La inseguridad y la criminalidad crecientes en Afganistán ponen en peligro el progreso en el país. La escasa renta que genera el país significa que la ayuda internacional constituye cerca de un 90% del total del gasto público, y por tanto la forma en que se emplea dicha ayuda tiene enormes repercusiones en la vida de la práctica totalidad de la población y determinará el grado de éxito de las actividades de reconstrucción y desarrollo. Dada la relación entre desarrollo y seguridad, la eficacia de la ayuda tiene también un enorme impacto sobre la paz y la estabilidad del país. Pero hasta la fecha la ayuda ha sido insuficiente, y en muchos casos se ha malgastado o ha resultado poco eficaz. No hay, por tanto, tiempo que perder: los donantes deben tomar medidas urgentes para incrementar y mejorar la ayuda a Afganistán.

I had a significant responsibility for the decision to hand the Afghanistan mission to NATO under a strong UN mandate. I have never for a moment regretted that decision. The task was necessary and urgent and NATO was the only organization in the world which could take it on. All nineteen nations then in NATO and the seven aspirant countries who were also in the room all agreed, unanimously, that the task should be taken on and that it would be a big and challenging operation Every one of them knew that if Afghanistan went back to being a failed state ‘run’ by the likes of the Taliban then the security and safety of all of us would be as vulnerable and as compromised as were the Twin Towers of New York’s World Trade Centre.

Good morning and welcome to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Thank you for coming out for Tony Cordesman’s briefing. He’s just returned from Iraq and Afghanistan and I’ll let him tell you all about that. After all, what would Valentine’s Day be without a briefing from Tony Cordesman on Iraq and Afghanistan. But we are very fortunate to have Tony’s insights. He has been on the ground in some very interesting places over the last couple weeks. And I think you’ll benefit largely from hearing his observations. And with that, my esteemed colleague, Tony Cordesman.

Afghanistan is not lost but the signs are not good. Its growing insurgency reflects a collective failure to tackle the root causes of violence. Six years after the Taliban’s ouster, the international community lacks a common diagnosis of what is needed to stabilise the country as well as a common set of objectives. Long-term improvement of institutions is vital for both state building and counterinsurgency, but without a more strategic approach, the increased attention and resources now directed at quelling the conflict could even prove counterproductive by furthering a tendency to seek quick fixes. Growing tensions over burden sharing risk undermining the very foundations of multilateralism, including NATO’s future. The U.S., which is demanding more commitment by allies, must realise that its unilateral actions weaken the will of others. At the same time, those sniping from the sidelines need to recognise that the Afghan intervention is ultimately about global security and do more.

Urgent changes are required now to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a failing or failed state. Not just the future of the Afghan people is at stake. If Afghanistan fails, the possible strategic consequences will worsen regional instability, do great harm to the fight against Jihadist and religious extremism, and put in grave jeopardy nato’s future as a credible, cohesive and relevant military alliance.

Afghanistan stands today at a crossroads. The progress achieved after six years of international engagement is under serious threat from resurgent violence, weakening international resolve, mounting regional challenges and a growing lack of confidence on the part of the Afghan people about the future direction of their country. The United States and the international community have tried to win the struggle in Afghanistan with too few military forces and insufficient economic aid, and without a clear and consistent comprehensive strategy to fill the power vacuum outside Kabul and to counter the combined challenges of reconstituted Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, a runaway opium economy, and the stark poverty faced by most Afghans.

The international community has a second chance in Afghanistan. The appointment of a new UN special envoy and the upcoming NATO summit in Bucharest offer a chance for the coalition partners to adopt a new strategy and avert disaster. The problems are well known. The rule of Hamid Karzai’s government extends only weakly outside of Kabul. The Taliban insurgency will continue to grow stronger as winter ends. Despite the billions of euros spent, most ordinary Afghans have yet to see the benefits in terms of security, access to justice and delivery of basic services. All these difficulties have been exacerbated by European and American policy disagreements.

Nearly six years after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, efforts to develop civil society are showing tentative signs of progress. Advances are especially evident in the increasing capacity of Afghan non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Kabul. But the effectiveness of civil society in influencing development in the provinces remains low, and rising insecurity in many regions threatens the future prospects of the nascent Afghan civil society.

The few weeks between the visits to Pakistan of Richard Boucher, the US assistant secretary of state who left last week, and Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, who arrives on September 10, could prove crucial in determining the fate of Afghanistan. This is the timeline for secret three-party talks to establish teega (a Pashtu word for a peace deal that resolves a conflict) between the Western coalition forces in Afghanistan (with Pakistan), the Afghan government, and the anti-coalition insurgents of Afghanistan. The first round of talks has already begun in the southwestern Pakistani city of Quetta, Asia Times Online has learned.

Afghanistan is at a crunch point. Put simply, either the 37 countries currently engaged in the reconstruction of Afghanistan through the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) recognise and stand up to the enormity of the challenge (and the opportunity) or the West’s signature mission will fail at the start of the new strategic age. Those are the stakes. In other words, Afghanistan is about so much more than Afghanistan. Today, there are not enough resources, in spite of the $10 billion pledged by donors. And, even at 35,000 strong, there are not enough forces (helicopters or troops). The Afghan people, who have a tradition of backing those most likely to prevail, have lost or are losing faith in the West. It is a set of failing circumstances that must be changed and changed rapidly if the defeatism that is beginning to predominate in the West is not to spread.

As interest in troop level deployments continue, recently, President Bush announced in a February 15, 2007 speech, the administration’s plans for an increase in U.S. forces in Afghanistan, including a planned gradual increase of 3,200 U.S. troops on the ground in the coming several months. The total troop deployment in this region is expected to reach 70,000 by 2008. Varying media estimates of military forces in Afghanistan have raised concerns about the actual number of U.S. troops currently deployed in the NATO and U.S. missions under Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in that country. This report provides official Department of Defense (DOD) statistical information on U.S. forces now serving in Afghanistan with comparisons to earlier force levels. It also provides brief official information on the military units extended or scheduled for the next rotation of duty into Afghanistan. As of March 1, 2007, according to DOD, the United States had 24,845 troops stationed in Afghanistan —21,581 active component and 3,264 National Guard or Reserves. For security reasons, DOD does not routinely report the composition, size, or specific destination of military forces deployed to the Persian Gulf. This report will be updated upon receipt of new DOD data. For additional information on U.S. forces, see CRS Report RL33503, U.S. and Coalition Military Operations in Afghanistan: Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.

From Afghanistan to Sri Lanka, Colombia to Kashmir, Congo to Iraq, the question of how to deal with insurgency is being asked. Finding the answer has so far involved scrutinizing past campaigns from Algeria to Zimbabwe, and especially Malaya and Vietnam.

Taliban fighters have re-emerged in full force in Afghanistan and insurgency-related violence has increased to record levels, resulting in 2,732 fatalities between September 1, 2006, and February 25, 2007. According to the United Nations, the 35,460-strong International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), along with the 8,000 troops deployed under the United States-led coalition command, has begun its own offensive against the insurgency in the south, targeting opium growing regions and Taliban safe zones.

With the September 2005 parliamentary elections; Afghanistan took another important step toward democracy and stability. Over the past foru years; President Hamid Karzai's government has put an end to decades of civil war and offered the Afghan people the possibility of rising from their abject poverty.

In June 2005, a U.S. infantry battalion hunting for Taliban insurgents in the Zabol province of southern Afghanistan came upon the remote village of Badamtoy, where they were warmly greeted. After providing gifts of medicine and toys, the commanding officer asked to speak with the village elder. The elder, when asked about the Taliban, replied that they had not been seen for months.

In the past six months, a number of events have raised the stakes in Afghanistan and further threatened the international effort there. The handover of command from the US-led coalition to NATO means that Afghanistan is now not only the first battleground of the so-called “War on Terror,” but a testing ground for the future of the Atlantic alliance. The Taliban-led insurgency based in Pakistan has shown new capabilities in the south and east, challenging both the US and NATO, while suicide bombings, unknown in Afghanistan before their successful use by the Iraqi insurgents, have sown terror in Kabul and other areas as well.2 A particularly daring attack on a Coalition convoy killed 16 people, including two US soldiers, close to the US embassy in one of the most heavily defended areas of Kabul on September 8.

Since the formation of Afghanistan, its nature as a Pashtun state has affected all its international relations. On the other hand, the fact that it was originally established as a buffer state between Britain and Russia still governs its national integration. In this article I examine Afghanistan’s relations with its neighbors through an investigation of its history and the present conditions of its borders with its southern, western and northern neighbors. My aim is to obtain an overall perspective of Afghanistan’s relations with its neighbors, historically decisive elements, and the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks.

The international community is just months away from decisions that are expected to make Kosovo a state, but planning for the security ramifications has not kept pace. It must avoid creating a weak state; the future Kosovo needs adequate institutions to ensure the rule of law and the inviolability of its borders, and to combat transnational organised crime and terrorism. Elements important for building a sustainable state must not be traded away to achieve recognition of Kosovo’s independence. A key component of post-independence security structures should be an army built in part upon the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), albeit a small one oriented to international missions like peacekeeping and subject in the first years to strict NATO control and limitations on its size and capabilities.

NATO on Monday took over command of international forces from the United States in southern Afghanistan, where the fight against the Taliban insurgency has turned more deadly than at any time since American forces ousted the radical Islamist movement in 2001.

In the aftermath of the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan looked to the international community--and to the United States, in particular--to rebuild an indigenous national police force. More than four years later, however, the Afghan National Police (ANP) remain ill-equipped and ill-disciplined, a glaring blind spot against a revived insurgency. The story of the ANP reveals not only the crucial importance of police assistance in the global War on Terror, but the ways in which the U.S. government, as currently organized, is fundamentally incapable of carrying out this kind of mission effectively.

A large springtime offensive by Taliban fighters has turned into the strongest show of force by the insurgents since U.S. forces drove the Taliban from power in late 2001. Afghan and foreign officials and local villagers blame a lack of U.S.-led coalition forces on the ground for the resurgence.

I want to preface my remarks by saying that Kati and I believe firmly that this commitment is absolutely essential in Afghanistan. We’re in Afghanistan because it is where the 9/11 attacks were planned. And if we lose in Afghanistan – and I’ll get back to what we mean by lose in a minute – if we lose in Afghanistan the Taliban and their close allies, Al Qaeda, will return.

The fledgling National Assembly can play a vital role in stabilising Afghanistan and holding President Karzai’s administration accountable but only if it gives voice to the country’s diverse population and gets major help from international actors. Its oft-delayed inauguration in December 2005 completed formation of the country’s main governing bodies but marked more the beginning of a political transition than its end.

President Bush and President Musharraf have affirmed the long-term, strategic partnership between their two countries. In 2004, the United States acknowledged its aspirations for closer bilateral ties with Pakistan by designating Pakistan as a Major Non-NATO Ally. The U.S.-Pakistan strategic partnership is based on the shared interests of the United States and Pakistan in building stable and sustainable democracy and in promoting peace and security, stability, prosperity, and democracy in South Asia and across the globe.

In 2006, NATO will expand its operation in Afghanistan to the southern sector and the eastern sector of the country, which means that by that the end of the year -certainly by the time the Prague [Riga] summit rolls around -that Afghanistan could be a NATO mission. As a matter of fact, I think Afghanistan will be a NATO mission by that time.

The catalogue of what we have lost for refusing to increase the size of the force to respond to the post-9/11 world is considerable. It has played out in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in the larger war on terror, and is causing structural damage to the force itself.