Rearming Europe?: The Road to Hell Is Paved with Good Intentions

The European Union is exceptionally good at two things: prohibiting, thanks to its extensive regulatory framework; and spending money. Yesterday, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, announced a plan to improve European defense by spending 800 billion euros over the next ten years. She justifies this expenditure by citing Europe’s delicate security situation, the need to confront the Russian threat, and the continued support for Ukraine.

 

The announcement has been applauded by all, as our leaders are in the grip of a collective hysteria following Donald Trump’s decision to force a peace agreement over the heads of the Europeans and against what they have been defending until now.

 

But the former German defense minister is mistaken. It is true that Europeans have always been frugal when it comes to their defense, relying on the security guarantees provided by the United States since the end of World War II. It is also true that, enchanted by the siren calls of the so-called “peace dividends” following the collapse of the USSR, Europeans have divested from their defense at an accelerated pace and without exception. For instance, the United Kingdom had 1,200 main battle tanks in 1991, 400 in 2004, and barely 200 in 2022. France had 1,300 in 1991, 406 in 2004, and 221 in 2022. Germany, which had more than 5,000 tanks in 1991, now has only 225. And what happened to tanks also happened to fighter jets and warships.

 

This reality has been one that Europeans have enjoyed without remorse, believing that war was an obsolete phenomenon on our continent—because that was what we wanted to believe, despite all evidence to the contrary.

 

But Europeans are once again mistaken if they think that throwing billions at their defense will improve it. If security were just about money, the United States would not have lost in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Vietnam. Nor would France have lost Algeria, or Spain the Sahara—to name just a few cases where disparities in economic resources between adversaries did not translate into victory for the wealthier side. Money also does not explain Russia’s quagmire in Ukraine or the current European hysteria over a Russia whose GDP barely reaches 10% of Europe’s total.

 

Much depends on what and how that money is spent. For instance, Pedro Sánchez just announced a pay raise for Spanish soldiers as an example of his goodwill to increase the defense budget, as demanded by our EU partners and NATO allies. But he should explain how better remuneration—deserved, no doubt—translates into increased defense capabilities and greater security for all. Defense consists of both personnel and material components. Weapons systems not only need to be purchased but must also be maintained to remain operational, which increases costs over time as they require more servicing. And let’s not forget the research into new systems that will modernize the armed forces in the future.

 

Moreover, personnel must be properly trained, well-equipped, organized, and provided with the necessary combat training to withstand and prevail in the harsh conditions of war. Let’s not forget, as General Sherman said while marching through Georgia, setting everything ablaze: “War is hell.”

 

Furthermore, for an army to emerge victorious in combat, it is not enough to have good soldiers and sufficient, high-quality equipment. Its generals must also know how to employ the forces effectively at the operational level and align their actions with a coherent war strategy. Otherwise, it would be inexplicable how Ukrainian fighters have managed to resist and halt Russia’s invasion of their country.

Finally, there is the matter of war culture and the will to fight—not only among those on the front lines but also among the civilian population at the national level. Military victories are worthless if the population and its leaders are unwilling to prolong a war. I don’t think I need to elaborate on the American experience in Vietnam, well documented through countless films, from Apocalypse Now to Forrest Gump and Full Metal Jacket, to name just three.

 

In summary, defense necessarily goes beyond the armed forces and consists of both material and intangible elements. More importantly, these elements do not simply add up; they multiply. In other words, if one of them approaches zero, everything collapses. To put it simply: without armed men, there is no possible defense; armed men without the will to fight cannot sustain a defense; brave and battle-hardened soldiers led poorly will face assured failure; well-mobilized armies within a flawed national strategy will face certain defeat.

 

This brings us back to this morning’s announcement by the EU’s highest institutional authority. What von der Leyen wants is for Europeans to spend more on the defense industry to achieve the dual goal of better equipping our armies and helping Ukraine fight Russia. Eight hundred billion over ten years means 80 billion per year—a figure lower than what the United States has been offering Zelensky, who, by the way, has always asked for more. And that’s assuming all this new funding would go directly to Ukraine—something that would not resolve Europe’s acute supply shortages or serious capability gaps.

 

The second stated goal—enhancing deterrence by improving real combat capabilities—is laudable but requires deep and extensive explanation, which our leaders do not seem capable of providing. Perhaps because they do not understand it themselves. Historically, European defense has been thought of as a combination of two elements: conventional forces and nuclear deterrence. For a simple reason. As we have seen in practice in Ukraine, conventional deterrence is unreliable and tends to fail, whereas nuclear deterrence, despite its inherent ambiguity, forces much greater caution in any action or decision that might escalate a conflict. We have also seen this in Ukraine, where NATO’s self-deterrence has outweighed the logic of allowing Ukrainians to strike Russian soil with our weapons.

 

How does von der Leyen plan to strengthen conventional deterrence to make it sufficiently credible in the eyes of a potential aggressor—namely, Putin’s Russia? In a recent war game, Russian forces advanced towards Kaliningrad through Lithuanian territory without the deployed German forces daring to confront them and without NATO or the EU reacting in time to prevent their march. I won’t detail the strategic and political consequences of such a fiasco here, but they were dramatic.

 

It is no surprise that some capitals are reconsidering remaining non-nuclear powers, given the weakness of conventional deterrence. Ukrainians remind us that in 1994, they returned thousands of nuclear warheads to Russia in exchange for Western security guarantees—guarantees that, had they known how weak they would be, they would have been better off keeping their nuclear arsenal.

If Europe were serious about deterrence, it should start with the most straightforward and cost-effective measure: nuclear weapons. After all, we have two countries with nuclear arsenals.

 

But in reality, von der Leyen is not proposing to improve defense—only the defense industry. That is why the arms conglomerate and its surrounding interests have applauded today’s announcement so enthusiastically. Yet, Europeans currently purchase more than 65% of their military equipment from the United States, from fighter jets like the F-35 to submarine combat systems like those on Spain’s S-80. Does the EU want to “Europeanize” defense acquisitions? Would 80 billion per year be enough? And how long would it take?

 

Given the frenzied pace set by the new Trump administration, this is a challenge for tomorrow, not ten years from now. Ukraine, too, seems unlikely to last that long without U.S. support.

 

Von der Leyen is doing what the EU has always done—sacrificing today’s security and well-being for an allegedly better future, which seems all the more idyllic the further away it is.

For all their good intentions, Europeanists, now neo-Gaullists, and those who feel abandoned by America should remember the wise saying that gives this article its title: The road to hell is paved with good intentions.