(Presentation held at the NATO Advanced Research Workshop

 “Intelligence Corporation and Exchange”

Vilémov Castle, Czech Republic. May 7-10, 2004)

 

The dreadful terrorist attacks of March 11th in Madrid underlined two realities.  Firstly, that terrorism poses the most severe threat on security and freedom in all democratic countries.  Secondly, that it is critical to increase our capacities of intelligence in order to prevent massacres such as the ones experienced in the U.S., Madrid and many other cities of the world from happening in the future.  

 

These two points lead to the conclusion that a more intense information exchange with our allies should have taken place.  In addition, we should have managed the available data among the different domestic intelligence services (In Spain the National Police, Guardia Civil and Intelligence National Center)  in a more efficient manner.  And this information exchange should have resulted in a more appropriate, preventive analysis.

 

At present each and one of the Allies agree that intelligence is the best weapon on hand to face terror. The asymmetric nature of terrorism makes it impossible for technological and military superiority to defeat terror by itself.  The transnational nature of most terrorist groups, along with the concealment with which some States support terrorist activities make conventional deterrence not to be suitable when it comes to fighting the terrorist threat.  The aim of intelligence services is to succeed in identifying and localizing the terrorist diffuse and invisible threat.  Intelligence must be the light that enables us to spot the silhouette of terrorism, which is a previous and decisive condition defeat the enemy.

 

In order to strengthen our intelligence capacities, two critical aspects must be looked into: Firstly the establishment of a Joint Intelligence Architecture in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. Secondly, the enhancement of the intelligence services and communities within each and one of the Allied States.

 

In the European context, an Intelligence Cell under the authority of the EU High Commissioner for Common Foreign and Security Policy has been set up recently.  Similarly, the exchange of intelligence is being promoted among NATO countries.   However, it is critical to advance towards a more integrated and efficient system of information exchange and joint intelligence analysis.  Such model ought to be opened to other democracies and to those countries legally committed to fighting terrorism.

 

NATO's Joint Intelligence System 

 

The current dilemma is how to organize such Joint Intelligence System in a proper manner.  In this regard, there are two alternative models.

 

The first model would be a system of bilateral collaboration with the U.S. as the epicenter. This system has basically two advantages. Namely, the information exchange between services is always based on a trust wholly relationship. The top priority of every intelligence service is the protection of sources, operations and information.  Thus, only on the grounds of a trust wholly relationship between countries, services and persons it is realistic to envision the possibility of exchanging sensitive, relevant information.  It could be said that multilateralism represents a difficulty the larger the greater the number of countries that participate in the system.

 

Conversely, the U.S. prefers the bilateral to the multilateral approach in every area of international collaboration, especially as security is concerned.  On top of the practical aspects that have already been highlighted, the U.S. has the strategic plan to build up a network of bilateral relationships based in Washington.  As a result, such system would contribute to increasing the unipolarity of the world order.

 

However, bipolarity also entail some important disadvantages the most important of which being that the system would depend in excess on the changing political will of the allies.  In consequence, the global efficiency of the system could be endangered by an Administration change or even eventual disagreements of a particular intelligence service.  Moreover, ultimately such model would centralize all the information in a single country.  And this point could raise concerns among some of the rest of the allies.

 

We suggest for the allies to move from a strictly bilateral and pure informal system towards a model increasingly allied and permanent.  Such a system could only be created within NATO, as the Atlantic Alliance is the only multinational organization that clearly defines the fundamental democratic principles of the fight against terrorism.  NATO is also the institution that accounts for the most political and strategic confidence among its members and is the most experienced organization in terms of military cooperation and joint information management.

 

The Joint Intelligence System that we suggest ought to be based on four fundamental pillars, namely:

 

·         The joint acquisition of technical intelligence systems such as satellites, tracking systems, communication interception systems, and platforms.  The utilization of the common system should be carried out by the Alliance itself and the information obtained used by all the allies.  In this regard, it would be critical to implement joint programs for the innovation, investigation and development of new intelligence capacities within the NATO framework.

 

·         Secondly, the system should come up with an information exchange system, which encompasses security, reliability and efficiency.  The definition development and management of this system ought to be carried out by NATO.  The information system would be fed with information coming from the existing national intelligence systems; and all national services would be entitled to have an access to the information archived in the same.  Thus, the system would need to come up with a common process to obtain specific information among the national intelligence systems.

 

·         A third element is the establishment of a cell for the joint analysis of information.  Such cell would allow the common evaluation of threats. In addition, it would foster the development of a Joint Allied Strategy in order to face both current and upcoming risks and threats.  It would base its evaluations both on the existing shared information in the system and the analysis carried out by the national services.

 

·         Finally, the last component of the system would be the possibility of developing some operating mechanism that enhanced and promoted the implementation of joint operations by the different national services in the future.

 

All these components would enable the set up of an Allied Intelligence Architecture that would provide the information exchange among allies with a greater deal of stability and continuity.  Moreover, it would create reliable and safe instruments for the cooperation among the allies regarding intelligence.  In addition, it would contribute to reaching strategic consensus in evaluating threats and it would incorporate the potential to undertake future intelligence operations in third countries.

 

 

Nevertheless, NATO’s Joint Intelligence System would not suffice to face the new threats that our security is challenged with.  The cooperation with third countries and especially with Arab and Muslim States is critical to intelligence when it comes to fight the terrorist threat.  On top of this, it is to be highlighted that the cooperation with Israel and Russia is especially important.

 

It is in this context that a new dilemma arises, that is: instituting bilateral cooperation between the allies and third countries versus creating some kind of multilateral cooperation.

 

Bilateral approach might result in redundancy when approaching third countries. Furthermore, a relationship that included the entire Atlantic Alliance could have a more significant strategic potential.  However, as of today including these countries in a multilateral system could be very difficult.  Only in the case of Israel, perhaps Russia,  it could be considered to incorporate the country into the Atlantic Intelligence Community with a special status.

 

Anyway, I would like to stress again that our chances to gain an access to the Islamic Terrorist network depend to a larger extent on our ability to develop effective intelligence cooperation with the moderate Arab and Muslim regimes.  We must undertake any joint action in our hand to build up a greater deal of confidence with such countries and ensure a more intense bilateral cooperation.

 

 

The second element that is vital to develop is the enhancement of the National Intelligence Services. In order to manage this enhancement it is imperative to increase the resources earmarked for this function in the first place.  In the Spanish case, this priority was clear in the National Budget for year 2004. The budget for the National Intelligence Center increased over 17 per cent, yet it continues to be limited to the very modest amount of 162 million Euros.

 

Separately, the latest terrorist attacks have underlined the importance of the so-called human intelligence.  Technological intelligence –increasingly sophisticated and powerful— is necessary yet not enough.  In other words, it is necessary but is unable to substitute the traditional intelligence based on human sources. As it has been pointed out, the success in fighting terrorism goes hand in hand with the possibility of infiltrating in the terrorist networks, even if such mission would involve a great deal of difficulty and risk.

 

Secondly it is vital to improve the coordination between the different information services that operate in every country, aiming at achieving a better integration of the information gathered by them all.

 

Recently Spain made an important step forward by establishing the Committee for Intelligence Affairs.  This organization brings together the ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior and Defense under the presidency of the First Vice President of the Government.  However, the technical levels of cooperation as well as its regulations remain to be defined.  This political organization will be lacking efficiency if the instruments for cooperation at operational and technical levels are not developed as appropriate. 

 

 

Terrorism is at present the number one threat to freedom and security for all democratic countries.  In order to defeat such threat three fundamental requirements need to be met; namely: an unbreakable victory will of our societies, the intelligence capacity to clearly identify the enemy and the strength to defeat it.

 

In order to develop the intelligence capacities needed to defeat terrorism we need to enhance our national services and establish an Intelligence Community that is more integrated in each and one of our countries.  But, it is also imperative to establish a Joint Intelligence System within the Atlantic Alliance.

 

The establishment of the Atlantic Alliance Intelligence Community will encounter two major difficulties: On the one hand, the national services will be reluctant to cooperate multilaterally; on the other hand, the interest of the U.S. in maintaining its global leadership regarding intelligence.

 

Conversely, a safe and cooperation-flexible system in the framework of NATO has the advantage that it allows to consolidate such cooperation while safeguarding it from eventual conflicts of interest among its members.  It would also allow the creation of reliable and efficient tools to foster and develop cooperation.  And cooperation is critical as it contributes to the larger impact of the technical intelligence mechanisms that we could be providing ourselves with.   In addition, a Joint Intelligence Capacity for evaluation would promote the strategic consensus within the Alliance.

 

In summary, the advantages of developing an Atlantic Intelligence Community seem more relevant than the difficulties and inconveniences.  The ultimate challenge posed by terrorism must leave limited margin to our narrow national interest.  The defeat or the victory of freedom in this war on terror will depend to a large extent on the will and capacities of democracies to create a common front to face such a radical threat.