Improving transatlantic relations
por GEES, 17 de noviembre de 2003
The essential problem of transatlantic relations is that us Europeans wish to share leadership with the Americans, but we are reluctant to take the costs this sharing-up would involve us in, whereas the Americans are delighted to share the costs, but not the lead. Therefore, re-establishing relations requires a new view, commitment and effort from both shores of the Atlantic, and not just from one.
It is a cliché, but true all the same: there are far more things that unite Europe and the States than divide them. We can tell for sure that we are bound by the most permanent and essential ties, being the most interim and secondary what separate us. To begin with, we are linked by common values based on democracy, freedom and respect for human rights. History, Geography and Culture also unite us. And finally, our common interests in the fields of economy, security and international relations.
What divides us? A commercial and often badly channelled rivalry, an increasing technological rivalry and the split between the Europeans ourselves.
In the field of security -my field- , I believe that we agree on the diagnosis of problems, but differ to a great extent in the way we solve them. Thus, Europeans and North Americans, both governments and people, share an idea of threats that places terrorism and the proliferation of mass destruction weapons among the major security risks. Moreover, if we descend to the specific origin of these threats, we find that Muslim fundamentalism in the Arabic countries, the conflict between Palestine and Israel, Iran and even Northern Korea, are deemed the main risks
There is a double difference on the strategy to face these problems. On the one hand, there is an underlying discrepancy on the means to be used. Thus, the United States are in favour of using force to neutralize these threats, whereas Europe opt for the so-called soft power. On the other, Americans tend to prefer unilateralism where Europeans are more inclined to multilateralism in any case.
The difference on the role of the military in the world of today is an unquestionable fact. According to the last study on Transatlantic Trends by the German Marshall Fund, 84% of the North Americans share the idea that war is necessary to do justice under certain circumstances, as against 48% of Europeans. In Spains case the situation is more dramatic. A tight majority of Spaniards consider the use of the military force to be legitimate only in the event of a genocide, unlike the case of illegal possession of mass destruction weapons. Only 8% believes that it is legitimate to resort to military force to restore democracy[1].
What are the reasons for this difference on the conception of military power?. Some explain it on the grounds of Europes traumatic war history during the 21st century; others think it is due to the lack of European military power, which conditions its own perception on the use thereof; others consider that Europe has entered post modernity, whilst the United States stick to modernity. The reason may lie in a combination of the aforementioned, but the fact is that such conception of military power separates public opinions even further, as reflected in the positions of the respective governments.
The second big difference does not solely consist in public opinion, but in political conception. Thus, Bush administration has developed a national security strategy that stresses unilateral action when domestic security interests are in jeopardy. This does not mean that multilateral aid is not sought to undertake certain actions, but makes it clear that under no circumstances shall the unfeasibility of a multilateral action impede multilateral action if required on security grounds.
On the contrary, North American public opinion is more multilateral than its Administration, although it is also more understanding towards unilateral action than Europes public opinion in the event of a direct security threat. According to the GMF study, most North Americans deem it justified to ignore the UN if the essential interests of our country are endangered, whereas only a minority of Europeans (40%) share this opinion. In Spain, only 15% of our citizens consider it legitimate that a threatened country attacks other country unless it is backed by international organizations. The problem is that governments of both sides of the Atlantic have deepened that gap with their policies, instead of trying to make it shallower.
The third divergence is the view of the new world order. This is where we encounter two problems. On the one hand, us Europeans do not accept reality: neither European public opinion nor some of the Governments of the main European countries; neither will the citizens and Governments of these countries resign to a reality where the United States is the only surviving world superpower after the Cold War, and where Europe, because of its internal split and strategic weakness, is a relatively unimportant actor in the world context. Moreover, many Europeans feel threatened by the North American hegemony in economic and strategic terms.
There is a division between North American politics and public opinion. Thus, Bush Administration seems to have overcome the isolationist temptation and, after the events of September 11, deems it essential to exercise an increasing military interventionism and global democratic leadership. On the other hand, a part of society is reluctant to take the political, financial and military costs this charitable imperialism would involve us in. As a result of this, the vast majority of North Americans would like Europe to play a more international leading role, and to become a superpower, even though this would imply occasional confrontations with North American policies.
Therefore, the problem is that Bush Administration would be delighted if Europe would share the costs of leadership with the United States, but holds an excessively high-handed and unyielding attitude towards differences. Quite the opposite, European administrations would like to undertake an increasing leadership, but seem neither capable nor willing to accept the costs of this joint leadership.
Consequently, Europe feels discriminated against, and the United States disappointed. The weakness of Europe makes us feel more saddened by the crisis, more resentful and more threatened by the United States than the North Americans themselves, who even expect a greater leading role and commitment from Europe.
As stated above, an added problem in Europe is that neither policies nor public opinions are homogeneous. Moreover, the transatlantic crisis is specially reflected in the European crisis. The same political differences existing in the governments of both sides of the Atlantic can be found in Europe between the Administrations of Spain and the United Kingdom, or between France and Germany. The same differences existing among transatlantic public opinions are present among European public opinions.
The conclusion is, firstly, that only strong transatlantic ties will enable a united Europe, and only a united Europe will enable strong transatlantic ties. Historically, the European Union was built under the political protection and the security umbrella provided by the United States. The eastward enlargement and the emergency of mass destruction weapons and terrorist threats make that protection and security more vitally important than ever.
Secondly, the United States need Europe to confront the challenges the whole of democratic countries are tackling. It is not just a question of costs and capabilities -it is as well- but mainly of lonesomeness, of having someone to share risks with, to enjoy good times and to endure bad times too. It is a question of being confident about the fact that it is more difficult to make mistakes together than on our own. Of avoiding the dangerous perception that just one country rules the world, possesses power, right and legitimacy.
This requires a great effort on both parts and from each European partner in particular. As far as the United States are concerned, they need to regain their role as promoter of the grouping of Europe, overcoming the temptation to divide it to weaken their rivals. In this respect, the States will have to increase their capabilities for psychological diplomacy, so Europeans are able to get over their childish fears, their adolescent complexes, and their infirmities of old age. The United States have to regard Europe as a relevant counterpart. It is not just a question of taking European opinions into account, but of adopting the perception that our opinions are considered in decision-taking. However, the most counterproductive measure for the future of transatlantic relations would be rewarding -in the interests of consensus- those administrations that -irresponsibly and contrary to the criterion of the majority- have put the cohesion and feasibility of that relation in jeopardy. The United States should understand that the potential differences in interests must not endanger the strength of the community of values, and that Europes attitude can not be focused on subordination but on cooperation. And finally, they have to understand that certain strategic self-government on the part of Europe may be positive for their interests in crisis, the way it happens with Iran.
On the part of European partners, it is essential to define which role wed like our continent to play in the new world order. Europe must aim to recover its weight in the international scene, and to become a more relevant partner in transatlantic relations. We would be making a serious mistake if we shaped Europe as a counter-power of the United States by siding with other neighbouring powers. Nevertheless, besides getting a joint and clear idea of Europes part in the world, we have to be willing to assume the costs of aspiring to co-leadership with the United States. In that respect, Europe will never be an outstanding strategic partner nor capable of exerting any influence on international relations unless it balances economic-political potential and military capabilities. Besides, Europeans need to understand that the seriousness of current threats require greater firmness, resolution and strength than presently displayed by our opulent society.
All these efforts should be directed towards the re-foundation of a geographically and strategically extended Atlantic Alliance, which allows us to face together the main challenge of the 21st century: the survival of freedom.