A career officer in the U.S. Foreign Service, Priscilla Clapp served as U.S. chargé d’affaires and chief of mission in Burma (Myanmar) from June 1999 to August 2002. After retiring from the Foreign Service, she has continued to follow events in Burma closely and wrote a paper for the United States Institute of Peace entitled “Building Democracy in Burma,” published on the Institute’s Web site in July 2007 as Working Paper 2. In this Special Report, the author draws heavily on her Working Paper to establish the historical context for the Saffron Revolution, explain the persistence of military rule in Burma, and speculate on the country’s prospects for political transition to democracy. For more detail, particularly on the task of building the institutions for stable democracy in Burma, see Working Paper 2 at www.usip.org. This project was directed by Eugene Martin, and sponsored by the Institute’s Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention.

Nearly 5 years after the United States invaded Iraq, the tremors from this cataclysmic event are still reverberating in the region and around the world. A new generation of jihadist extremists is gaining experience on the battlefields of Iraq, and what passes for political authority seems increasingly wielded by nonstate groups via the point of a gun. All the surrounding states view developments in Iraq with varying levels of disquiet. Many commentators believe that the invasion has become the most important regional event framing political and military affairs since the 1967 Six-Day War. The war has dramatically altered internal political dynamics throughout the region, placing the regimes and their historically close relations with the United States under new pressures. All these forces are converging to frame a new strategic challenge to the United States and the international community, which has vital economic and political interests in ensuring regional stability and security. The World Economic Forum, for example, recently identified geopolitical instability in the Middle East as a separate and distinct threat to global stability.

In recent years, from within and without, Arab regimes have faced a democratic challenge. Originally, this challenge arose from domestic, reform-minded groups frustrated by the shortcomings of their governments and the failings of Arab rulers over many years. Increasingly, Arab states were falling further behind other countries in areas such as living standards, civic rights, treatment of women, and responsivenessto rapid changes in the world.

How do adversaries manage to sit down and talk about long-standing conflicts while violence and mistrust continue to define their security relations? While official diplomatic communications are the obvious way for adversaries to talk, unofficial policy discourse, or track two diplomacy, is an increasingly important part of the changing international security landscape. Private foundations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), universities, and governments—mostly based in the West—have devoted significant financial and human resources to track two dialogues. What has been the payoff?

At times of peace, Germany’s Middle East policy has historically taken a secondary position—one subordinate to Germany’s primary policy toward Europe and America. While of secondary importance, it was a tool that could be used to manipulate the Middle Eastern Question by playing off Western powers against each other. Berlin’s goal was a peaceful penetration of the Ottoman Empire, and it had no colonial aspirations in the region. During the world wars, however, Berlin elevated its Middle East policy to primary status by instigating jihad in the enemy’s hinterland. Yet in recent years, Berlin has sought out policies on Middle East peace and Islam fitting the European framework.

The following article examines and analyzes the philosophical underpinnings of the Hizb al-Tahrir in Central Asia. It does so to highlight a larger, more important theoretical and policy point: The United States, in its global war against terror, has improperly defined what constitutes a legitimate Islamist threat. As a result, it mislabels many Islamist groups that do constitute a real security threat to the United States and to democratic regimes in general.

This article examines democratization efforts in the Arab world and how governments neutralized, utilized, or adjusted to them. The reactions of Islamists and the liberal movements themselves are also examined. In general, the regimes were able to defeat the demands for reform by using a number of classical techniques and new adaptations.

King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia has warned that the Middle East conflict is likely to have a global impact if it is not resolved.1 Indeed it is precisely the spectre of a global conflagration that has made the Greater Middle East the central battlefront of geopolitical competition. The Greater Middle East and the Arab world are becoming increasingly dependent on non-Arab powers for their defence. This has been exemplified by Iran and Pakistan being treated cordially by the Arab League. Therefore, resolving the Arab-Israeli issue will not necessarily lead to a de-escalation of regional conflicts, many of which have little or nothing to do with the Arab-Israeli conflict.

As the date drew near for the publication of the report by the Iraq Study Group, co-chaired by former Secretary of State James A. Baker III and former Congressman Lee H. Hamilton—there were expressions of concern from various Israeli sources regarding the probable content of The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward—A New Approach. Initial speculation and concern derived from the individuals who made up the team responsible for the report's authorship. The members of the Iraq Study Group consisted largely of individuals who adhered to an approach to the region often called 'conservative realist.' According to this view, it is imperative that the United States 'engage' and dialog with the existing political forces of the region, even if in both words and practice these forces appear to hold to a pronounced hostility to the United States. This view holds that only through such engagement and accommodation can the United States help to maintain stability and goodwill in the region.

Saudi Arabia’s position on the Iraq crisis, and on the various proposals in the American debate about what to do in Iraq, is driven primarily by regional balance of power concerns. The primary Saudi fear, in official circles, is that Iran will use its position of influence in Iraq to consolidate a position of regional dominance in the wake of an American withdrawal. Riyadh therefore has urged the United States not to leave Iraq in its current situation, expressing public (if not particularly enthusiastic) support for the Bush Administration’s “surge” option.While Saudi regional policy can best be apprehended through the lens of classic balance of power politics, Sunni-Shi’i sectarian tensions overlay that policy and, perhaps more importantly, are the lens through which much of the Saudi public sees the regional situation.

Kuwait’s Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM), founded in 1991, is a relatively new political actor in Kuwait. Yet by the standards of regional Islamist movements, it is one of the most experienced in parliamentary and electoral politics. The ICM can claim some real electoral and programmatic successes, but any move beyond marginal or incremental achievements rests largely on its ability to build on the success of an ad hoc and diverse coalition of Islamist, liberal, and populist political forces. In short, if the ICM navigates difficult waters, it may be able to achieve many of its goals while demonstrating the broader potential of an Islamist electoral movement as part of a coalition pressing for liberalizing political reform. Kuwaiti political history suggests strong reasons for skepticism—the opposition has never been able to maintain a united front for long, and the Kuwaiti government has tools at its disposal to disperse, placate, and even exclude dissenters. But the opportunities beckoning the movement and other opposition political forces are stronger than they have ever been.

Since the Republic of Yemen was created in 1990 through the unification of the northern and southern states, the Yemeni regime has very consciously framed its policies in the language of democracy, while simultaneously muzzling initiatives that might help facilitate democratic consolidation. There has been a marked increase in the level of popular political activity, but the country’s power structures have proven resilient to political reform.

On March 3, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad paid his first official visit to Saudi Arabia. Those who anticipated some dramatic outcome were disappointed. Not only were no concrete agreements announced; the summit with King Abdullah did not even produce the kind of anodyne communiqué that normally follows such meetings.

The following two articles were adapted from lectures presented at a GLORIA Center conference entitled "After Lebanon: A New Middle East?," made possible by the generosity of Mr. Joel Sprayregen.

Although the Iraq Study Group (ISG) report has been dubbed "the revenge of the realists," it is unrealistic on two important diplomatic issues. While its recommendation to invite Iran and Syria to play a bigger role inside Iraq has been highly criticized, its questionable linkage of progress in Iraq to progress on resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict has received less attention. The simplistic connection the ISG report makes between building peace in Baghdad and building peace in Jerusalem does not stand up to serious scrutiny.

While Hezbollah militiamen no longer operate at the border fence, the militant Islamic group has planted its yellow flags with green insignia along the border. Southern Lebanon, once Hezbollah's stronghold, is now patrolled by 20,000 United Nations peacekeepers and Lebanese troops under a cease-fire struck Aug. 14 after the 33-day war.

The Middle East can be a region of extraordinary violence... but it is also a region of extraordinary generosity and good will. One story last year particularly impressed me... It seems that last summer, two Israeli brothers were killed in a Hezbollah rocket attack in northern Israel. Their other brother donated their eyes to surgeons - to help others see. One recipient turned out to be an Arab. So even in the turmoil of the Middle East the Old Testament philosophy of “an eye for an eye” can take on a new meaning.

The author seeks to present his analysis of how the United States and other Western states might best address their military cooperation and basing needs within the Middle East, while still respecting and working with an understanding of regional and especially Arab history and concerns. He also provides policy recommendations based upon his analysis.

As they lay siege to one of the last bastions of democracy in Beirut, agents of the Syrian and Iranian governments and their principle cohort, Hezbollah, are assiduously moving forward joint strategic designs that intend to kill as many Americans as possible while smothering much of the region in a darker hue of repression.

The age of U.S. dominance in the Middle East has ended and a new era in the modern history of the region has begun. It will be shaped by new actors and new forces competing for influence, and to master it, Washington will have to rely more on diplomacy than on military might.

The effects of this summer’s Israel-Hizballah war, which began with the killing and abduction of Israeli soldiers, are still being discussed. Militarily, Israel dealt Hizballah a severe blow: the group lost its grip on the Lebanon-Israel border, lost its arsenal of long-range missiles, and suffered serious causalities. Yet, despite displaying vulnerability in the later stages of the war, Hizballah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah quickly recovered from his losses when it became apparent that the group had survived and could continue its resistance.

The recent series of interviews with Syrian President Bashar Asad in Arab and Western media reveals the extent of changes in the Middle East, in general, and Syria, in particular, in the wake of the confrontation between Israel and Hizbullah in the summer of 2006. Before that conflict, Asad hardly ever mentioned “Israeli aggression against Syria that can end in war” or the “state of alert” in the Syrian army, but since then, Asad has repeatedly stressed the readiness of his military forces.

Our search for compatibility and cooperation in U.S. and German/European policies should heed leaders’ declarations that actions in the international arena are driven by both values and interests. The identification of twin motives, however, begs the question of whose values and whose interests propel American and German/European policies toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The following essays refer to both governmental and non-governmental actors, to both regional and third-party players. The purpose of this essay is to augment their findings by highlighting the values and interests that operate at multiple levels. Understanding both differences and similarities as to motive is crucial to the exercise of projecting the likelihood of transatlantic alliance-building on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Since the formation of the contemporary Middle East in the wake of World War I, its political life has been bedevilled by the doctrine of “Arab Nationalism,” which postulates the existence of “a single [Arab] nation bound by the common ties of language, religion and history… behind the facade of a multiplicity of sovereign states.” The territorial expanse of this supposed nation varies according to different exponents of the ideology, ranging from “merely” the Fertile Crescent to the entire territory “from the Zagros Mountains in the east to the Atlantic Ocean in the west, and from the Mediterranean shores and the Anatolian hills in the north to the Indian Ocean, the sources of the Nile, and the Great Desert in the south.”

It took the United States four years after September 11 to develop a useful working definition of the gravest danger to world peace. Last October President Bush finally identified our enemies: "Islamic Radicals... empowered by helpers and enablers... strengthened by front operations who aggressively fund the[m]." Making no distinction between Sunni or Shi'ite radicals, he concluded that defeating "the murderous ideology of the Islamic Radicals," is the "great challenge of our century."

We live at a time of unprecedented promise. Freer and more open economic and political systems of governance are gaining ground, and the evidence is clear that these developments lead to more prosperous and more hopeful lives.

The extension of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict into the Lebanese arena has created a multifaceted crisis in the Middle East, a crisis where the protagonist is unmistakable -- Hezbollah.

In its 2005 White Paper "China's Peaceful Development Road," Beijing proclaims: "The international community should oppose unilateralism, advocate and promote multilateralism, and make the U.N. and its Security Council play a more active role in international affairs."

Melodramatic images of war are now televised all day long. The images out of Israel this week have produced something new for war-soaked living-room audiences. One might call it Katyusha World.

Neither the mainstream media nor Kofi Annan have mentioned it, but Hizballah has attacked UNIFIL observers twice this week. (Hat tip: Larry.) From the UN’s own press releases.

Why has Iran decided to play its Lebanese card now? That is a question asked by Iranian-born journalist Amir Taheri in the July 23 London Sunday Times. Part of the answer, he writes, "lies in Washington's decision last May to reverse its policy towards Iran by offering large concessions on its nuclear programme. Tehran interpreted that as a sign of weakness."

La France est appelée à composer avec une force politique qu’elle voulait voir sortir affaiblie du conflit avec Israël. La guerre du Liban qui a consacré la victoire morale, politique et militaire du Hezbollah, est mal vue par certains régimes arabes qui ont cautionné l’agression israélienne et joué un rôle actif dans la neutralisation de la Ligue arabe durant le conflit.

This report analyzes the current conflict between Israel and two U.S. State Department-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), the Lebanese Shiite Muslim group Hezbollah and the radical Palestinian Hamas organization. On July 12, 2006, what had been a localized conflict between Israel and Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip instantly became a regional conflagration after Hezbollah captured two Israeli soldiers in a surprise attack along the Israeli-Lebanese border. Israel has responded by carrying out air strikes against suspected Hezbollah targets in Lebanon, and Hezbollah has countered with rocket attacks against cities and towns in northern Israel. Fighting on the ground has also started. Meanwhile, Israeli clashes with Hamas and other Palestinian militants have continued unabated in the Gaza Strip.

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has embarked on a mission to the Middle East to reinforce the U.S. position on the recent surge of violence. Secretary Rice was right to announce that pressing for a ceasefire is not necessarily the best way to further the cause of peace—particularly if it rewards Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran, which have done much to instigate the current conflict. Rice should make the case that the United States remains anxious to promote solutions that will bring stability and security to all nations in the region. She must be clear to all sides that there are three unchanging messages from Washington.

We've been pretty comfortable and carefree in the West for some time now. Until 9/11 we had the luxury of ignoring the age-old madness of Arab/Islamic terror, even though the holy warriors were already killing us in Beirut, in the Palestinian territories, on hijacked jetliners, and at the WTC in 1993. Most of us kept ignoring it, and few of us gave much thought to the hell that our friends in Israel have lived with on a daily basis for all these years.

Dr. Walid Phares, a perspicacious expert on modern jihad terrorism, has elucidated the practical, short-term considerations that likely motivated Hizbollah’s aggressive actions across Israel’s internationally recognized northern border with Lebanon (kidnapping of Israeli soldiers; katyusha rocket attacks on Israeli civilian populations), which precipitated the ongoing conflagration.

Before things can turn a corner in the Middle East, we need the diplomatic equivalent of electric-shock therapy. We may need $100 oil to jolt the Europeans and the Chinese. We may need the Russians to be told that they can forget joining the World Trade Organization. And we're going to need something dramatic to reward India, whose response to terrorism last week was exemplary.

In recent years, the weakness of Arab states vis-à-vis non-Arab regional powers and the international community has reached unprecedented levels. Their utter powerlessness in March 2003 to block American efforts to achieve regime change in Iraq and, indeed, the quiet cooperation of Arab Gulf states in that effort starkly highlighted this state of affairs.

La ola democratizadora que se inició en Irak se forjó en la idea de que las sociedades libres no florecen bajo regímenes de miedo. La administración Bush inició su escalada democrática en Oriente Medio sabiendo que la gente se expresa libremente cuando se es libre: eso es la democracia y el pluralismo, a riesgo de resumir demasiado. Además, reforzó las sociedades civiles sojuzgadas realizando inversiones cruciales para el establecimiento de instituciones democráticas.

Since the September 11 attacks, a number of U.S. and European strategists have stepped forward to call for a fundamental paradigm shift in how the United States and Europe engage the broader Middle East—thatwide swath of the globe, predominantly Muslim and overwhelmingly authoritarian,stretching from Morocco to Afghanistan.

The Arab Human Development Report 2004 delves into the constitutional, legal, political, and social flaws and constraints on freedom that impede good governance in the Arab region, and presents a strategic vision for promoting good governance as a means of encouraging different Arab societies to explore and define their own specific paths towards achieving an Arab renaissance.

Managing policy differences on a range of issues emanating from the Middle East poses serious challenges for the United States and its European allies and friends.

Is there an end to bin Ladenism? The wars on terrorism and in Iraq and Afghanistan could become futile endeavors if holy warriors endlessly regenerate themselves, drawing strength and new recruits from an ever-vibrant Muslim jihadist culture.

Quiero también expresar que Naciones Unidas quiere decir, para los españoles, legalidad internacional, quiere decir paz, quiere decir lucha contra el hambre y contra la miseria.

Hace un año Madrid sufrió el peor ataque terrorista de su historia. Con su dolor se rompió la vida en toda España.

Redactores árabes han publicado recientemente artículos críticos exponiendo que la principal motivación del terrorismo es la pobreza o la desesperación. Citan en cambio el papel de los factores culturales y religiosos a la hora de motivar el terrorismo, y particularmente la incitación de los jeques que animan a los jóvenes a perpetrar operaciones de terror.

En un artículo titulado "Adolf Hitler en el proceso de creación de una mentira con éxito", Abú Khawla, activista de derechos humanos y ex presidente de la sección tunecina de Amnistía Internacional, afirma que el islamismo es "una mentira muy exitosa", y no "una fuerza política y social a destacar".

Neoconservatives hope that a democratic Iraq and Afghanistan can usher in a new age of Middle Eastern consensual government that will cool down a century-old cauldron of hatred.