Successive administrations have urged the creation of an anti-missile system to protect against long-range ballistic missile threats from rogue states. The Bush Administration believes that North Korea and Iran are strategic threats, and questions whether they can be deterred by conventional means. The Administration’s position on this issue remains unchanged after a recent reassessment that the Iranian nuclear weapons program was halted in 2003. The Administration has built long-range missile defense bases in Alaska and California to protect against North Korean missile threats. Although the system has been tested, most agree that further testing is necessary. The Administration proposed deploying a ground-based mid-course defense (GMD) element of the larger Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) in Europe to defend against an Iranian missile threat. The system would include 10 interceptors in Poland, a radar in the Czech Republic, and another radar deployed in a country closer to Iran, all to be completed by 2013 at a cost of about $4 billion.

Dealing with the changing international scenario requires a complex strategy, integrating many different actions: economic, political, military, humanitarian, environmental, etc. No common and coherent European approach yet exists.

L’architecture du traité de Lisbonne reflète une ambition à la baisse, conséquence directe des échecs des référendums français et néerlandais. Il s’agit désormais d’un traité modificatif qui amende les textes du TUE et du TCE, ce dernier étant rebaptisé « Traité sur le fonctionnement de l’UE » (TFUE). Les chapitres relatifs à la Politique étrangère et de sécurité commune (PESC) et à la Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense (PESD), également renommé « Politique de sécurité et de défense commune » (PSDC), reprennent toutefois l’ensemble des dispositions introduites dans le traité avorté établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe.

The American presence in the Mediterranean is longstanding, but despite 200 years of engagement in the region, the American perspective on the Mediterranean remains distinctive and diffused. The European Union and key European partners have Mediterranean strategies in place, and the French-led initiative for a Mediterranean Union points to new dynamism in Europe’s policy looking south. Washington, by contrast, continues to divide the region, intellectually and bureaucratically along rigid regional lines—Europe, including southern Europe on the one hand, the Middle East and North Africa on the other.

The Treaty of Lisbon, if ratified, comprises a series of innovations designed to increase the coherence and capabilities of the EU as a security actor. Besides several institutional changes, there are also new substantive concepts, such as the protocol on “permanent structured cooperation”. Moreover, security cooperation is being relabeled. It will be known no longer as the “European” but as the “Common Security and Defense Policy” (CSDP), which signifies a new level of ambition. However, major characteristics remain unchanged, and the impact of the reforms may be rather limited.

Since 2001, Europe finds itself increasingly involved in international military operations. NATO responded to the attacks of 9/11 by invoking, for the first time in its history, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty—the alliance’s collective defense clause—and European military assets were deployed to the United States, the Mediterranean Sea, and Afghanistan. Deployable rapid response forces were created by NATO (the NATO Response Force) and by the European Union (the Battle Groups). The EU Security Strategy, formulated in 2003, lists combating terrorism, countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction, dealing with failed and failing states, and responding to regional emergencies as scenarios that may require military intervention. National governments also increased their commitments to international security and stabilization efforts. They have deployed military forces to operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, East Timor, Darfur, and Chad, as well as contributed troops to the war on terror in the Horn of Africa and UN peacekeeping operations worldwide. And at home and overseas, European militaries are stepping up efforts to prepare for and respond to natural disasters and humanitarian crises. From 2001 to 2006, the total number of European troops deployed overseas has gone up from slightly over 65,000 to around 80,000.

Any consideration of the future of ESDP should begin wit an honest assessment of what it is today. This means dismissing some misconceptions that have surrounded the project in the past.

Four years after the European Security Strategy (ESS) was adopted at the December 2003 European Council, Javier Solana has been asked by EU leaders to revisit the issue. This request from the December 2007 Summit was somewhat surprising, given that the ESS is a policy document which has stood the test of time to an unusual extent.

Dans cinq mois, la France assurera la présidence de l'Union européenne. Elle disposera alors de six petits mois pour faire aboutir l'un des dossiers clés de l'Europe, qui conditionnera à la fois sa sécurité et son identité politique pour les décennies à venir : la «défense européenne».

The third Venusberg Report pulls no punches. It is now or never for an effective EU foreign and security policy. The Berlin Declaration celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome clearly calls upon Europe to get a grip of world reality and urgently. Indeed, if Europe fails to play its part in closing the strategic gap between what Europe currently contributes to global stability and what its status and power demands of it the dangers faced by the European citizen will become acute. The new strategic cocktail created by the complex interaction of energy insecurity, a global belt of instability beyond state control, strategic terrorism and organised international crime represent the dark side of globalisation from which no-one can hide. Add to that the crisis in US leadership, the emergence of new powers, such as China and India uncertain as yet as to their world role, and the complex problems of Europe’s neighbouring regions in Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa and the scale and scope of the challenge Europe faces becomes apparent. It is, therefore, time that Europe ended its obsession with internal structure and looked outward with true strategic vision. That is Europe’s leadership challenge today, not tomorrow. Indeed, the world will no longer wait for Europe to come to a strategic consensus at its own convenience. Therefore, only a truly comprehensive programme of strategic security engagement across the civil-military spectrum will enable Europe to fulfil the role for which ironically it is uniquely placed. That is the essence of Project European Security.

For the past 500 years, the Europeans, and then the Europeans and the Americans, have dominated much of world history. The 21st century will be diff e rent. The relative economic and diplomatic decline of the West becomes more apparent every year. Take the world’s financial and trading systems. Developing countries now hold three quarters of global foreign exchange reserves (China alone, with about $1.4 trillion, has more than a quarter of the total). ‘Sovereign wealth funds’ – investment vehicles mostly managed by authoritarian states such as China, Russia and Saudi Arabia – control around $2.5 trillion and are starting to invest in well-known western companies. In the Doha round of world trade liberalisation – in contrast to earlier rounds – an EU-US accord is not enough to ensure a deal: Brazil and India have caused much of the deadlock.

The European Union is in the process of developing a common foreign and security policy. This requires three essential ingredients. First, the progressive convergence of the foreign policies of its Member States. Second, the institutional framework required to foster the process of convergence with adequate input and expertise, and to enable effective decision-making.

The European Union is starting work on a new security strategy. France's president, Nicolas Sarkozy, wants it approved in the second half of 2008, during his country's EU presidency. The original 2003 European security strategy (ESS) is generally considered to be a good document, but Sarkozy is right to point out that the world has changed. For example, the 2003 ESS says little about Russia, energy security or climate change - or defence.

A pesar de que la Organización para la Seguridad y la Cooperación en Europa (OSCE) es un organismo de menor perfil que la Unión Europea o la Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte (OTAN), esta organización de carácter regional, que es la mayor del mundo en su género, cuenta con un impresionante corpus de compromisos para con la democracia y los derechos humanos. Se encarga, además, de desarrollar actividades relacionadas con la democracia en muchos de los países que engrosan sus filas y sigue siendo uno de los actores principales en la supervisión de los procesos electorales. Sin embargo, la OSCE empieza a tambalearse. Desde Vladivostock hasta Vancouver, sus miembros no logran ponerse de acuerdo sobre el funcionamiento y el futuro de la organización. En los cuatro últimos Consejos Ministeriales celebrados no se ha alcanzado ningún compromiso.

The European Union will take in two new members on 1 January before it has recovered from the indigestion caused by its biggest-ever enlargement two-and-a-half years ago.

In the present report, the focus is placed on the European Union (EU) and its security policy. It commences with some context-setting, i.e. with clarifying the EU’s place in the global and European security “architecture” and its relations with the United Nations, the OSCE and NATO, fi nding the latter to be more controversial than suggested by offi cial declarations. It then proceeds with the analysis of the EU, fi nding its main contribution to regional security to be related to what the EU is and represents rather than to what it does. An analysis of the latter, i.e. the directly security-related institutions and activities of the EU under the auspices of the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and the ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) is also provided as well as an account of the “neighbourhood” programmes of the EU.

The draft Constitutional Treaty for the EU provides for the new post of European Foreign Minister and the establishment of a new European External Action Service (EEAS), or Foreign Ministry of Europe. With the ‘no’ votes in the French and Dutch referendums in May and June 2005, these proposals may appear to some observers to be pretty much dead in the water. While the politics of European integration are going to get much hotter in the coming two years than at any time since 1992, the problems that caused the European Council to support the creation of new measures will not go away simply because the draft Constitutional Treaty is under threat. This Policy Brief reviews a recent plea from the European Parliament for a stronger voice in the constitutional arrangements for EU foreign and security policy. In the wake of the referendum results in France and the Netherlands, there is a new recognition that European leaders must address the democratic deficit in EU decision-making. This will give the Parliament new leverage to press its case that it should have a greater say in shaping the proposed Constitutional measures affecting the EU’s foreign and security policy. The charged political environment may offer the Parliament the chance to bargain for specific increases in its authority (enhanced scrutiny powers over the new EEAS, the European Defence Agency, and the financing of EU military operations). The parliament is also looking for recognition of its role in EU diplomacy. Whether or not the Parliament succeeds in these bids will depend on its ability to speak with one voice and to actively make this voice heard in national capitals in the coming one to two years.

The security policy of the European Union has combined diplomatic, political, cultural, economic and – in this context also -- military measures to foster international stability. The European Union should continue to develop this integrated approach.

Patrick Cronin, IISS Director of Studies, and Robin O’Neill, Wyndham Place Charlemagne Trust, introduced the series of meetings. Robert Whalley, Chairperson and former Director for Counter Terrorism and Intelligence at the Home Office, asked participants to bear strategies for Europe, the EU and other fora in mind during the analysis of threats and motivations.

An overview of the national sercurity strategies of EU and NATO countries.

Europa consideró durante mucho tiempo que ETA era un problema de España. Durante años –aún después de nuestra plena integración en la Unión– instituciones, políticos y prescriptores de opinión europeos, seguían llamando a ETA “organización independentista vasca”. Nos brindaban su solidaridad; pero nos “juzgaban” cada vez que solicitábamos una extradición o se producía un atentado. Nuestros socios europeos actuaban como si fuéramos una democracia menor de edad. Y nosotros los españoles, tan preocupados por no aceptar la premisa de los terroristas e “internacionalizar el conflicto”, renunciamos a exigir que se europeizara la solución. Cuando volaron las Torres Gemelas de Nueva York, empezaron a prender en el Parlamento Europeo las reivindicaciones de los españoles, que pedíamos acción común. Si las decisiones que se han tomando a partir de esas fechas se hubieran puesto en marcha hace quince o veinte años, hoy ETA sería parte del pasado.

Los atentados del 11-M suscitaron una reacción inmediata por parte de los responsables de las instituciones europeas. Éstas reafirmaron su voluntad de dar una respuesta común y coordinada a una amenaza de seguridad interna ante la cual los Estados por sí solos difícilmente pueden enfrentarse. El nuevo plan de acción de la UE busca reforzar las medidas adoptadas tras el 11-S, que colocan al terrorismo como un asunto prioritario en la agenda interna y externa, y que sólo han sido cumplidas parcialmente. La UE ocupa un lugar relevante y cuenta con los instrumentos necesarios para fijar nuevos criterios en una lucha antiterrorista que se aleje de la mera respuesta militar efectuada hasta ahora por EEUU.

Tras los atentados perpetrados en el corazón londinense, muchas son las preguntas que surgen, sobre todo qué se ha hecho hasta ahora en materia antiterrorista, desde los trágicos sucesos vividos en Madrid en marzo de 2004. Tanto los gobiernos de los Estados miembros como los responsables de órganos europeos vinculados a la lucha contra el terrorismo han expresado con contundencia su determinación en acelerar y promover las acciones concretas orientadas a prevenir y reaccionar inmediatamente frente a ataques terroristas. La coincidencia de los atentados terroristas con la presidencia del Reino Unido de la Unión Europa podría abrir una ventana de oportunidad que permitiera avanzar considerablemente en temas de seguridad. A continuación se describen y analizan brevemente los avances en la lucha contra el terrorismo de la UE realizados desde marzo de 2004 y cuáles son las perspectivas futuras de este ámbito, fundamental para el bienestar de los ciudadanos europeos.

El propósito del presente análisis es dar a conocer una nueva fuerza, la Fuerza de Gendarmería Europea, que sin duda está llamada a convertirse en una valiosa herramienta para llevar a cabo todo tipo de operaciones de gestión de crisis. Veremos en que consiste, como se gestó su creación, cuales son sus formas de actuación y, por último, su enmarque dentro de las estructuras europeas.

This paper examines the array of tools and mechanisms of the EU in the field of conflict prevention, contrasting short-term and long-term instruments whilst looking in particular at the case of sanctions and military preventive deployments. The number, nature and scope of these instruments have significantly evolved over time to take account of the constant developments of the European integration process and notably the increasingly important role of the EU in the area of foreign policy. Nonetheless, the EU still faces the challenge of approaching, in an effective manner, the whole range of conflict prevention and crisis management strategies and of integrating in its overall preventive strategy the new instruments introduced by the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defense Policy.