprender lo ocurrido para, a continuación, actuar en consecuencia.

En junio de 2005 los jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de la UE iniciaron el denominado “período de reflexión” para lanzar un amplio debate sobre el futuro de la UE. De momento, el inicio de ese debate ha sido lento. No obstante, los resultados del EU-25 Watch (véase http://www.iep-berlin.de/publik/EU25-Watch/ para un informe detallado) conducen a cinco observaciones que se presentan para mayor debate: (1) la heterogeneidad y diversidad de preferencias, condiciones y capacidades entre los Estados miembros de la UE como rasgo dominante, resultado de diferentes ciclos de modernización; (2) el distanciamiento cada vez mayor entre la UE y los ciudadanos de sus Estados miembros, interpretado no sólo en términos de una confianza cada vez menor sino también como una crisis de liderazgo político; (3) el Tratado Constitucional y el enfoque de “esperar y ver qué pasa” adoptado por muchos Gobiernos para desdramatizar la situación actual, lo que hasta la fecha no ha resultado demasiado productivo en términos de ideas originales; (4) la fatiga ocasionada por la ampliación en los Estados miembros más antiguos, que ha inspirado una intensa reflexión acerca de la consolidación y los límites de la UE; y (5) un proceso de integración que en la actualidad se está viendo determinado mayoritariamente por factores externos, fundamentalmente porque se carece de un proyecto de integración atractivo al estilo del mercado único o el euro (que reforzaría la cohesión política de la UE). Con respecto a las prioridades y perspectivas de la UE para los próximos años, se tiene cierta conciencia de que se incluirán reformas institucionales en la futura agenda de la UE, con o sin el Tratado Constitucional. En línea con un enfoque pragmático, lo más probable es que esto se haga caso por caso y con un nivel de ambición relativamente bajo, al menos durante 2006.

Cuando se considera el referéndum francés sobre la Constitución Europea desde el exterior, aparece lleno de paradojas. En primer lugar, aunque los principales partidos políticos han dado oficialmente su apoyo al texto, sigue existiendo una enorme incertidumbre en cuanto al resultado. Desde mediados de marzo, todas las encuestas han dado como ganador al “no”. Segundo, aunque solamente las dos primeras partes del texto presentan elementos nuevos, el debate se ha centrado hasta ahora en la tercera parte. Algunos de los principios básicos del Tratado de Roma de 1957, como la libre competencia y las cuatro libertades de movimiento, aparecen en la actualidad como excesivamente liberales como para “incluirlas” en una constitución. Tercero, a pesar de la intensidad del debate, la campaña se ha centrado principalmente en temas que no están relacionados con la Constitución (por ejemplo, la Directiva Bolkestein y la adhesión de Turquía a la UE). Estas paradojas subrayan la necesidad de analizar el debate que se está produciendo en Francia y apuntar unos cuantos factores explicativos. Por lo tanto, el presente estudio consta de tres partes diferenciadas. La primera ofrece una descripción general de los principales acontecimientos desde mediados de julio; la segunda describe los participantes más destacados en la campaña y, por último, la tercera intenta apuntar algunas explicaciones.

Este trabajo se centra en el análisis de cómo la crisis de legitimidad sufrida por el proyecto de Tratado Constitucional afecta tanto a la forma de elaboración como al contenido del documento. La referencia a las valoraciones y demandas defendidas desde sectores representativos del “No de izquierdas” permite ofrecer propuestas tendentes a reabrir el proceso haciéndolo más democrático, así como a modificar sustancialmente el proyecto actual, sin por ello poner en cuestión la necesidad de superar el marco de los Estados actuales y proseguir la ampliación en el camino hacia la construcción de “otra Europa”.